Judge Eddie C. Sturgeon, Case 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Eddie C. Sturgeon, Case: 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - August 17, 2023

08/18/2023 09:00:00 AM C-67 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Eddie C Sturgeon

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Civil - Unlimited PI/PD/WD - Auto Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL CARMAN VS DONALD [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Demurrer, 03/27/2023

Defendants Marina D. Mosley's ('Driver') and Karen L. Donald and Edward E. Mosley's ('Parents') respective Demurrers are SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action for civil conspiracy. (ROAs 27, 31.) Defendant Driver's Motion to Strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.

(ROA 29.) Defendant Parents' Motion to Strike is GRANTED without leave to amend. (ROA 36.) All requests for judicial notice are denied.

1. Demurrers A demurrer may be sustained upon defects that appear on the face of the pleading or any matter of which the court takes judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30.) Courts 'treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.' (Sarale v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 225, 245.) A demurrer may be sustained where the pleading 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 430.10(e).) First, there is no separate tort of 'civil conspiracy.' The only significance of a conspiracy charge is that each member may be held responsible as a joint tortfeasor. (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 ['As is well established, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort. Rather civil conspiracy is a legal doctrine that imposes liability on person who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediately tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.'].) The elements of conspiracy are as follows: '(1) the formation and operation of a conspiracy; (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.' (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 [quoting Kidron, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 1581.) For conspiracy liability, 'the conspiring defendants must have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and concur in the scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. Knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission[.]' (Navarrete v. Meyer (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1292 [citations omitted].) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants (1) attempted to circumvent the Motor Vehicle Code related to transfer of ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident; and (2) 'manufactured insolvency' by procuring an insurance policy for the subject vehicle with the minimum coverage.

Here, there is no allegation that Defendant Driver's parents had any knowledge that she would in fact negligently operate the subject vehicle to cause the accident. In Navarrete v. Meyer, the court found that Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

2976431 6 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: CARMAN VS DONALD [IMAGED] 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL a civil conspiracy was possible between a driver and the passenger where the evidence might show agreement to an unlawful purpose such as 'driv[ing] so fast in excess of the speed limit as to render the car airborne[.]' (Navarrete, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at 1294.) But here, Defendant Parents were not in the car with Defendant Driver and there is no allegation that Defendant Parents agreed that Defendant Driver should drive recklessly or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

In opposition, Plaintiff introduces facts outside of the complaint regarding a prior 2019 accident caused by Defendant Driver and requests judicial notice of documents reflecting those facts. Those requests for judicial notice are denied. In any case, Plaintiff argues that this prior accident precipitated the Defendants' attempt to transfer the subject vehicle to Defendant Driver and limit Driver Parents' own insurance liability. While Plaintiff argues that attempting to transfer the car to Defendant Driver or purchasing a minimum liability policy for Defendant Driver establishes sufficient allegations for a conspiracy, the court disagrees. There is no law that required or prohibited the transfer of vehicle to Defendant Driver and Defendants' collective failure to effectively do so does not present any conspiracy.

Nor is there any law that requires parties hold automobile insurance policies above the statutory minimum. None of the facts alleged or introduced on opposition could establish a conspiracy.

Accordingly, the demurrers are sustained as to the fourth cause of action for civil conspiracy (mislabeled as the second third cause of action in the complaint).

2. Motions to Strike Under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acted with 'malice' or 'oppression' to recover punitive damages: (1) 'Malice' means . . . despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) 'Oppression' means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court stated, '[o]ne who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.' (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 890, 897.) Ten years after Taylor, the Legislature added a heightened requirement that any conduct must be 'despicable' to support a claim for punitive damages. (See Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211-1212; College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 [explaining that this amendment was a substantive limitation on the recovery of punitive damages].) Punitive damages cannot be established against Defendant Parents The court has already sustained the demurrer to the fourth cause of action and while Defendants have not demurred to the negligent entrustment cause of action, those allegations cannot serve as the basis for punitive damages against Defendant Parents. The negligent entrustment claim states only that '[o]n information and belief, Karen Donald and Edward Mosley knew or should have known that their daughter, Marina Mosley, would be unfit and incompetent to drive their vehicle after having ingested drugs or alcohol during the Independence Day holiday.' (ROA 1, Compl., ¶ 48.) This allegation, based on information and belief, not only lacks any specificity but does not meet the standard of despicable conduct even if taken as true.

The motion to strike punitive damages as to Defendant Parents is granted without leave to amend.

Whether there are sufficient allegations for punitive damages against Defendant Driver is a closer question. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Driver was intoxicated and 'when she began drinking alcoholic beverages and/or taking an illegal substance, Marina Mosley knew that she was going to operate a motor vehicle upon public roadways.' (Compl., ¶ 23.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Driver fled Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

2976431 6 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: CARMAN VS DONALD [IMAGED] 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL the scene of the incident without calling emergency services. (Id., ¶¶ 17-18.) Punitive damages for unintentional torts are rare and no case law since Taylor has stated that driving while intoxicated, by itself, is sufficient for punitive damages. Cases before and after Taylor have typically required something more. (See, e.g., Sumpter v. Matteson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 928, 936 [the jury could refuse to award punitive damages even where intoxicated driver had driven at a high rate of speed through stale red light without stopping]; Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 85 [punitive damages warranted where intoxicated driver drove at excessive speed zigzagging around stream of traffic in area that had many pedestrians and bicyclists].) Taylor itself involved a defendant with a history of alcohol abuse, with prior drunk driving convictions and pending drunk driving charges, who voluntarily took employment transporting alcoholic beverages, and was drinking while he drove.

(Taylor, supra, 25 Cal.3d at 893.) The court concludes that Taylor is limited to its facts, particularly by virtue of the later statutory amendments requiring despicable conduct for the imposition of punitive damages. As such, the complaint is currently insufficient to support punitive damages, and the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

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