Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 21SMCV01766, Date: 2022-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21SMCV01766    Hearing Date: November 21, 2022    Dept: 200

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 200

BACKGROUND

This is an unlawful detainer and ejectment action.  The property at issue is located at 389 Upper Mesa Road, Santa Monica, California (the “Property”). The Property was bought by Guy Cognein who later donated it to Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant The UCLA Foundation (“the Foundation”).  Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff Perside Nicole Cognein (“Mrs. Cognein”) is the wife of Mr. Cognein, who continues to live on the Property. 

The Foundation filed a Complaint, seeking primarily a declaration that Mrs. Cognein had no right to occupy the Property and a writ of possession against Mrs. Cognein.  Mrs. Cognein who is appearing in pro per countersued, alleging over 20 claims based on largely incomprehensible allegations, some of which accuse persons and entities who are not even parties in this case.   

            This hearing is on the Foundation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The motion is directed at all but two of the cross-claims.  The two cross-claims that are not the subject of the motion are (1) the first cause of action for breach of contract, which the Court has already summarily adjudicated in the Foundation’s favor, and (2) the fourth cause of action for trespass, which The Foundation agrees should proceed to trial. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Foundation requests judicial notice of the Complaint, the Cross-Complaint, and a printout of the California Secretary of State registration information for the Foundation.  There is no opposition to the request.  The Court grants the request as to the Complaint and Cross-Complaint as it may take judicial notice of records of any court of this state.  Evid. Code §452(d). The Court also grants the request as to the Secretary of State registration as it “shall” take notice of matters once a party requests it and (1) gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request and (2) furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.  Evid. Code §453.

LEGAL STANDARD

It is well established in California that either prior to trial, but after the time to answer or demur has passed, or at the trial, the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense.  (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; see also Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586 (The non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings can be made at any time, even during trial, since the grounds for a general demurrer are never waived.), see also Code Civ. Proc. §438(f).) 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (See, e.g., Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (TRG 1998) §§ 7:275, 7:322; Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.)  Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id.; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)  Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677; Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp, (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.)

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings where the complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”  Code Civ. Proc. §438(c).  The motion may be made so long as the “moving party did not demur to the complaint … on the same grounds as the basis for the motion.”  Id. §438(g).  The Foundation did not demur to the Cross-Complaint. 

DISCUSSION

Defamantion/Libel/Slander

Mrs. Cognein’s claims for defamation, libel and slander simply list the parties they are pled against.  Cross-Compl. at 10.  They do not identify the statements that are allegedly defamatory, libelous or slanderous; explain why they are so; or even show that the statements were published by the Foundation.  Cross-Compl at p. 10.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s claims for defamation, libel and slander. 

Invasion of Privacy

Mrs. Cognein’s claim for invasion of privacy is similarly defective.  To establish this claim, Mrs. Cognein is required to show three elements: (1) she possessed a legally protected privacy interest; (2) her expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable, and (3) the invasion of privacy complained of must be serious in both nature and scope.  (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (2013) 56 Cal.4^th 906, 926.)  Mrs. Cognein has not pled any of these elements. 

She claims that “financial records was (sic) stolen from our mailbox by john doe affiliated to ucla reviled (sic) confidential information about my husband which directly has financially and psychological well being effects on me.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 10.  Mrs. Cognein does not explain the nature of the confidential information she claims was stolen so she has not shown she possessed a legally protected privacy interest in that information or that her expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.  Indeed, she claims the information was about her husband, and not her.  She also alleges the claim against “st john staff ula (sic) affiliated doctors”, so it is not even clear she is alleging the claim against the Foundation, as opposed to a UCLA hospital.  She has certainly plead no facts showing any connection between the person who allegedly stole the confidential records and the Foundation.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s invasion of privacy claim.    

Breach of Confidentiality Agreement

Mrs. Cognein’s claim for breach of confidentiality agreement only names parties and contains no specific allegations.  Mrs. Cognein has not even alleged the existence of a confidentiality agreement, much less that the terms of such an agreement have been breached by the Foundation.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s breach of confidentiality agreement. 

Discrimination, Harassment, Ageism, Racism

Mrs. Cognein alleges the Foundation was “driving [her] as minority out of the neighborhood,” was harassing her, and was engaged in ageism and racism.  Again, these claims are devoid of any specific allegations.  To the extent there is any specificity alleged, they suggest the claims are being brought against parties other than the Foundation.  Mrs. Cognein’s racism claim is being brought against the “ucla OBYN department,” which she claims interviewed and failed to hire her.  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  Further, Plaintiff’s ageism claim complains that in the course of the unlawful detainer action, the Foundation remarked on the age gap between her and her husband.  Even assuming such a claim would give rise to age discrimination (it would not), the statements are protected by the litigation privilege.  Civ. Code §47(b).  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s claims for discrimination (“driving me as minority out of the neighborhood”), harassment, ageism and racism. 

