Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV36167, Date: 2023-10-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV36167 Hearing Date: October 12, 2023 Dept: 68
BACKGROUND: This is a child sexual assault case.
TIMELINE:
|
1972 |
Acts of
sexual assault occurred at Wadsworth Avenue Elementary School by DOE #2, a
teacher and since identified as William Alexander. |
|
11/15/22 |
Plaintiff
filed the complaint. |
|
3/1/23 |
Plaintiff
amended the complaint. |
|
4/24/23 |
LAUSD
answered the complaint. |
|
9/13/23 |
LAUSD moves
for judgment on the pleadings. |
MOVING PARTY argues: Plaintiff does not and cannot state facts
sufficient to comprise causes of action because the California legislature’s
elimination of the requirement that Plaintiff present a pre-litigation
government tort claim in connection with her claims based on childhood sexual
assault arising from conduct occurring prior to 2009 is an unauthorized
creation of government liability. It is also unconstitutional under Article
XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution, which prohibits appropriations
of public funds to compensate plaintiffs for un-enforceable claims having no public
purpose.
RESPONDING PARTY argues: LAUSD ignores Coats
v. New Haven Unified School (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, which holds that
Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is constitutional and that victims of
childhood sexual abuse need not present government tort claims. No case has
held that the revival of a stale or lapsed claim equates to an appropriation of
public funds.
IN REPLY, MOVING PARTY argues: Coats
v. New Haven Unified School (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415 did not involve,
address, or make any finding at all regarding the prohibition against gifts of
public funds and dealt solely with conduct that occurred after 2009, thus not implicating
the challenged retroactive elimination of California Tort Claims Act
requirements for pre-2009 conduct.
LEGAL STANDARD: A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional
equivalent to a general demurrer. (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic
Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Like demurrers,
motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the
allegations, not their veracity. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: The
Court DENIES Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice of 1) Child Abuse and
Neglect Reporting Requirements from the LAUSD website, 2) Child Abuse Awareness
Training Printout from the LAUSD website.
MEET AND CONFER: The
motion for judgment on the pleadings is not accompanied by the declaration
of¿defense counsel and thus does not satisfy the meet and confer requirements.
(Code Civ. Pro., § 439, subd. (a).) Nevertheless, as this is not a basis to
deny the motion, the Court will address the merits.
DISCUSSION: Plaintiff sues LAUSD for (1) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention
of Unfit Employee; (2) Failure to Report Suspect Child Abuse; and (3) Negligent
Supervision of Minor.
The crux of LAUSD’s motion is that the California
legislature, without authorization, eliminated the requirement that Plaintiff
present a pre-litigation government tort claim in connection with her claims
based on childhood sexual assault arising from conduct occurring prior to 2009 and
without authorization, created government liability. LAUSD asserts that the
legislature lacks power to create liability against the state for any past act
of negligence when there was no enforceable claim against the public entity at
the time of the past act, citing Chapman v. State (1893) 104 Cal. 690,
693 and Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 518.
Here, however,
the legislature does not create any liability against LAUSD where none existed based
on the theories of Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention and Negligent
Supervision of Minor. Government Code section 815.2, which states that public
entities are vicariously liable for the injuries proximately caused by an act
or omission of their employees, was enacted in 1963 and became effective in
1964. Plaintiff’s injuries allegedly occurred in 1972.
However, the
same is not true with regard to the claim under the Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act. The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act mandated that LAUSD’s
agents and employees report child abuse and neglect starting in 1987 at the
earliest. (Pen. Code, § 1165.7.)
Because LAUSD’s constitutionality argument is
based on the enforceability of the three causes of action, which has been
discussed above, the constitutionality argument is moot.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the Court grants LAUSD’s motion for Failure
to Report Suspect Child Abuse cause of action and denies it for the other two
causes of action. The Court does not grant leave to amend. (Gami v.
Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 870, 876.)