Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Maynard Brittan, as Trustee of the Brittan Family Trust and Roxbury Management Company 

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Olesya Manokhina 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from a landlord-tenant dispute.  Plaintiff Olesya Manokhina is a tenant at 425 N. Doheny Drive, Beverly Hills, California (the “Property”).  Maynard Brittan Trust is the owner of the Property.  Defendant Maynard Brittan is the trustee of the Maynard Brittan Trust.  Defendant Roxbury Management Company (“Roxbury”) is the manager of the Property.   

Plaintiff complains of various habitability issues at the Property including “non-functional or lack of adequate heating,” “unapproved and illegal construction”, “rubbish” and “filth,” “electrical wiring not up to code”, “lack of hot water,” “leaking plumbing,” and “general non-maintenance.”  (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶11.)  Plaintiff claims that after her complaints, Defendants finally replaced a defective water heater but the repair was done so shoddily it resulted in a slow and continuous leak of carbon monoxide and other caustic gases into the Property.  (FAC ¶¶13-14.)  As a result, Plaintiff claims she miscarried.  (FAC ¶¶20-21.)     

The operative complaint (FAC) alleges claims for (1) wrongful death, (2) tortious breach of warranty of habitability, (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (4) nuisance, (5) professional negligence, (6) negligence, (7) breach of contract, and (8) intentional interference with estate. 

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 36-96.  Plaintiff has asserted the same objection to all of these interrogatories on the ground they “exceed the allowable amount under the CCP.”  Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiff waived all objections by failing to timely serve her responses within the deadline agreed to by the parties, and moreover, a declaration from defense counsel supported the need for interrogatories beyond the maximum of 35 allowed under the Code. 

TIMELINESS OF MOTION 

Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(c) provides that a motion to compel further responses must be made “within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response.”  Here, Plaintiff served her objections on January 18, 2023.  Defendants’ motion to compel was filed on February 23, 2023, within the 45 days required under the Code. 

TIMELINESS OF OPPOSITION 

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion was due on March 21, 2023, nine Court days before the hearing on April 4, 2023.  Plaintiff filed her opposition and served it by mail on March 22, 2023.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s opposition is untimely.  However, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the untimely opposition, particularly where, as here, Defendants had actual notice of the opposition (by reviewing the docket) and had sufficient time to file a reply.   

MEET AND CONFER 

Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(b)(1) provides that a motion to compel must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.  Here, Defense counsel simply sent a letter, without any attempt to meet and confer in person or by telephone.  (Berke Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. F to Berke Decl.)  While this record does not show a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve issues raised in the motion, the Court will nonetheless exercise its discretion to consider the merits of the motion to compel, but cautions counsel that subsequent failures to comply with statutory obligations may result in a continuance of the hearing on the subject motion.     

DISCUSSION 

Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(a)(3) provides that a party may move to compel responses to interrogatories where “an objection to an interrogatory is without merit.”  Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s objections to the special interrogatories are without merit because (1) Plaintiff waived all objections by failing to timely serve her responses, and (2) Defendants filed a declaration demonstrating need for interrogatories exceeding the 35 limit set by the Code.  The Court agrees.         

On October 13, 2022, Defendants served Special Interrogatories Set One; responses were due by November 16, 2022.  (Berke Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. A to Berke Decl.)  The parties agreed to a two week extension to November 29, 2022.  (Berke Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. B to Berke Decl.)  Plaintiff failed to serve her responses by November 29, 2022, and agreed she would provide responses without objections.  (Berke Decl., ¶¶  6-7; Ex. D to Berke Decl.)  On January 18, 2023, Plaintiff served objections to Special Interrogatory Nos. 36-96 on the ground that they exceed the allowable limit under the Code.  (Ex. E to Berke Decl.).   

Plaintiff’s objections are improper because she had waived all objections by failing to timely respond to the interrogatories.  (CCP §§ 2030.290(a) (“If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response,” the party “waives … any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product”); see¿also Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403-04.)  Further, her counsel agreed to provide responses without objections.  (Ex. D to Berke Decl.) 

Even assuming Plaintiff had not waived all objections, her objection on the ground the interrogatories exceeded the 35 limit set by the Code is without merit when counsel has made a declaration of necessity.  To the extent Plaintiff disputes the substance of the declaration (as she does in her opposition on the ground the additional interrogatories are “objectively improper and redundant”), she should have filed a motion for protective order on the ground the number of special interrogatories is unwarranted.  (See, e.g., Clark v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 118928 at *3-*4; Roberson v. Avalon by the Sea, 2017 Cal. Super. LEXIS 79198 at *4-*5.) 

Defendants seek sanctions in the amount of $1,185.  Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, the Court “shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person or attorney who unsuccessfully … opposes a motion to compel further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  Further, under Code Civ. Proc. §  2023.030(a), the Court may impose sanctions for misuse of the discovery process, which as relevant here includes “[f]ailing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery.”  Code Civ. Proc. 2023.010(d).  The Court concludes sanctions are warranted under either section, given that Plaintiff asserted objections despite having clearly waived all objections, necessitating this motion.   

The Court next considers whether the sanctions sought are reasonable.  In determining the appropriate amount of discovery sanctions, the Court starts with the lodestar which is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the reasonable number of hours expended. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096; see also¿Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)  The Court concludes that Defense counsel’s hourly rate of $225 is reasonable, and the hours spent (five) are reasonable.  Accordingly, the Court will award sanctions in the amount of $1,125 plus a filing fee of $60, for a total of $1,185.       

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel further responses.  Plaintiff is directed to respond to Special Interrogatory Nos. 36-96 within 30 days from the date of this Order.  Further, the Court awards monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,185 against Plaintiff’s counsel.    

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED:  April 4, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court