Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV28057, Date: 2023-02-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28057 Hearing Date: February 3, 2023 Dept: 68
Diana Dolores Diaz vs. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Case No. 22STCV28057
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Diana Dolores Diaz
MOTION: Demurrer to Complaint with Motion to Strike
The parties are largely battling over the question of the detail that must be pleaded in the Lemon Law case as there are a number of nuances which, if pleaded, may cause the underlying transaction to not be subject to some or all of the claims asserted. In a nutshell, Plaintiff contends that its pleading is adequate as, in some cases, it provides a conclusory legal allegation that mimics the statutory terminology.
Defendant contends that the conclusory allegations must be pleaded factually so that the facts pleaded show that the claims are valid.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a Lemon Law case stemming from Plaintiff’s purchase (lease) of a 2020 Mercedes. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges five causes of action for (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under Song-Beverly Warranty Act; (2) Breach of Express Warranty Obligations under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act; (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Warranty Act Section 1793.2; (4) Breach of Implied Warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; and (5) Breach of Express Warranty of Merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
Defendant filed its Demurrer with Motion to Strike on October 17, 2022. Defendant demurs to all five causes of action on the basis that they are vague and ambiguous. Plaintiff filed her opposition on January 23, 2023. Defendant filed its reply on January 27, 2023.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Demurrer
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
1. First, Second, and Third Causes of Action
Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Third Causes of Action related to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Warranty Act claims on the basis that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to maintain the causes of action.
Statutory claims are subject to heightened pleading above and beyond mere fact pleading. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790 [“[S]tatutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity…”].) Moreover, a complaint that does not allege the material facts in dispute “with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to surmise” is subject to a demurrer for uncertainty under section §430.10(f). (See Ankey v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 531, 537; see also Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (1927) 7 Cal.3d 150, 157 [noting that a pleading must “set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action.”].) In particular, the time of occurrence of material facts must be alleged with certainty, especially where the date itself is material. (Williamson v. Joyce (1902) 137 Cal. 151.)
While Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “the subject Vehicle was/is defined as a “new motor vehicle” (Comp., ¶ 8), the Complaint fails to allege the facts that allow Plaintiff to make that claim. The allegation is really nothing more than a legal conclusion. This infirmity, claims Defendant, makes the Complaint uncertain with regard to the specific circumstances of Plaintiff’s purchase. As such, Plaintiff’s complaint is vague and ambiguous as to whether the Song-Beverly Act would apply.
The Court recognizes that the recent Rodriquez decision drew a line that may cause some transactions to not be covered by the law as Plaintiff’s contend prior law provided. And the Court recognizes that the issue remains subject to some debate. But there is no virtue or justification for skirting the legal distinctions and artfully pleading so as to merely obfuscate the material facts underlying Plaintiff’s claim. If the details of the underlying sale/lease impact the validity of the claim, this Complaint is uncertain when it fails to include the material facts. It is necessary for Plaintiff to plead in greater detail the status of the vehicle at the time of Plaintiff’s purchase. Plaintiff’s Complaint is also vague and ambiguous as to the specific terms of the alleged warranty, beyond some references to a few of its more general terms. (Comp., ¶ 14.)
Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s first three causes of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
2. Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action
Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action related to Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to maintain the causes of action.
Here, these causes of action also require that Plaintiff plead in greater detail the status of the vehicle at the time of Plaintiff’s purchase and the more specific terms of the alleged warranty.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
B. Motion to Strike
Defendant requests that the following language be stricken from the Complaint:
Paragraphs 20, 28, 41, 42, 55, 56, 66 and the Prayer for Relief insofar as it relates to the third cause of action, on the basis that the applicable law does not allow for recovery of “the entire purchase price” or diminution in value, plus civil penalties, for violations of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b). (Code Civ. Proc., § 436 (a) and (b).)
(Motion to Strike, pp. 1-2.)
While the notice of motion for Defendant’s Motion to Strike refers to the third cause of action, the memorandum refers to the second cause of action. (Motion to Strike, p. 4.) Plaintiff’s opposition points this out (Opposition, p. 4), but Defendant fails to clarify in its reply, instead referring to both the second and third causes of action. (Reply, p. 1.)
The Court shall not rule on the Motion to Strike as it is moot in light of the ruling on the demurrer. The Motion to Strike is Off Calendar.