Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is a construction defect case.  Plaintiff Tracie Calfee Dalton owns a home located at 1619 San Ysidro Drive, Beverly Hills, California (the “Property”).  She purchased the Property from Defendants Pamela Becker and Ocean Santa Barbara Investments, LLC (“OSBI”).  She alleges that when the Property was delivered to her, it was defective and unfit for its intended purposes.  She alleges numerous and extensive defects, including water intrusion and soil erosion issues, structural problems, plumbing and sewer defects, electrical system problems, and fire protection issues.   

The operative complaint alleges claims for (1) violation of building standards as set forth in Cal. Civ. Code §896, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of express warranty, and (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  In addition to Becker and OSBI, Plaintiff also sued numerous subcontractors, including as relevant here, Guarantee Plumbing Inc. (“GPI”).  GPI provided and installed rough and finish plumbing at the Property.  GPI has countersued Plaintiff. This hearing is on GPI’s motion for determination of good faith settlement.  The terms of the conditional settlement are that GPI agrees to pay Dalton $12,500 in exchange for a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s complaint against GPI, and a mutual complete and total general release of all past, present and future claims including presently unknown claims pursuant to Civ. Code §1542.  (Black Decl. ¶ 5.)  GPI avers the settlement is the product of extensive arms-length negotiations between the parties.  (Black Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.)  The settlement is conditioned upon the Court’s finding of a good faith settlement.  There is no opposition to the motion.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, “[a]ny party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(a)(1).)  “The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counter-affidavits filed in response, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence at the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc.§ 877.6(b).)  “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (Code Civ. Proc.§ 877.6(c).)  The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.  (Code Civ. Proc.§ 877.6(d).)   

DISCUSSION 

GPI argues that the settlement is “within the ballpark” of GPI’s relative liability in this case, in accordance with Code Civ. Proc. §§ 877 and 877.6(a)(1), as well as the factors adopted by the Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499-500 (“Tech-Bilt”).  

In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the following factors for evaluating whether a proposed settlement was made in good faith: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settler’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) discount for settlement before trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants.  (Id. at p. 499.)  The Court also stated that “practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. . . . The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.”  (Id. at 499–500.) 

Settlement Amount as a Rough Approximation of Plaintiff’s Recovery 

GPI argues that while it believes it has no liability, it nonetheless agreed to pay $12,500 to resolve the dispute.  Accordingly, it argues that a payment of $12,500 is “within the ball park” of its relative liability.  This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of a determination that the settlement is in good faith. 

Allocation of Settlement Proceeds Among Plaintiffs 

Because Tracee Dalton is the only plaintiff in this action, this factor does not apply. 

GPI’s Financial Condition and Insurance Policy Limits 

GPI has presented no evidence about its financial condition or any insurance policy limits.  Accordingly, the Court cannot determine whether this factor weighs in favor of or against a determination that the settlement is in good faith. 

Discount for Settlement Before Trial 

GPI does not address this factor.  Accordingly, the Court cannot determine whether this factor weighs in favor of or against a determination that the settlement is in good faith.   

Evidence of Collusion, Fraud, or Tortious Conduct 

GPI argues the settlement was the product of extensive arms-length negotiations, and was not the product of fraud or collusion.  Accordingly, the Court determines this factor weighs in favor of a determination that the settlement is in good faith.   

Given the foregoing and the absence of any opposition to this motion, the Court determines the settlement was made in good faith. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS GPI’s motion for determination of good faith settlement.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: March 15, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court