Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 23STCV13765, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13765    Hearing Date: October 26, 2023    Dept: 68

Garrett Matsunaga vs. General Motors, LLC; 23STCV13765

MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC

RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Garrett Matsunaga

Demurrer to Complaint with Motion to Strike

I. BACKGROUND

            This is a lemon law case in which Plaintiff Garret Matsunaga (Plaintiff) is alleging that there are several defects with his 2018 Chevrolet Bolt EV (the subject vehicle) that Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) has been unable to remedy. Plaintiff is also alleging that Defendant made misrepresentations to Plaintiff regarding the features of the vehicle and duration of the vehicle’s charge.

            Plaintiff leased the subject vehicle on July 6, 2018. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities. (Comp., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff did not file his complaint until June 14, 2023. Defendant filed its demurrer to Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Third Causes of Action on September 6, 2023. These are Plaintiff’s causes of action related to fraud and misrepresentations allegedly made by Defendant. Defendant demurs on the basis that these causes of action are barred by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud and because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to maintain the causes of action. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s demurrer.

            Defendant has also moved to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

[The Court observes that since this demurrer implicates only non-Song-Beverly claims, Plaintiff’s counsel should make appropriate notations in counsel’s time sheets or other billing records noting that time devoted to addressing these non-Song Beverly claims is likely to not be entitled to recovery of attorney fees under Song-Beverly.  The Court is not making any determination on this issue at this time, but instead is indicating that Plaintiff’s counsel’s time records must reflect the time devoted to this separate matter so that should it become relevant the records allow appropriate analysis.]

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Demurrer

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

1.    Statute of Limitations

Defendant demurs to the First, Second, and Third Causes of action on the basis that they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The statute of limitations for fraud claims is three years. (CCP § 338(d).) The delayed-discovery rule tolls the applicable statute of limitations only if a plaintiff is unable to discover his or her cause of action with reasonable diligence, and to rely upon it, the plaintiff must plead “facts showing that [he] was not negligent in failing to make the discovery sooner and that [he] had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.” (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 437; Johnson v. Ehrgott (1934) 1 Cal.2d 136, 137.)

Plaintiff leased the subject vehicle on July 6, 2018. His complaint alleges that the “vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects.” (Comp., ¶ 10.) This suggests that Plaintiff knew of the defects at the time the vehicle was delivered to him and could not argue delayed-discovery. He did not file this complaint until June 14, 2023, almost five years after he leased the vehicle and almost two years after the three-year statute of limitations would have run.

As Defendant points out in its reply, Plaintiff does not address the statute of limitations argument at all in his opposition. Other than the statement in his complaint that the vehicle was delivered with serious defects, there is no other indication of when Plaintiff discovered the problems with the vehicle. Plaintiff’s complaint lists numerous recalls and warnings that were issued by Defendant regarding the subject vehicle, but does not indicate if he discovered the defects because of these recalls.

Because the complaint as currently pled shows that the statute of limitations has run on the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, Defendant’s demurrer to these causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.

2.    First Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment and Misrepresentation, Second Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation, and Third Cause of Action for violation of the Business & Professions Code § 17200

Defendant also demurs to these three causes of action on the basis that they fail to state facts sufficient to establish fraud. The Court already sustained the demurrer to these causes of action on the statute of limitations basis, but the Court will also address the sufficiency of the complaint for these causes of action.

California law requires that every element of a fraud cause of action “must be alleged in the proper manner [,] and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom and by what means the representations were tendered.’” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, quoting Hills Trans. Co. v. Southwest (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.

For each of the fraud causes of action, Plaintiff just makes conclusory allegations about what Defendant knew and when it knew it. Plaintiff does plead with the requisite specificity who at GM made the misrepresentations to Plaintiff, when they were made, and by what means the misrepresentations were made. Early in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed salesperson at Martin Chevrolet in Torrance made representations to Plaintiff about how far the subject vehicle could go on a single charge. (Comp., ¶ 8.) That allegation does not include any factual allegation that anyone at GM made any representation.  Martin Chevrolet is the dealer.  Plaintiff has sued the manufacturer.

In paragraph 8 of the Complaint Plaintiff includes the following allegation:

“Once Plaintiff was satisfied by the representations made by the salesperson and by Defendant Manufacturer through its advertisements and publications that the Vehicle’s range on a single charge was 238 miles, he decided to lease the Vehicle.”

This is not sufficient to state a claim for fraud by GM.  Indeed, Plaintiff does not identify the allegedly false “advertisement and publications” that he is basing his claim upon.

Plaintiff alleges that he decided to lease the subject vehicle after hearing these representations from the dealer’s salesperson. (Comp., ¶ 8.) Nor has Plaintiff alleged that this salesperson knew that the representations that they were making were false.

Because Plaintiff has not pled the three fraud causes of action with the requisite specificity, the Court also sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the three causes of action on this basis with leave to amend.

B. Motion to Strike

Defendant has moved for the Court to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief (Prayer for Relief, ¶ 7.)

Punitive damages are available where a Defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code § 3294.) In this case, Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to constitute causes of action for fraud. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain his request for punitive damages.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is granted with leave to amend.

III. ORDER

1.    Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Third Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

2.    Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.

3.    Plaintiff is given 20 days to amend the complaint.