PROCEEDINGS: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

MOVING PARTY: Carmen John Perri   

RESPONDING PARTY: Z&F Properties LLC 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”).  Plaintiff Carmen John Perri, a person with disabilities, visited Fair Market, located at 10458 National Blvd, Los Angeles California (the “Property”) on or about June 26, 2022.  Fair Market is owned by Defendant Z&F Properties LLC.   

During his visit, Plaintiff encountered the following barriers to access related to his disability: (1) an accessible parking area whose slope exceeds Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), (2) an accessible parking space that does not provide compliant accessible parking signage, and (3) an access aisle that is inadequately marked. 

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 7, 2022 which seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendant to bring the Property into compliance with the Unruh Act; damages under the Unruh Act including the statutory minimum of $4,000 per violation; and attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code section 52.  Plaintiff seeks statutory damages for Plaintiff’s encounter with the barriers on or about June 26, 2022 ($4,000) and for being deterred from returning to the Property ($4,000).   

Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing Defendant was served personally through its agent for service of process on August 23, 2022.  Defendant was obligated to respond within 30 days. Defendant did not do so.  Plaintiff successfully requested the entry of Defendant’s default, which was entered by the Clerk’s Office on September 30, 2022.  Plaintiff requested a default judgment on June 6, 2023. Plaintiff served Defendant by mail with both the Request for Entry of Default and Request for Default Judgment.  Defendant has not appeared. 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

Default judgment against Defendant for a total of $9,074, which is comprised of: (1) $8,000 in statutory damages, (2) $570 in attorneys’ fees, and (3) $504 for costs.  Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief enjoining Defendant from further violations of the Unruh Act and mandating that Defendant provide an ADA-compliant property.   

ANALYSIS 

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 sets forth the two options for obtaining a default judgment. First, where the plaintiff’s complaint¿seeks compensatory damages only, in a sum certain which is readily ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint or statement of damages, the clerk may enter the default judgment for that amount. However, if the relief requested in the complaint is more complicated, consisting of either nonmonetary relief, or monetary relief in amounts which require either an accounting, additional evidence, or the exercise of judgment to ascertain, the plaintiff must request entry of judgment by the court. In such cases, the plaintiff must affirmatively establish his entitlement to the specific judgment requested.¿ (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 287.) Section 585 also allows for interest, costs and attorney fees, where otherwise allowed by law. (Code of Civ. Proc.  585(a).) 

Multiple specific documents are required, such as: (1) form CIV 100, (2) a brief summary of the case; (3) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (4) interest computations as necessary; (5) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties.  (CRC Rule 3.1800.)  

Here, Plaintiff has properly complied with all the substantive and procedural requirements for a default judgment.  Substantively, Plaintiff has stated a statutory basis for his claim for damages and attorneys’ fees.  A memorandum of costs in the amount of $504 is set forth in Item 7 of the CIV-100 form.  Plaintiff has filed a declaration in support of his claims.  Procedurally, Plaintiff properly served Defendant more than 30 days prior to requesting entry of default and default judgment, correctly completed JC Form CIV-100 in a manner that would not void or put at issue the entry of default, provided a declaration of non-military status, dismissed all fictitious defendants, requested damages in amounts supported by the filings and not in excess of the amount stated in the Complaint, and filed a proposed judgment (JUD-100).   As default has already been entered and there has been no appearance or filing whatsoever from Defendant, default judgment is appropriate here.   

However, while the Court awards Plaintiff’s requested statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, it denies Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.  The Unruh Act permits only preventive injunctive relief, not the mandatory injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks here.¿  

Civ. Code § 52 governs the remedies that may be imposed for a violation of the Unruh Act.¿ Section 52(c) provides for “[a] request for preventive relief[.]”¿ Although Cal. Civ. Code §52(c) does not define “preventive relief,” other provisions of the civil code (Cal. Civ. Code §3368) have defined it as “prohibiting a party from doing that which ought not to be done.”¿ If a word or phrase has a particular meaning in one part of the law, the court will give it the same meaning in other parts of the law.¿ (Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 890, 899; see also Balasubramanian v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 977, 988 (“We must construe identical words in different parts of the same act or in different statutes relating to the same subject matter as having the same meaning.”).¿¿¿ 

The California Supreme Court has explained that “[a]s a general rule, we think we may say that when the injunction merely grants preventive relief it is prohibitive, but when it directly or indirectly grants affirmative relief it is mandatory.”¿ (Ohaver v. Fenech (1928) 206 Cal. 118, 122; see also Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446-447 (“[T]he general rule is that an injunction is prohibitory if it requires a person to refrain from a particular act and mandatory if it compels performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties.”).)¿ “It is generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation, the Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.”¿ (Mattco Forge Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 854.)¿ The Legislature is thus presumed to know the Supreme Court’s definition of preventive relief and to have intended that meaning in § 52(c).¿ 

In this case, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendant from “further violations of the [Unruh Act]” which by necessity requires Defendant to affirmatively alter the property.¿ (Proposed Judgment ¶1.)  But Cal. Civ. Code 52(c) only allows an injunction for preventive relief and does not permit the affirmative or mandatory injunctions sought by Plaintiff here.¿ (See, e.g., Brian Whitaker v. Hugo Boss Retail Inc., 2023 Cal. Super. LEXIS 14327 at *9 (granting motion to strike request for mandatory injunctive relief under section 52(c)); Whitaker v. Federal Express Corp., 2023 Cal. Super. LEXIS 3910 at *10-*12 (section 52(c) only allows an injunction for preventive relief and does not permit the affirmative or mandatory injunctions sought by plaintiff); Whitaker v. California Pizza Kitchen, 2023 Cal. Super. LEXIS 30687 at *8 (“section 52(c) permits a plaintiff to seek prohibitory injunction requiring a defendant to refrain from a particular act but does not authorize the imposition of mandatory injunctive relief that compels the performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties”).)¿¿¿¿ 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER  

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Carmen John Perri’s Request for Default Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  Default judgment in the amount of $9,074.00 is awarded in favor of Plaintiff.  The Court denies the request for injunctive relief.