Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 21STCV18600, Date: 2022-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV18600 Hearing Date: December 6, 2022 Dept: 200
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octavio pineda, Plaintiff, v. RENAL CAREPARTNERS OF LOS ANGELES, et
al., Defendants. |
Case No.:
21STCV18600 Hearing Date: December 6, 2022 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: PLAINTIFF octavio pineda’s MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE fourth AMENDED COMPLAINT |
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff
Octavio Pineda
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants
Renal CarePartners of Los Angeles, Inc., US Renal Care Culver City Dialysis and
Jaime Leongson
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a medical negligence claim. Plaintiff Octavio Pineda was receiving
dialysis treatment from Defendants Renal CarePartners of Los Angeles, Inc., US
Renal Care Culver City Dialysis and Jaime Leongson. Plaintiff developed a blister at the site where
he received dialysis. Over the next twelve
visits, the blister grew, but Defendants took no action. Plaintiff claims Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff’s
primary care physician or the doctor at the facility about the enlarged blister. Eventually, the blister burst, and Plaintiff
had to be taken to the emergency room, where he was in critical condition due
to the loss of a significant amount of blood and almost died.
The first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleged claims for
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). The Court sustained a demurrer to the FAC on
grounds that the negligence claim sounded in professional negligence, not
ordinary negligence, and that the NIED claim cannot survive as an independent
cause of action because Plaintiff’s fiancé and children were not “at the scene
of the injury-producing event at the time it occurred.” (December 3, 2021 Minute Order.) Plaintiff sought reconsideration which was
denied. (February 9, 2022 Minute Order.)
Plaintiff
then filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) which again alleged ordinary
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants again demurred, arguing that the
first cause of action for negligence must be alleged as a claim for medical
negligence and Plaintiffs had failed to remove the cause of action for
NIED. Plaintiff argued he adequately
plead negligence via a negligent retention and hiring claim. The Court concluded the amendment was outside
the scope of the Court’s prior grant of leave, and the Court had only given Plaintiff
leave to amend to allege a claim for professional negligence, rather than
ordinary negligence. (June 22, 2022
Minute Order.) Plaintiff then filed a
Third Amended Complaint alleging only medical negligence.
This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a
Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiff
seeks leave to add claims for “general negligence” and “negligent hiring,
training, supervision and retention.” No
opposition was filed.
LEGAL STANDARD
CCP § 473(a)(1), provides, in
relevant part: “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as
may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or
striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a
party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the
time for answer or demurrer.¿ The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to
the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any
pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an
answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”
Under California Rules of Court
Rule, rule 3.1324, subdivision (a),¿a motion to amend a pleading shall:
(1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended
pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous
pleadings or amendments;
(2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are
proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number,
the deleted allegations are located; and
(3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the
previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the
additional allegations are located.¿
In addition, under California
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, subdivision (b),¿a¿separate declaration¿must
accompany the motion and must specify:¿
(1) the effect of the amendment;
(2) why the amendment is necessary and proper;
(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations
were discovered; and
(4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made
earlier.
The Court’s discretion to grant
leave “should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial
policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.”¿ (Kittredge
Sports Co. v. Superior Court¿(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.)¿
Ordinarily, the Court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended
pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion
to strike are premature.¿¿The Court, however, does have discretion to deny
leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of
action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment.¿
(See¿California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(1985) 173
Cal.App.3d 274, 281 (overruled on other grounds by¿Kransco v. American
Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co.¿(2000) 23 Cal.4th 390).)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s
declaration in support of the motion satisfies the requirements under CRC Rule
3.1324. Plaintiff identifies the
amendments, their effect, and the recently received information that prompted
the amendment. (Bhanji Decl. ¶¶3, 10, 12,
13.)
The
Court next considers whether the amendment is proper. Plaintiff seeks to add an ordinary negligence
claim, on which the Court had previously sustained a demurrer. According to Plaintiff, the ordinary negligence
claim is based on allegations that the “Defendant facility did not maintain and
follow health and safety protocols and or policies within Defendant facility and
in compliance with federal and state regulations.” (Motion at 8.) But these were the same allegations made in his
First Amended Complaint (FAC ¶48), on which the demurrer was sustained.
Plaintiff
also seeks to add a claim for negligent hiring, training, supervision and
retention. Again, these allegations were
part of his First Amended Complaint (FAC ¶48), on which the demurrer was
sustained.
Plaintiff
argues that these additional claims “cannot fall within the medical negligence
cause of action because Defendant facility is not a natural person but a
corporation.” (Motion at 9.) But hospitals, clinics and facilities are
subject to medical negligence claims. Indeed,
Plaintiff is asserting its medical negligence claim against Defendant
facilities.
Relying
on Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners Medical Group (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th
1412, 1420, Plaintiff argues that only “health care providers” can be sued for
medical negligence, and a “health care provider” includes only natural persons
licensed to practice medicine. But Lathrop
acknowledged that, under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (or
“MICRA”), a “health care provider” includes
both “(1) any person licensed or
certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500)
of the Business and Professions Code … and
any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to
Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200)
of the Health and Safety Code.” (Id.
at 1419 (emphasis added).) In Lathrop,
the corporate defendant did not argue that it was a clinic, health dispensary
or health facility, so the court focused on whether it would qualify as a “person
licensed or certified under Division 2 of the Business and Professions
Code.” (Id.) Lathrop did not hold that a medical
negligence claim can only be made against a natural person.
Plaintiff
next argues that “non-licensed employees/agents of the Defendant facility who
are not licensed health care providers as outlined by Business and Professions
Code 2000 et seq. cannot be held liable for their negligent acts under the
theory of medical negligence.” (Motion
at 9.) But the only employee or agent
Plaintiff has sued is Jamie Leongson who is the Administrator and Director of
Nursing at Defendant US Renal Care Culver City Dialysis. Plaintiff has not alleged that Mr. Leongson
is not a licensed health care provider.
Accordingly,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is futile as
it seeks to assert claims on which Court has previously sustained a demurrer.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file fourth amended complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 6, 2022 ___________________________
Edward
B. Moreton, Jr.
Judge
of the Superior Court