Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from an altercation between a police officer and an emergency medical technician (“EMT”), leading to the arrest and imprisonment of the EMT.  On July 22, 2019, Defendant LAPD Sgt. Jeannette Pelayo was in the process of transporting a sexual assault victim (“Lily”) to the rape treatment center at UCLA Medical Center (“UCLA”).  Lily appeared to have a seizure, and Pelayo requested an ambulance.   

Plaintiff Roryce Dirden, an EMT, arrived at the scene.  According to Dirden, a dispute arose as to whether to transport Lily to UCLA’s rape treatment center or to Cedars Sinai Medical Center, which was the nearest medical facility.  Dirden was concerned there was a medical emergency, and therefore, Lily should be moved to the nearest medical facility.  According to Defendants, however, Dirden’s “unacceptable behavior and aggressive questioning of Pelayo and the victim caused the victim to suffer another medical episode and completely interfered with Pelayo’s investigation.”  As a result, when the ambulance stopped, Plaintiff was arrested. 

  Dirden was taken to the Hollywood Station where he was placed in the holding tank for two to three hours.  According to Dirden, after the commanding officer of LAPD Hollywood Division (Captain Cory Palka) and others reviewed Pelayo’s body camera footage, they concluded there was no cause for Plaintiff’s arrest.  Palka apologized and released Dirden from custody, commenting that he wished Pelayo had more “emotional intelligence” regarding how she handled the incident with Dirden.       

Dirden brought claims for (1) battery, (2) negligence, (3) violation of Civil Code § 52.1, (4) violation of civil rights (42 USC § 1983), individual liability, (5) violation of civil rights (42 USC § 1983) entity liability, (6) false imprisonment, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress.   

The case was removed to federal court.  The federal court granted Defendants Pelayo and the City of Los Angeles’ motion for summary judgment as to all federal law claims and the negligence claim.  The federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dirden’s remaining state law claims and remanded the case back to this Court.  Thus, Dirden’s only surviving claims are for (1) battery, (2) violation of Civil Code § 52.1 (“Bane Act”), (3) false imprisonment, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress.    

This hearing is on Dirden’s motion for discovery of personnel and other records of Pelayo.  Dirden seeks “[t]he entire disciplinary file of [Pelayo] including but not limited to all personnel complaints and personnel complaint investigations of allegations of race or national origin discrimination, fabrication of probable cause or dishonesty.”  Dirden argues he has demonstrated good cause as the records are material to the subject matter of the pending litigation because they are needed to challenge Defendants’ claim that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and because they touch on the credibility of potential witnesses.   

 

LEGAL STANDARD  

A party in a civil proceeding may gain access to police officer records and citizen complaint records through the procedures established in Evid. Code §§ 1043 and 1045. (See Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1085 (Haggerty).)¿¿¿ 

Evid. Code § 1043 requires a written motion and notice to the governmental agency which has custody of the records sought, and affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.  It further states that no hearing for a discovery motion shall be held without full compliance except upon a showing of good cause for noncompliance or a waiver by the governmental agency with custody of the records. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (d).)  Once good cause is established, Evid. Code § 1045 provides that the court must then examine the information in chambers in conformity with Evid. Code § 915 and shall exclude from disclosure information consisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction that is the subject of the litigation. (Evid. Code, § 1045.)¿¿ 

DISCUSSION 

The question before the Court is whether Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause and set forth the materiality of the discovery sought. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This initial burden is a “relatively relaxed standard.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84.) Information has been deemed material where it “will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial” and general allegations which establish some cause for discovery are sufficient. (Id. at pp. 84-85 [citations omitted].) The motion must include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.” (Evid. Code § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)  Declarations by counsel on information and belief are sufficient to show the materiality of the information sought in personnel files. (Abatti v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39, 59; Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 25 Cal.4th 1011, 1026.)¿¿   

Dirden argues that the requested documents are relevant to show Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.  The Court agrees in part.   

There is no basis to seek Pelayo’s entire disciplinary file, nor is there a basis to seek personnel complaints and personnel complaint investigations of allegations of race or national origin.  The operative complaint does not allege that Dirden’s race or national origin was a motivating factor for his arrest and imprisonment.   

