Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 21SMCV01766, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01766 Hearing Date: October 18, 2022 Dept: 200
|
THE
UCLA FOUNDATION, Plaintiffs, v. perside
nicole cognein, et al., Defendant. |
Case No.: 21SMCV01766 Hearing Date: October 18, 2022 [TENTATIVE] order RE: PLAINTIFF THE UCLA FOUNDATION’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION |
BACKGROUND
This is an unlawful detainer and
ejectment action. The property at issue
is located at 389 Upper Mesa Road, Santa Monica, California (the
“Property”). Separate Statement of Facts
(SSOF) ¶1. The Property was bought by Guy Cognein who later donated it to
Plaintiff The UCLA Foundation. SSOF
¶¶1,3,5. Defendant Perside Nicole
Cognein is the wife of Mr. Cognein, although Mr. Cognein was unmarried at the
time he donated the Property. SSOF ¶¶
Mr. Cognien’s donation to Defendant was
memorialized in three agreements (the “Agreements”), which among other things, provided
that Mr. Cognein would have a life tenancy in the Property. SSOF ¶¶3,5.
A grant deed was also recorded in which Mr. Cognein expressly granted to
Plaintiff his “entire interest” in the
Property, while “reserving unto [Mr. Cognein] a life estate.” SSOF ¶6.
On October 10, 2020, Mr. Cognein
died. SSOF ¶8. His life estate ended upon his death, and
Plaintiff became the sole owner of the Property and therefore had the sole
right to occupy the Property and to exclude all others from occupying the
Property. SSOF ¶9. However, after Mr. Cognein’s death, Defendant
claimed she was a successor in interest to Mr. Cognein’s rights and refused to
vacate the Property. SSOF ¶13. In December 2020 and January 2021, Plaintiff
put Defendant on written notice of her obligation to leave the property. SSOF ¶¶14, 15.
In May 2022, Plaintiff received a
call from the Los Angeles Fire Department that there was a fire/life safety
violation for the Property (the “Violation”).
SSOF ¶21. The conditions giving
rise to the Violation included “accumulation of combustible waste” and
“excessive storage of rubbish.” SSOF
¶22. Defendant refused Plaintiff access
to the Property to address the conditions noted in the Violation, and
therefore, Plaintiff sought a restraining order which the Court granted. SSOF ¶23.
In July 2022, Plaintiff offered to
sell the Property to Defendant for $2.75 million. SSOF ¶27.
The offer had four conditions, none of which Plaintiff ever satisfied. SSOF ¶¶28,34.
Plaintiff also did not accept Defendant’s offer price, marking the offer
letter “Price to be adjusted.”
SSOF ¶29. Further, the parties
never signed a contract to effect the sale of the Property. SSOF ¶66.
To date, Defendant has refused to
vacate the Property. SSOF ¶35. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant
complaint alleging claims for declaratory relief, ejectment and unlawful
detainer. Defendant filed a cross-claim
alleging a breach of contract by Plaintiff to sell the Property to
Defendant.
As part of discovery, Plaintiff
served Defendant with requests for admissions (“RFAs”). SSOF ¶41.
Defendant did not respond even after Plaintiff offered to extend the
time to respond by another 33 days. SSOF
¶42. Instead, Defendant stated: “You
have all the answer from past communications … Anything you want need [sic] to
be by court order.” SSOF ¶43. Plaintiff then moved to deem admitted matters
in the RFAs, which Defendant did not oppose and which the Court granted. SSOF ¶¶44,45,46.
As a result of the Order to deem
matters admitted, Defendant has now admitted the following: (1) the Agreements
and Grant Deed are genuine and authentic, (2) Plaintiff is the “sole owner” of
the Property, (3) upon Mr. Cognein’s death, his life estate in the Property
ended, (4) since Mr. Cognein’s death, Plaintiff “has had the sole right to
occupy” the Property, (5) Defendant received Plaintiff’s 60 day notice to quit,
(6) Defendant continues to occupy the Property, (7) Defendant has “no legal right to occupy” the Property
since Mr. Cognein’s death, (8) to the extent any tenancy was created, “any such
tenancy was properly terminated by the 60 Day Notice”, and (9) Defendant never
agreed to pay Plaintiff $2.75 million and Defendant failed to satisfy necessary
conditions as set out in Plaintiff’s offer letter. SSOF ¶¶47-65.
Based in large part on Defendant’s
admissions, Plaintiff now seeks a motion to summarily adjudicate its claims for
(1) declaratory relief, (2) unlawful detainer and (3) ejectment. Plaintiff also seeks summary adjudication of
Defendant’s cross-claim for breach of contract on the ground that no contract
was formed. Defendant has not filed an
Opposition.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A party may move for summary adjudication
as to one or more causes of action. CCP
§437c(f)(1). A motion for summary
adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary
judgment. Id. §437c(f)(2). A motion
for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is
no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. §437c(c).
A plaintiff meets its burden on summary
adjudication by proving “each element of the cause of action entitling the
party to judgment on that cause of action” after which the burden shifts to
defendant to show a triable issue of fact.
Id. §437c(p)(1). It is not plaintiff’s initial burden to
disprove affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant. (Oldcastle
Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermans Mutual Cas. Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th
554, 565.)
A defendant (or here, a cross-defendant)
meets its burden on summary adjudication by showing “that one or more elements
of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established
or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met
that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” CCP
§437c(p)(2).
Thus, where there is no material dispute
of fact, summary adjudication should be granted. (LPP
Mortgage Ltd. v. Bizar (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 773, 776.)
DISCUSSION
I.
