Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from a failed bid for two government projects.  Plaintiff Aaron Celious is the owner of Maroon Society Inc. (“Maroon”).  Maroon has assigned its claims to Celious.  (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶14.)  Maroon is in the business of providing data compilation, analysis and strategic services for both private and public sector entities.  (Id. ¶21.)  Maroon engaged in a competitive bid process for two different projects for Defendant City of Los Angeles (the “City”).  It was not chosen for either project.  (Id. ¶¶23-24.)   

Defendant Ernesto Morales’ company, North Star Alliances LLC, was awarded the bid for one of the projects.  (Id. ¶¶8, 28, 82.)  Defendant Robin Engel’s company, Star Insights, LLC, was awarded the bid for the other project.  (Id. ¶¶9, 28, 170.)  Plaintiff alleges that Engel and Morales grossly and fraudulently misrepresented the qualifications and experiences of their companies, to obtain an unfair competitive advantage over Maroon.  (Id. ¶28.)   

The operative second amended complaint alleges claims for (1) fraud, (2) negligence, (3) violation of Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) intentional interference with prospective economic relations, (5) negligent interference with prospective economic relations, and (6) violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 

Plaintiff moved to file a third amended complaint (“TAC”), which the Court denied on grounds that Plaintiff’s declaration did not meet the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).  Plaintiff then renewed his motion for leave to file a TAC, with a new declaration.  The Court denied the renewed motion on ground Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §1008, as Plaintiff did not show diligence in submitting the new declaration.     

This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion for relief under Code Civ. Proc. §473(b) for excusable neglect to file a motion for leave to amend complaint.  Plaintiff argues his neglect in failing to submit a code-compliant declaration in support of his motion to amend was excusable because he is pro se litigant entitled to some leniency regarding procedural mistakes.   

 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Under¿Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), the Court may relieve a party from a dismissal taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise,¿or¿excusable neglect.  This application must be filed no more than six months after entry of the order from which relief is sought and must contain an affidavit of fault demonstrating the moving party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 

A mistake is a basis for relief under¿section 473¿when by reason of the mistake a party failed to make a timely response.  Surprise occurs when a party is unexpectedly placed in a position to his injury without any negligence of his own.  Excusable neglect is a basis for relief when the party has shown some reasonable excuse for the default.  (Credit Managers Association of California v. National Independent Business Alliance (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173;¿Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.)  An “excusable” error means one which a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances might have made. (Solv-All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007.)¿ 

Under¿Code of Civil Procedure section 473, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an excusable ground, such as fraud or mistake, justifying a court's vacating a judgment. (Basinger v. Roger & Wells (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 16, 23-24.) 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff seeks relief from this Court’s order denying his motion for leave to file the TAC due to his failure to understand the procedural rules as a pro se litigant.  But ignorance of the law is not “excusable neglect”.  (A & S Air Conditioning v. John J. Moore Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 617, 620; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319.) 

That Plaintiff is appearing in pro se does not matter.  Litigants who choose to represent themselves must be treated in the same manner as represented parties and must follow the correct rules of procedure.  (Rappleyea v Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985;¿Nwosu v Uba¿(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)  A self-represented litigant is not entitled to any greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.  (Petrosyan v Prince Corp. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 587, 594¿(self-represented litigants are entitled to same treatment as represented parties); See¿McComber v. Wells¿(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522-523 (pro¿se¿litigants are not entitled to special treatment and are¿required¿to¿follow¿the¿rules); Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639 (“When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.  Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.”).) 

Citing Rappleyea v. Campbell, Plaintiff argues that as a pro se litigant, he is entitled to some leniency in procedural matters.  But Rappleyea actually supports denial of his requested relief.  There, our Supreme Court held: “Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to¿parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Id. at 984-985, citing Lawrence v. Superior Court¿(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 611, 619, fn. 4.)  The reasoning for equal treatment of pro se and represented litigants is that any other rule “would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.”  (Id. at 985.) 

In Rappleyea, out of state defendants proceeding in propria persona, mailed their answer to plaintiff's complaint to the clerk of courts within the 30-day period of¿Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 412.20(a)(3), but submitted an incorrect filing fee pursuant to the clerk of court’s instructions. The answer was returned and refiled after the 30-day period expired. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a default judgment and denied defendants’ motion to set aside the judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the clerk’s incorrect advice about the filing fee and plaintiff's attorney’s incorrect advice to defendants about their right to set aside the judgment were extrinsic mistakes that caused defendants to miss the answer deadline of¿§ 412.20(a)(3)¿and the deadline to set aside a default judgment of¿Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473.  Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to set aside the default judgment.  In contrast to Rappleyea, there was no incorrect advice to Plaintiff about what he needed to do to submit a code-compliant declaration in support of his motion to amend. 

 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for relief under Code Civ. Proc. §473(b) for excusable neglect to file motion for leave to amend complaint.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: September 24, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court