Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 22SMCV00116, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00116    Hearing Date: December 13, 2022    Dept: 205

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Jessica Harbeck and Nicole Harbeck

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendants and Cross-Complainants Misti Schwartz, Courtney Schwartz and Simon Kittiyachavalit

BACKGROUND

            This cases arises from a bitter feud between neighbors.  Plaintiffs Jessica Harbeck and Nicole Harbeck allege their neighbors, Defendants Misti Schwartz and Courtney Schwartz, are operating an illegal vacation rental in violation of Santa Monica’s Municipal Code (SMMC).  (Compl. ¶22.)  The Harbecks have also sued their landlord, Defendant Simon Kittiyachavalit, for allegedly aiding and abetting the Schwartzes in the violation.  (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.)  The Complaint alleges two claims, but only one survived demurrer.  The sole claim remaining is for operating an illegal vacation rental in violation of SMMC.  (Compl. ¶¶ 18-43.)

The Schwartzes have countersued Jessica Harbeck for allegedly engaging in an “ongoing and unrelenting campaign of harassment, threats, stalking and intimidation.”  (Cross-Compl. ¶10.)  According to the Schwartzes, Jessica has destroyed their property, impersonated them on line, set up fictitious online accounts in their names, and stalked them at their new home.  (Cross-Compl. ¶10.)  As a result of this harassment, the Schwartzes felt so unsafe in their apartment, they had to move elsewhere, although they continued to pay rent on their unit.  So that they would not be out of pocket on two rents, they subleased their unit with their landlord’s permission.  (Cross Compl. ¶17.)  However, Jessica began to harass the subtenants, threatening them, falsely accusing the Schwartzes of being scammers, wrongfully suggesting the sublease was illegal, and telling them things were going to “get ugly.”  (Cross Compl. ¶17.)  The Cross-Complaint alleges four claims for (1) conversion, (2) private nuisance, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (4) intentional interference with contract.

This hearing is on the Harbecks’ motion to bifurcate.  The Harbecks seek a bench trial on their sole claim of violation of the SMMC, which they argue should precede a jury trial on the Cross-Complaint.  According to the Harbecks, their claim involves discrete issues of law with minimal disputed issues of fact that can be easily and quickly tried before the Court.     

LEGAL STANDARD

“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action … or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues…”  Code Civ. Proc., § 1048 (b).  The court has general discretion to order certain issues tried before others “when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby.”  Code Civ. Proc., § 598.    

Absent a statutory provision providing otherwise, there is no right to bifurcation.  All such orders are permissive.  See National Electricity Supply Co. v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist.¿(1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 418, 421 (bifurcation¿is permissive where it does not prejudice any party’s substantial right).  Granting or denying a motion to bifurcate lies within the trial court's broad discretion.  See Vegetable Oil Products Co. v. Superior Court¿(1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 252 (Vegetable Oil Products); see also Pilliod v. Monsanto Co. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591, 626 (Pilliod). 

DISCUSSION

            The Harbecks move the Court to try their “much shorter and more law-based cause of action first, as a bench trial, to conserve judicial resources and focus the issues to be decided by the longer jury trial demanded by the Cross-Complaint.”  (Motion at 2.)  The Shwartzes argue, however, that there will be no judicial economy because a bifurcated trial on the Harbecks’ SMMC claim would not narrow the legal questions or factual disputes with respect to claims of the Cross-Complaint.  (Opp. at 3.)  The Court agrees with the Schwartzes.

            The Harbecks have not shown that a finding that the Schwartzes violated the SMMC would obviate or narrow any of the Schwartzes’ cross-claims except their cross-claim for intentional interference with contractual relations which on balance, even if eliminated, would not result in significant savings of time and costs.  The Schwartzes argue conclusorily that if the sublet was illegal, the Schwartzes would have “less of a claim” to conversion of their personal property.  (Motion at 8.)  There is no authority cited.  Likewise, the Harbecks argue that the nuisance claim “would no longer be applicable” because the Harbecks had a right to complain about the allegedly illegal sublet.  (Motion at 9.)  But the Schwartzes are alleging nuisance that goes beyond a complaint about an illegal sublet, including among other things that Jessica Harbeck was harassing, threatening and stalking them.  The Harbecks offer no argument as to how the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim would be narrowed.  (Motion at 9.)  And as to the cross-claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, while the illegality of the sublease would obviate a claim for contractual interference, the elimination of this cross-claim alone would not result in significant conservation of judicial resources as the facts supporting the interference claim are the same as those supporting the other cross-claims. 

            The Schwartzes also dispute the Harbecks’ characterization that the presentation of their claim will be “short” or law-based.  The Schwartzes argue that resolution of the Harbeck’s SMMC claim will require examination of the terms of each lease or rental agreement for the unit, as well as testimony by some of the various sub-tenants who will also be witnesses in connection with the Schwartzes’ cross-claims for nuisance and conversion.  (Opp. at 3-4.)  The Court agrees.  The Schwartzes’ SMMC claim will require the fact finder to examine the terms of each lease to determine if they violate the SMMC.  Further, the sequencing proposed by the Schwartzes would not result in the convenience of witnesses as the subtenant witnesses will then have to testify in two separate trials.  This alone militates against a grant of the motion to bifurcate. 

            The Schwartzes also argue that the Court “must be able to hear evidence essential to its obligation to balance the equities, as a necessary prerequisite to awarding the equitable relief requested by [the Harbecks].”  (Opp. at 4.)  The Court agrees.  The Harbecks seek injunctive relief which is an equitable relief, requiring the court to “consider the relative equities and circumstances between the parties.”  Koller v. Specialized Loan Servicing, 2017 Cal. Super. LEXIS 40189 at *22 (citing Pahl v. Ribero (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 154, 161; Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 455).)  The Court cannot properly weigh these equities without also weighing the facts supporting the Cross-Complaint, including, for example, that the Schwartzes were forced to sublet their apartment as a result of the threats, harassment and intimidation they endured from Jessica Harbeck.  In any event, even if the Court were to accept the Harbeck’s argument that in this case the Court should not seek to balance the equities but, rather just consider the public good, that argument would be insufficient to justify bifurcation.

            In sum, the Court concludes that the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice and the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would not be promoted by a bifurcation. 

CONCLUSION

            Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants’ motion to bifurcate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  December 13, 2022                                ___________________________

                                                                                    Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court