Judge: Eddie C. Sturgeon, Case: 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - January 25, 2024

01/26/2024  09:00:00 AM  C-67 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Eddie C Sturgeon

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Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Auto Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) 37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL CARMAN VS DONALD [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication, 10/09/2023

Defendants Karen L. Donald and Edward E. Mosley's ('Defendant Parents') Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED. Plaintiff Phylis Eileen Carman's request for judicial notice is granted.

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question; 'no more is called for.' (Id. at 851.) The moving party must show that the undisputed facts, when applied to the issues framed by the pleadings, entitle the moving party to judgment. (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 66.) If the moving party carries this burden, it causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subject to its own burden of production to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material facts exists. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) Courts must view the evidence and inferences 'in the light most favorable to the opposing party.' (Id. at 843.) 'A motion for summary adjudication . . .

shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment' and 'shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, . . . a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.' (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c(f).) 'Negligent entrustment is a common law liability doctrine, which arises in numerous factual contexts. In cases involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability is imposed on a vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver. Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.' (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559 [cleaned up].) CACI No. 724 lists the requisite elements for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle as follows: '1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; 2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated by [name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by [name of driver] with the owner's permission]; 3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known, that [name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; 4. That [name of defendant] permitted [name of driver] to drive the vehicle; and 5. That [name of driver]'s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to [name of plaintiff].' Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3017870  9 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  CARMAN VS DONALD [IMAGED]  37-2022-00025372-CU-PA-CTL (See also McKenna v. Beesly (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-566.) To prevail on the third element, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the driver's incompetence to use the vehicle at the time the vehicle is entrusted to the operator. (Blake v. Moore (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 700, 706 ['entrustment of a vehicle to an intoxicated person is not negligence per se. A plaintiff must prove defendant had knowledge of plaintiff's incompetence when entrusting the vehicle']; Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 415, 420 [there was substantial evidence for jury to find negligent entrustment when father was aware of nineteen year-old son's three prior vehicle accidents].) Based on the evidence submitted to the court, Plaintiff is unable to meet the third element of negligent entrustment showing that Defendant Parents knew or should have known that Defendant Marina was incompetent or unfit to drive. Both Defendant Parents testified that since she had returned to California in 2018 and up until the time of the accident 'there was no evidence that Marina consumed alcohol or had an alleged substance abuse problem' and did not observe her to drink or take drugs on the date at issue. (E.g., ROA 102, Donald Decl., ¶ 17; ROA 103, Mosley Decl., ¶ 18; UMFs 16-17.) Plaintiff argues she should be able to convince a jury that her parents should have known Defendant Marina was incompetent or unfit based on her history of mental illness and attending sobriety meetings at a boarding school. (E.g., PUMFs 24-26, 37-38.) But there is no evidence submitted that alcohol or drug use had ever caused any specific incident in Defendant Marina's past, that she had used alcohol or drugs between returning to California in 2018 and the accident, or that she had a history of driving under the influence such that Defendant Parents would know or should have known that their daughter was incompetent or unfit to drive. None of the other circumstantial facts raised by Plaintiff are sufficient.

Accordingly, Defendant Parents' motion is granted. While Plaintiff did not include a statutory owner liability claim in her FAC, the court will hear from Plaintiff as to whether leave is requested to add such a claim.

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