Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is a quiet title action.  Peter Nygård is a disgraced former fashion mogul who is currently in prison in Canada for sex crimes.  Prior to Nygård’s arrest, in 2014 and 2015, he bought the two commercial properties at issue in this action – 13700-13704 Saticoy Street, Panorama City, CA 91402 (the “Saticoy Property”) and 9450 Topanga Canyon Blvd, Chatsworth, CA 91311 (the “Topanga Property”, and together with the Saticoy Property, the “Properties”).  

Nygård purchased the Properties through an entity called Edsons Investments, Inc. (“Edsons”), which was formed, owned, and controlled by Nygård.  (Saticoy Complaint ¶ 6, Topanga Complaint ¶ 6.)  After Nygård purchased the Properties through Edsons, Nygård formed the Topanga LLC and Saticoy LLC for the purpose of holding title to the Properties. (Saticoy Complaint ¶ 9, Topanga Complaint ¶ 9.)  Edsons was the initial sole member of both LLCs, and on June 11, 2015, transferred title of the Properties to each of the LLCs. (Saticoy Complaint ¶¶ 11, 13, Topanga Complaint ¶¶ 11, 13.)  Also in 2015, Nygård formed a charitable trust named the Nygård Foundation, for which Nygård serves as a trustee.  (Egleson Decl. Ex. B at 1.)  

In October 2019, Nygård formed a new entity, NBH.  (Saticoy Complaint ¶ 15, Topanga Complaint ¶ 15.)  The initial members of NBH were Greg Fenske and Tiina Tulikorpi, who were both long-time employees of Nygård.  Fenske and Tulikorpi held their membership interests in NBH expressly in trust for Nygård.  (Saticoy Complaint Ex. C; Topanga Complaint Ex. C.)  

On October 24, 2019, Edsons conveyed all of its membership interest in the LLCs to NBH.  (Saticoy Complaint ¶ 15, Topanga Complaint ¶ 15.)  NBH remains the sole member of both LLCs.  (Saticoy Complaint ¶ 2, Topanga Complaint ¶ 2.)  In or around December 2019, Tulikorpi resigned as a member of NBH, leaving Fenske as the sole member and manager of NBH.  (Saticoy Complaint ¶ 18 at 2, Topanga Complaint ¶ 18 at 2.)  

In February 2020, Nygård’s offices were raided by the FBI as part of their investigation into Nygård for sex crimes.  (Egleson Decl. Ex. C.)  Following the raid, Nygård stepped down as chairman, and the LLCs subsequently went into bankruptcy.  (Id.)  On December 14, 2020, Nygård was arrested in Canada after being indicted in the Southern District of New York on nine-counts of sex trafficking, racketeering and related crimes. (Egleson Decl. Ex. D.)  Nygård has been detained in Canada since his arrest, separately charged with similar crimes in three Canadian jurisdictions, and on September 9, 2024, was sentenced to 11 years in prison after being convicted in his first Canadian trial.  (Egleson Decl. Exs. C, E.)  In connection with Nygård’s bail hearing in Canada in January 2021, Fenske filed an affidavit and testified in court stating that he was “continu[ing] to provide administrative support for [Nygård]” and that “Nygård has lost virtually everything except for his home in the Bahamas and his Falcon Lake cabin.”  (Egleson Decl. Ex. F at ¶¶ 5, 11.)  

At issue in this consolidated action is title over the Properties, and specifically, the Foundation’s claims to have a superior secured interest in the Properties. On May 11, 2020, the Foundation recorded purported deeds of trust against each of the Properties, which were purportedly signed by Nygård’s niece, Angela Dyborn, on behalf of the LLCs.  (Saticoy Complaint, Exhibit E, Topanga Complaint Ex. D.) The deeds of trust were based on alleged five- year-old promissory notes, signed by Tulikorpi and dated May 1, 2015, for loans that were allegedly given to the LLCs and secured by the Properties.  (Saticoy Complaint Ex. F., Topanga Complaint Ex. E.)   

The LLCs claim that the promissory notes and deeds of trust are invalid.  They claim that the loans were never made to the LLCs, that the promissory were actually signed by Tulikorpi in 2020 and back-dated to 2015, and that Tulikorpi and Dyborn were not authorized to sign the instruments on behalf of the LLCs.  (Saticoy Complaint ¶¶ 20-38, Topanga Complaint ¶¶ 20-38.)  