Conspiracy

Mrs. Cognein alleges “ucla conspir[ed] with her neighbors to intimidate [her] and commit illegal act gentrification I have truck they want mazzerati to park there against all defendant.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  This claim is largely incomprehensible.  In any event, “[c]ivil conspiracy is not an independent tort.  Instead, it is a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.”  (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4^th 211-212.)  The Cross-Complaint offers no detail as to any alleged concerted effort, mutual understanding or overt act in furtherance of a common design as required to sustain a claim for liability under a conspiracy theory.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s conspiracy claim.    

False Appraisal

The Foundation conducted an appraisal of the Property and offered Mrs. Cognein the opportunity to purchase the Property for the appraised value.  Mrs. Cognein alleges this was a “false appraisal.”  Specifically, she alleges that “ucla john doe has falsely appraised [her] resident (sic) that no one professionals is agree with it (drive by appraisal).”  Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  Again, the claim is incomprehensible.  To the extent the claim is one for fraud, it does not identify the statements that are fraudulent or explain why they are false.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings on Mrs. Cognein’s false appraisal claim. 

Unlawful Solicitation

Mrs. Cognein alleges a claim for “unlawful solicitations and grooming non sophisticated individuals to be lured in signing unconscionable contracts.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  Again, there are no allegations to support this claim.  To the extent Mrs. Cognein is alleging the Foundation duped her husband, Mr. Cognein, into signing the agreements that donated the Property to the Foundation, she has alleged no facts to support the claim, nor to support her standing to pursue the claim.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s unlawful solicitation claim.

False Lien/Filing False Claim    

            Mrs. Cognien alleges a claim for “[f]alse lien aka paper terrorism.  I am informed that ucla foundation has 100000 lien on my asset they don’t know why.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  She also alleges a claim for “filing false claim and false lien our asset.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  As with her other claims, these claims are unintelligible and devoid of any factual support.  It is not clear what “lien” is being alleged, why it is a “false” lien, or what actions the Foundation has undertaken with respect to the “false lien”.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings on Mrs. Cognein’s false lien claims.

Interfering with Probate Proceeding

Mrs. Cognein alleges “[i]nterfering with my probate proceeding been denied twice.” Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  There are no facts to support this claim.  It is not clear how the Foundation allegedly interfered with her probate proceedings or how such interference gives rise to any cognizable claim.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings on Mrs. Cognein’s “interfering with probate proceeding” claim.       

He Says He Is an Insider

Mrs. Cognein alleges a claim titled “[h]e says he is an insider.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 11.  It is not clear what this claim seeks to allege, much less that it is a cognizable claim.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings on Mrs. Cognein’s “insider” claim.

Corporate Corruption

Mrs. Cognein alleges a claim for “Corporate corruption” against the Foundation based on the fact that “ucla per se and judy burn they bought a house from the bank pennies on a dollars now they want to drive me out so wheel and deal on my resident someone get bribed in the process same shell game from mortgage fraud of 2008.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  These allegations are not intelligible and do not support any cognizable claim.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings on Mrs. Cognein’s “corporate corruption” claim. 

Loss of Consortium/Insurance Fraud/Kidnapping and False Imprisonment/Malpractice

Mrs. Cognein alleges a claim for loss of consortium against “st john hospital James Harvar ucla physicians”.  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  She also alleges a “medical insurance fraud” claim against “st john jane doe social workers.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  She further alleges a claim for “kidnaping, false imprisonment and assault to inflict emotional distress” against “john and jane doe in st john wells fargo whole food.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  Additionally, she alleges a claim for “mal practice loss of medical record” against “st john.”  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  As to all these claims, Mrs. Cognein is alleging conduct on the part of others, not the Foundation.  None of these other parties are a defendant in this matter.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to all these claims.       

Antitrust

Mrs. Cognein alleges antitrust based on her inability to retain counsel which she claims is because lawyers “fear back lash and retaliations” and “boycott” from the Foundation.  Cross-Compl. at p. 12.  This claim is unsupported by any factual allegations.  Even if it were, it would not constitute an antitrust violation.  Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the pleadings as to Mrs. Cognein’s antitrust claim. 

Leave to Amend

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)  But the burden is on the  complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  Mrs. Cognein has filed no opposition, and accordingly, has not met her burden to show that her Cross-Complaint can be amended to address the many deficiencies noted in this Order.

CONCLUSION

            Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant The UCLA Foundation's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 21, 2022                                    ___________________________

                                                                                    Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court