Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case involves a dispute over parking spaces.  Plaintiffs Toni Kopek and Richard Lee live in a condominium building in Pacific Palisades and claim ownership of two parking spaces, G114 and G116.  They contend Defendants Bagram and Susanna Mardirossian are illegally occupying the spaces.  They have also sued their homeowners association, Casa Gateway Homeowners Association (“HOA”), for failing to enforce bylaws and a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&R’s).   

The operative complaint alleges claims for ejectment, preliminary injunction, trespass, nuisance, quiet title and enforcement of “governing documents”.  The Mardirossians counter-sued, alleging three causes of action: (1) adverse possession, (2) prescriptive easement, and (3) declaratory relief.  The Court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Plaintiffs on the Mardirossians’ second cause of action for prescriptive easement.  ¿¿¿¿    

This hearing is on Kopek’s motion to sever and try separately the remaining causes of action in the Mardirossians’ cross-complaint.  Kopek argues that (1) a determination on the Mardirossians’ remaining causes of action will determine legal ownership and title to the parking space, which is a preliminary issue to Kopek’s claims for ejectment, trespass and nuisance, and the resolution of this issue will promote judicial efficiency and economy; and (2) the Mardirossians’ remaining claims are purely equitable in nature, for which there is no right to a jury trial, and the court must determine the equitable issue before any jury trial.  The Mardirossians filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion to sever.  The HOA filed an opposition, but it opposes the severing for trial of Plaintiffs’ eleventh and twelfth causes of action, which is sought by Kopek’s motion.  

LEGAL STANDARD 

Upon a properly noticed motion of a party made no later than the close of pretrial conference, or in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, a court may bifurcate a trial into separate issues when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby. (Code Civ. Proc. §598.) The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, or of any separate issue of any number of causes of action, preserving the right of trial by jury as required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.¿(Code Civ. Proc. §1048(b).)  The court has broad discretion to order a severance of trials. (See¿National Electric Supply Co. v Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist. (1960) 187 Cal App 2d 418, 421; see also¿Grappo v. Coventry Fin. Corp. (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 496, 504¿(“the court in its discretion shall regulate the order of proof.”).) 

DISCUSSION 

Kopek argues that the Mardirossians’ remaining causes of action involve purely equitable issues which should be tried first, before any jury trial on her causes of action.  The Court agrees.   

There is no right to jury trial where the “gist” of an action depends on the application of equitable doctrines.  (Shaw v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 983, 995.)  Where an action seeks to quiet title without affecting possession, it is equitable.  (Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 24-25 (declaratory relief and quiet title claims are equitable); Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1241 (where the gist of the declaratory relief claim is a request that it be judicially determined that plaintiff is entitled to conveyance of title to the property, it is an equitable claim).)  

Here, the Mardirossians’ remaining causes of action do not seek ejectment and do not affect possession.  The Mardirossians are already in possession of the parking space.  Thus, there is no right to a jury trial, and the equitable issues in the cross-complaint should be decided by the Court before any jury trial, particularly where as here they will narrow the issues to be decided by the jury trial.  (See, e.g., Dills v. Delira Corp. (1956) 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 129  (“There is no question but that the trial court properly tried equitable before legal issues. This procedure is particularly useful, where, as here, a determination of the¿equitable issue may determine the lawsuit and prevent a more costly¿jury trial.”).)   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Toni Kopek’s motion to sever and try separately the remaining causes of action in Bagram and Susanna Mardirossians’ cross-complaint.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: November 9, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court