This action was initially filed on October 21, 2020 by two plaintiffs that held a mechanic’s lien on the Saticoy Property against the Saticoy LLC, Fenske, and the Foundation.  In response, on February 21, 2022, Saticoy LLC filed a cross-complaint against the Foundation for disparagement of title and to quiet title as to the Saticoy Property.  On April 15, 2022, Topanga LLC initiated a separate action against the Foundation for disparagement of title and to quiet title as to the Topanga Property.  On June 16, 2023, this Court ordered that the two actions be consolidated.  A bench trial is scheduled for March 2025.  

While this current action was pending, on May 1, 2023, Movant Louis Bacon was awarded over $203 million in damages by a New York court for the significant harm that he suffered as a result of a decade-long “global and multi-media” defamation campaign that Nygård orchestrated and paid for with a sole objective: to “destroy Bacon.” (Egleson Decl. Ex. I.)  The damages award came after eight years of litigation between Movant and Nygård. On July 14, 2023, the New York court entered a judgment in the amount of the damages award (the “Judgment”), which has been recognized by California as a sister-state judgment.  (Egleson Decl. Exs. J, K, L.)  Nygård has not paid any portion of the Judgment. Since the Judgment was awarded, he has sought to challenge the award by filing three successive motions to vacate and two appeals in New York courts. He has also refused to respond to the discovery requests served on him in connection with Movant’s efforts to enforce the Judgment.  

Movant now files this motion to intervene.  Movant argues that he fulfills the requirements of mandatory intervention because he has an interest relating to the Properties that is the subject of this action; disposition of the matter may impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, and his interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties.  Alternatively, Movant argues that he is entitled to permissive intervention because he has a direct and immediate interest in the action; the intervention will not enlarge the issues, and the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by the existing parties.  There was no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

Code Civ. Proc. § 387, subdivision (d)(1)¿provides that the court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if “a provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene,” or “[t]he person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the¿disposition of the action may impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.”   

Additionally, upon timely application, a court may “permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(2).)  A court will determine the timeliness of a motion to intervene based on the date when a nonparty “knew or should have known their interests in the litigation were not being adequately represented.” (Ziani Homeowners Assn. v. Brookfield Ziani LLC (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 274, 282.) 

The trial court has discretion to permit intervention where the court finds that “(1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action.” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386.) 

“The purpose of allowing intervention is to promote fairness by involving all parties potentially affected by a judgment.”¿(Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California¿(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1199; see also¿City and County of San Francisco v. State of California¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1036¿¿(section 387¿“balances the¿interests of others who will be affected by the judgment against the interests of the original parties in pursuing their litigation unburdened by others”).)  Section 387¿should be liberally construed in favor of intervention. (Simpson Redwood Co., 196 Cal.App.3d at 1200.) 

DISCUSSION 

The Court concludes that Movant has met the requirements for mandatory intervention.  First, Movant has an interest relating to the Properties.  California courts have recognized a creditor’s interest to intervene in certain instances where the debtor’s assets are at issue in an action.  In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Gerlach (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 299, the court allowed a judgment creditor to intervene in an action involving insurance proceeds to which the debtor had a right.  The court recognized that the creditor had an “interest in the instant litigation [that] is of a direct and immediate character” and that the interest was “greater than that possessed by a simple creditor” because there was “no reasonable probability that the judgment can be satisfied from any source” except the insurance proceeds at issue.  (Id. at 303-305.)   

Such is the case here. Movant possesses a wholly unsatisfied money judgment of more than $200 million against Nygård. This action concerns a title dispute over the Properties that belong to entities for which Movant has filed charging orders against, and ultimately belong to Nygård, the judgment debtor. The Properties represent a significant source of recovery against a debtor who has claimed to have “lost virtually everything.”  

Second, the disposition of this case will affect Movant’s ability to protect his interest.  The Foundation has claimed a superior secured interest in the Properties, and if the Foundation is successful in obtaining a declaratory judgment, the Movant’s ability to recover on the Properties would be impaired because the Properties would be foreclosed on by the Foundation.  Moreover, even if Movant brought a separate action to litigate his rights, the factual and legal determinations made in this action may have a persuasive effect on any such action.   

