Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Respondent Chad Padilla 

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Petitioner State Bar of California  

 

 

BACKGROUND 

 

This case arises from Respondent Chad Padilla’s alleged unauthorized practice of law.  Petitioner State Bar of California alleges that Respondent has never been a licensee of the State Bar of California but has deliberately misled clients, judges, and the public into believing that he is entitled to represent and assist pro per litigants and perform legal services on their behalf.   

This hearing is on Respondent’s motion for “a trial by jury after waiver.”  Respondent argues (1) he is entitled to a trial by jury, (2) he has never waived his right to a jury trial, and (3) even if he waived his right to a jury trial, the Court should relieve him of such a waiver under Code Civ. Proc. §473(b).  

DISCUSSION 

It is a well-established principle that “‘[t]he jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity.” (C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8.)  In classifying a given action as legal or equitable, the Court looks to its substance, i.e., the nature of the rights at issue and the remedy sought.  The label attached to a complaint or cause of action does not control. (Fearey v. Gough (1943) 61 Cal. App. 2d 778; Paularena v. Superior Court (1965) 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 911.)  

“Although … ‘the legal or equitable nature of a cause of action ordinarily is determined by the mode of relief to be afforded’, the prayer for relief in a particular case is not conclusive.” (C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal.3d at 9; see Walton v. Walton (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 277, 287.)  Rather, the “practice of the court is to examine also the allegations of the complaint in reaching its determination as to the kind of action the plaintiff is bringing.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996), Actions, § 119, p. 186, italics omitted.)  An accurate indication may often be gleaned from a combined review of the caption, prayer and allegations. (Ibid.)  

Here, the petition seeks relief pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §6126.3.  Section 6126.3 allows the State Bar to apply to the Court to assume jurisdiction over an unauthorized law practice.  Section 6126.3(d) provides that the “application shall be set for hearing, and an order to show cause shall be issued directing the person to show cause why the court should not assume jurisdiction over the practice as provided in this section.”  By its express terms, §6126.3 does not allow for a jury trial but requires an OSC hearing.  

The petition also seeks only injunctive relief.  It seeks an order assuming jurisdiction over Respondent’s law practice and orders allowing the State Bar (1) to examine, retrieve, remove and secure in a protected area all files and records of Respondent’s practice, (2) to notify possible clients to obtain other legal counsel; (3) to arrange for the surrender or delivery of clients’ papers or property; and (4) to apply for appointment of a receiver to take possession and control of any bank accounts relating to Respondent’s unauthorized practice.  The petition also seeks an order to compel Respondent to provide any passwords required to access electronic data and not to withdraw funds from any frozen bank account.  Further, the petition seeks orders to compel third parties to assist in unwinding the unauthorized law practice, including having the telephone company to disconnect the phone lines, the webhost to modify or remove any websites associated with the law practice; the owner of the premises where the practice is located to allow access to the premises, and the US Postal Service to enter a change of address for all mail addressed to the law practice.   

These are all types of injunctive relief.  And there is no right to a jury trial for an action that seeks only injunctive relief.  (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846 (an action seeking only specific performance and injunctive relief is an equitable one for which there is no right to a jury trial); People v. Englebrecht (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1245 (essence of an action for injunctive relief is equitable and there is no right to a jury trial).) 

Respondent argues that because the request for injunctive relief is based on statute, the gist of the action is legal, and a jury trial must be granted.  But the authorities he cites do not support his argument.   

C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. did not involve a request for injunctive relief based on a statute.  There, plaintiff solicited bids from defendant and other subcontractors for the installation of reinforcing steel in the construction of a waste water treatment plant.  Plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages after defendant refused to perform in accordance with its bid on the subcontract.  The court found that the request for damages did not mean the claim was a legal one, entitled to a jury trial.  Rather, the court looked to the “gist of the action” which was a claim for promissory estoppel that would require a jury to determine whether injustice could be avoided only by enforcement of defendant’s promise.  The court concluded the “gist of such an action” was equitable, thus plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial.   (C & K Engineering Contractors, 23 Cal.3d at 11.)  As in C&K Engineering Contractors, the gist of the action here is a claim for injunctive relief for which there is no right to a jury trial, and where the statute on which the claim is based only allows for an OSC hearing.   

Plaintiff’s citation to Ceriale v. Superior Court is equally unavailing.  There, the trial court ordered that plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract, negligence, and emotional distress in her legal malpractice action be tried as equitable issues because the underlying action, plaintiff’s dissolution of marriage, was an equitable proceeding.  The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial for her claims because those claims would have been tried to a jury at common law.  The court of appeal allowed the peremptory writ to issue because the fact that equitable principles were involved in the legal malpractice action did not abrogate petitioner’s constitutional right to a jury trial.  (Ceriale, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1631-1636.)  This case does not involve claims of breach of contract, negligence or emotional distress, which are long recognized to be legal claims, entitled to be tried to a jury.  Unlike here, Ceriale did not involve a claim for injunctive relief based on a statute.   

Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 5th 279 is instructive.  There, the court concluded no right to a jury trial existed for causes of action under California's unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq., and California's false advertising law (FAL), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq., because the gist of these causes of action was equitable (as they seek injunctive relief) and they differed significantly from actions triable by jury at common law.  (Id. at 327.)  As in this case, the claims in Nationwide, sought injunctive relief pursuant to a statute.  Accordingly, the mere fact that the request for injunctive relief is based on statute does not render the claim one at law, entitled to a jury trial. 

Respondent also argues that Judge Zukin concluded he was entitled to a jury trial when she waived jury and interpreter fees.  But Judge Zukin was never presented with, nor did she consider, the issues raised here, as to whether Respondent had a right to a jury trial.  “Opinions are not authority for issues they do not consider.” (Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 530, 539.)  Accordingly, her waiver of fees does not mean she found Respondent is entitled to a jury trial.     

Because the Court concludes there is no right to a jury trial, it does not consider Respondent’s other arguments that he has not waived a jury trial or if he has, he should be relieved of the waiver.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Respondent’s motion for a trial by jury after waiver.      

DATED:  February 15, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court