“[A] showing of good cause must be based on a discovery request which is tailored to the specific officer misconduct which is alleged.  Thus, when a defendant asserts that his confession was coerced, a discovery request that seeks all excessive force complaints against the arresting officer is overly broad … [O]nly documentations of a past officer misconduct which is similar to the misconduct alleged by defendant in the pending litigation is relevant and therefore subject to discovery.”  (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County (Luna) (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021.)   

The Court, however, finds good cause exists for discovery into personnel complaints and personnel complaint investigations that Pelayo fabricated probable cause or was dishonest.  This information is relevant to show Pelayo had a pattern of fabricating probable cause and otherwise goes to the credibility of Pelayo.  (Garden Grove Police Dept v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 430, 433-434 (motions made pursuant to Evid. Code § 1043 and 1045 may be used to discover information to impeach an officer’s credibility); Luna, 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021      ("[E]vidence of habit or custom [is] admissible to show that a person acted in conformity with that habit or custom on a given occasion. Similarly, evidence of reputation, opinion, and specific instances of conduct is admissible to show, inter alia, motive, intent, or plan.  Thus, in¿People v. Memro, the court concluded that, ‘evidence that the interrogating officers had a custom or habit of obtaining confessions by violence, force, threat, or unlawful aggressive behavior would have been admissible on the issue of whether the confession had been coerced.’”  (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted).) 

  The Court next considers whether Dirden is entitled to the actual documents, as he argues, or whether he is only entitled to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the complainants and witnesses, as Defendants argue.  The Court agrees with Defendants. 

Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, established the well settled rule that only the names, addresses and telephone numbers of complainants and witnesses are discoverable.  (Id. at 828-829.)  In Kelvin, the defendant was charged with battery on a police officer.  The criminal defendant made a motion for discovery of prior complaints against the arresting officers for use of excessive force and racial prejudice.  (Id. at 823.)  The court held that the motion should have been granted; however, the court limited the discovery to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any persons who could provide testimony relating to the officers’ prior use of excessive force because admissible evidence could only come through the testimony of actual witnesses against the officers.  (Id. at 828-829.)   

Similarly, in Carruthers v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Ca.App.3d 439, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s order that only the names, addresses and telephone numbers of complainants were discoverable.  (Id. at 441-442.)  The criminal defendants in Carruthers were charged with battery on police officers.  They sought, inter alia, three categories of personnel records: (1) statements, (2) documents from the actual investigative package, and (3) records from disciplinary proceedings.  The appellate court, citing Kelvin, held that the trial court was correct in denying defendants’ request for these documents and instead ordering only the names, addresses and telephone numbers be released.  (Id. at 442.)  The court also noted that the defendant did have a right to seek additional discovery if the initial information proved inadequate.  (Id.)   

Additionally, the California Supreme Court in City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, affirmed a municipal court order limiting Pitchess discovery to names, addresses and telephone numbers.  (Id. at 84.)  In that case, the criminal defendant was charged with resisting arrest and brandishing a knife.  He filed a motion for discovery of all prior complaints of excessive force or violence involving the arresting officers.  At the hearing on the motion, the municipal court ruled that the defendant had made a sufficient showing of good cause to justify an in-camera review, but stated that any disclosure would be limited to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the complainants and witnesses and to the dates of the prior incidents.  (Id. at 80.)  The California Supreme Court affirmed and declined to disclose any documents, copies of reports, or any information relating to disciplinary proceedings or investigations of the police department.  (Id.) 

In sum, Dirden has shown good cause and the Court will conduct an in camera review of complaints that Pelayo fabricated probable cause or was otherwise dishonest, but the Court will only allow access to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of complainants and witnesses.  Moreover, consistent with Evid. Code § 1045, the Court shall exclude from disclosure information consisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction that is the subject of the litigation.  

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for discovery of personnel and other records of Pelayo.  Defendants are required to provide complaints against Pelayo for fabrication of probable cause or any claims of dishonesty for the Court’s in camera review within 30 days of this Order.  The date will be set at the hearing of this motion.     

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: February 16, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court