Further, the parties have been ordered by the Court to engage in mediation, and resolution of the case through mediation without Movant’s participation is likely to affect Movant’s rights. No current party has an incentive to represent Movant’s interests in the mediation since the Foundation, the LLCs, and Movant all have competing interests in the Properties.  (Cf. Gray v. Begley (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1524 (insurer with interest in litigation “has a sufficient interest… to intervene when the [parties] reach[] a settlement without the participation of the defending insurer”).) 

Third, Movant’s interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties.  “The most important factor in determining the adequacy of representation is “how the [proposed intervenor’s] interest compares with the interests of existing parties.”  (Thompson v. Thompson (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018) 2018 WL 6133659, at *3) (internal citation omitted); 7C Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1909 (3d ed.).) The required showing is “minimal”, and Movant meets the requirements if he “shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am. (1972) 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10).  “If all existing parties are adverse to the [proposed intervenor], then there is no adequate representation.”  (7C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1909.)   

Here, both the Foundation’s interests and the LLC’s interests are adverse to Movant’s interest.  The Foundation claims to have a superior right to the Properties so that it has priority over Movant in seizing the Properties.  Movant claims that it does not.  As a result, the Foundation clearly cannot represent Movant’s interests in this action.  With respect to the LLCs, Movant has filed charging orders against the LLCs and is therefore adverse to the LLCs in the enforcement context.  The LLC and Movant’s ultimate objectives with respect to the Properties are adverse insofar as Movant intends to foreclose on the Properties in satisfaction of the Judgment thereby taking those Properties from the LLCs.   

There is also a risk of collusion between the LLCs and Foundation.  The parties on both sides of the litigation (the LLCs and the Foundation) were under the common ownership and control of Nygård until at least April 1, 2020 when Nygård resigned as trustee of the Foundation following his arrest, and it is approximately one month later that the Foundation recorded the purported deeds of trust, which were signed by Nygård’s niece on behalf of the LLCs.  Given the prior close relationships and the timing, one cannot rule out continuing or future collusion among these parties, which further underscores that Movant’s interests are not represented by any party in this litigation and counsels in favor of intervention.  (See 7C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1909 (“representation may be inadequate, and intervention will be allowed, if there is even a hint of collusion between the purported representative and those to whom the representative is formally opposed in the litigation”).) 

Finally, the motion to intervene is timely.  Timeliness of a motion to intervene is determined by the “totality of the circumstances facing would-be intervenors, with a focus on three primary factors: ‘(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.’” (Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, 574.)  For mandatory intervention, “because ‘the would-be intervenor may be seriously harmed if intervention is denied, courts should be reluctant to dismiss such a request for intervention as untimely.” (Id.) “[T]he most important consideration in deciding whether a motion for intervention is timely” is whether there is prejudice to the existing parties.  (Id.)  Prejudice means only prejudice that is “caused by the movant’s delay” and does not include “prejudice that would result from allowing intervention.” (Id.) “California courts have found intervention to be timely based solely on the absence of such prejudice.”  (Id.)  

Here, there is no prejudice.  The case is in the early stages of discovery; the Court recently ordered the parties to mediate, and the post-mediation status conference is set for December 18, 2024, which is still a month away.  (See, e.g., Zhang v. Am. Fran. Regl. Ctr., LLC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) 2016 WL 11701765, at *1 (intervention motion timely where “discovery is only in the initial stages, with no depositions yet completed”); U.S. Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm’n v. PC Iron, Inc. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2017) 2017 WL 3783905, at *2 (existing parties not prejudiced where “discovery remains open in this case and key depositions are yet to be taken”). At this stage of the proceedings, there would be no prejudice to the parties in allowing Movant to intervene and participate in the discovery and mediation process.   

Moreover, Movant was diligent in seeking to intervene.  Movant was awarded the Judgment a little over a year ago and has been diligently searching for available assets in multiple different jurisdictions that can be executed on to satisfy the Judgment.  Movant’s investigation has been impeded by Nygård’s refusal to cooperate with discovery into his assets and his multiple motions and appeals in New York courts to undo the Judgment and delay enforcement discovery.  In addition, Nygård has employed a labyrinth of corporate structures to hold his assets, which has served to obscure his interest in assets from creditors like Movant.   

In sum, Movant has met the requirements for mandatory intervention, and the Court will not consider whether Movant also qualifies for permissive intervention.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Louis Bacon’s motion to intervene.     

   

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED:  November 7, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court