Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV28553, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28553 Hearing Date: December 12, 2022 Dept: 68
Taquan Gullet v. State of California, et al., Case No. 22STCV28553
Before this Court are the Demurrers of Defendant George Gascon, District Attorney and Defendants Sherri R. Carter, Court Executive Officer and Clerk, and Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
Much is written. Little is communicated. The Court is presented with a 202 page Amended Complaint
The most recent Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff purportedly “alleges” several causes of action related to the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license. The exact “causes of action” and which parties they are directed against are difficult to discern.
This action was initiated on September 1, 2022. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on September 6, 2022. That document is the subject of the demurrers of Defendant George Gascon, District Attorney and Defendants Sherri R. Carter, Court Executive Officer and Clerk, and Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. The 202 page document titled “Amended Complaint, etc.” is incomprehensible.
It appears that this 202 page document is based on Plaintiff having his license suspended. On June 13, 2022 Plaintiff Gullett was given a Notice to Appear #14170 with a Suspension/Revocation Order and Temporary Driver License. (Complaint ¶ 18.). He challenges that Order. (Complaint ¶ 20.) He has sought a hearing in the DMV on that matter, but it has yet to be set.
It is not entirely clear what Plaintiff believes he is asserting as a legal claim in this civil suit. However, the demurrers have attempted to decipher and liberally construe the possible claims that are lurking in the Amended Complaint. The Court similarly is liberally construing the allegations in the Amended Complaint.
The two demurrers raise many of the same arguments. Defendants demurs on the basis that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in the FAC. Defendant Gascon demurs on the grounds that the FAC is barred against him based on prosecutorial immunity. Defendant Carter and the Los Angeles Superior Court demur on the grounds that the FAC is barred against these Defendants based on absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. Both Defendants demur to the causes of action contained in the FAC on the basis that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Finally, Defendants demurs on the basis that the FAC is fatally uncertain.
The Plaintiff appears to want this Court to somehow intervene in the DMV administrative process and/or inject itself into some criminal process.
All grounds stated in the 2 demurrers are valid.
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Defendant demurs to the First Amended Complaint on the basis that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in the FAC.
The court must sustain a demurrer where the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(a).) “‘The principle of ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ [Citation.] Thus, in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power ‘to hear or determine [the] case.’” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 324.) Code of Civil Procedure section 43 states that it is only the Courts of Appeal and the California Supreme Court which may reverse, modify, or affirm a Superior Court judgment or order.
In Alvarez v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111, the court stated:
[A]s a general rule one trial judge cannot reconsider and overrule an order of another trial judge. There are important public policy reasons behind this rule. ‘For one superior court judge, no matter how well intended, even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge appellate court.’ The rule also discourages forum shopping, conserves judicial resources, prevents one judge from interfering with a case ongoing before another judge and prevents a second judge from ignoring or arbitrarily rejecting the order of a previous judge[.]
Plaintiff is either asking the Court to overturn criminal charges, though from the FAC it is unclear whether any have been filed, or, in the alternative, dismiss the charges against Plaintiff prior to the Administrative hearing at the DMV. This Court does not have jurisdiction to do so prior to a final administrative decision. (CCP § 1094.5.)
The allegations, very liberally construed, fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Nor does it appear that anything can cure the deficient claims such that leave to amend should be granted.
The entire pleading is uncertain. It is unintelligible. It is a rambling mass of disjointed and disparate text which fails to communicate any basis for the semblance of a legal claim
Accordingly, Defendants Demurrers to Plaintiff’s FAC are sustained on all the grounds stated without leave to amend.