The
Court Grants Summary Adjudication on Plaintiff’s Claim for Declaratory Relief
A party may obtain declaratory
relief if two elements are met: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief and
(2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [the
party’s] rights or obligations.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance LLC (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.)
Here, ownership of the Property and the right to occupy it are proper
subjects for declaratory relief, as the declarations sought concern “rights or
duties” with respect to “property”. CCP
§1060. Also, the Complaint and Answer present
an actual controversy and create justiciable questions.
Plaintiff seeks declarations that:
(1) Defendant “is not a tenant of [Plaintiff] and has no rights as a tenant”;
(2) Defendant “has no right to occupy
the Property as a tenant of [Plaintiff] or otherwise”; (3) Defendant “has had
no right to occupy the Property since Mr. Cognein’s death” and (4) assuming
Defendant had any rights as a tenant, all such rights were validly terminated
by Plaintiff’s 60 day notice. Defendant
has admitted each of the foregoing, by virtue of the Court’s order to deem admitted
matters in the RFAs. See SSOF ¶¶52,54,55,57,58,59.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has met its
initial burden to show there is no triable issue of fact on its claim for
declaratory relief, and so the burden shifts to Defendant to come forward with
evidence showing there is a triable issue.
Defendant has failed to meet its burden as it has not even filed an
Opposition, and in any event, it has admitted to the facts supporting
Defendant’s claim for declaratory relief.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.
II.
The
Court Grants Summary Adjudication on Plaintiff’s Claim for Ejectment
Defendant admits Defendant is the
sole owner of the Property, and she is occupying the Property without rights. On these facts, Defendant is entitled to a
judgment ejecting Defendant.
The essential elements of an
ejectment claim are the plaintiff’s ownership of some interest in real
property, and the defendant’s possession and withholding of the property. Witkin, Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2008)
Pleading, §634; Baugh v. Consumer Associates Ltd. (1966) 241 Cal.App. 673, 675
(“The essential elements of a cause of action for ejectment are ownership
disclosing a right to possession, the defendant’s possession, and a withholding
thereof from the plaintiff.”).
Here, Defendant has admitted
Plaintiff is the sole owner of the Property.
SSOF ¶48. She has also admitted
that she continues to occupy the Property, which amounts to unauthorized
possession and withholding. SSOF
¶53. Accordingly, there is no triable
issue that all the elements of an ejectment claim are met, and the Court GRANTS summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s
ejectment claim.
III.
The
Court Grants Summary Adjudication on Plaintiff’s Claim for Unlawful Detainer
Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful
detainer is “pled in the alternative, in the event the Court finds that
[Defendant] had any right to possession of the Property after Mr. Cognein’s
death.” Compl. ¶43. The owner of a residential property may
properly terminate a tenancy with just cause.
Civ. Code § 1946.2(a). Under the
statute, just cause includes “at fault just cause”, and “at fault just cause”
includes (1) committing waste, (2) assigning or subletting the premises in
violation of the tenant’s lease, and (3) tenant’s unjustified refusal to allow
the owner to enter the residential property.
Civ. Code §1946.2(b)(1)(H).
Here, all three grounds for finding “at
fault just cause” exist. First,
waste exists when an occupant diminishes the value of the Property by
“neglecting to do what an ordinarily prudent person would do in preserving his
own property.” (Bliss v. Security First Nat. Bank (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 50,
55.) Here, Defendant admits that she
“failed to preserve” the Property “such that the fair market value of the
[Property] has declined since [her] occupancy began.” SSOF ¶62.
Indeed, Defendant has allowed the conditions of the Property to become so
unsafe, the Property was cited by the fire department. SSOF ¶¶21-23,25,62.
Second, under the Agreements, Mr.
Cognein had no right to lease or sublease any portion of the Property without
Plaintiff’s written agreement. SSOF
¶16. Without Plaintiff’s permission, Mr.
Cognein bifurcated the Property and rented a portion of it to someone
else. SSOF ¶¶18,19. After his death, Defendant claimed she was
the successor in interest to Mr. Cognein’s rights as a lessor. SSOF ¶13.
Thus, Mr. Cognein and Defendant improperly rented a portion of the
Property in violation of the Agreements.
Third, Defendant repeatedly refused Plaintiff
access to the Property to abate hazardous conditions that were identified by
the fire department and Defendant’s neighbors.
SSOF ¶24. Even after the Court
issued a temporary restraining order, Defendant placed unreasonable
restrictions on Plaintiff’s ability to access the Property and threatened to
injure persons hired to clean up the property.
SSOF ¶67.
In sum, Plaintiff has established as
a matter of law that even if there was a tenancy, Plaintiff had “at fault just
cause” to terminate the tenancy.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detainer.
IV.
The
Court Grants Summary Adjudication on Defendant’s Cross Claim for Breach of
Contract
To prevail on a claim for breach of
contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a contract, (2) the
plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s
breach, and (4) resulting damage to the plaintiff. Richman
v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.
Here, the undisputed facts show
there was no contract. Defendant never
agreed to the sale price in Plaintiff’s offer.
Defendant returned Plaintiff’s offer letter with the marking it “Price
to be readjusted.” SSOF
¶29. Plaintiff’s offer was also
contingent on several conditions that Defendant never satisfied. SSOF ¶56.
On these facts, the Court finds there was no contract, and therefore GRANTS summary adjudication in
Plaintiff’s favor on Defendant’s cross-claim.
ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication
is GRANTED in its entirety.
DATED: October 18, 2022 ___________________________
Edward
B. Moreton, Jr.
Judge
of the Superior Court