Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 22SMCV01090, Date: 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV01090    Hearing Date: January 31, 2023    Dept: 205

 

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

 

MOHAMMAD TEHRANI and LAURA A. LAW, 

 

                        Plaintiffs,

            v.

 

MANDEL PARKS, MANDEL PARKS REAL ESTATE and DOES 1 to 20,

 

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  22SMCV01090

 

  Hearing Date:  January 31, 2023

  [TENTATIVE] order RE:

  Defendant mandel-parks

  demurrer and motion

  to strike

 

 

 

MOVING PARTY:                    Defendant Mandel-Parks erroneously sued as Mandel Parks and Mandel Parks Real Estate

 

RESPONDING PARTY:         Plaintiffs Mohammad Tehrani and Laura Law

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Mohammad Tehrani and Laura Law allege Defendant Mandel Parks negligently caused damage to them from July 11, 2020 to present at 1545 Brockton Ave., Apt. #18, Los Angeles, Ca 90025.  Their complaint alleges in full: “Defendant’s caused intentional infliction of personal injury/injuries to Plaintiff’s for many years and continuing to present day, causing and allowing: severe physical injuries, severe emotional distress, punitive damages and other harm, caused by intentional negligence and more; and breach of contract, and more, and Premises Liabilities.”

 

This hearing is on Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike.  Defendant argues the entire complaint is subject to demurrer because it is ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain and fails to plead the essential elements of the claims alleged.  Defendant also moves to strike the claim for punitive damages because Plaintiff has failed to allege the factual predicates of malice, oppression and fraud.  Lastly, Defendant moves to strike the complaint as to Laura Law, because Mohammad Tehrani has signed the Complaint on her behalf, but he is not an attorney and therefore cannot represent Law in this lawsuit.   

LEGAL STANDARD

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)        

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”); Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

DISCUSSION

Demurrer

            A complaint is subject to demurrer where the pleading is uncertain or ambiguous and unintelligible.  Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f).  “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3 [222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360]; accord Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)

“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2 [229 Cal. Rptr. 605]; accord, McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387 (“[W]e ignore [e]rroneous or confusing labels … if the complaint pleads facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”; Saunders v. Cariss (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 905, 908 (“[T]he trial court is obligated to look past the form of a pleading to its substance.”).)

This is one of those rare cases where a demurrer for uncertainty is appropriate.  Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to support their conclusory allegations.  They simply recite a series of claims (“intentional negligence” “breach of contract” “premises liabilities” “intentional infliction of personal injuries”) and damages (“severe physical injuries” “severe emotional distress,” “punitive damages”), without alleging the facts that would support each element of the claim or each type of damage.    

Accordingly, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer on the ground that the complaint is uncertain and fails to plead facts that would support the claims alleged.  However, as the Court cannot say there is no reasonable possibility that an amendment would cure the defects noted above, the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint. 

Motion to Strike

   Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.  Defendants argue Plaintiffs have only made conclusory allegations that they are entitled to punitive damages without stating facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  The Court agrees.    

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (citations omitted).)  Allegations that merely plead the statutory phraseology are wholly insufficient to state a basis for recovery of punitive damages.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)  Conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct as willful, intentional or fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of the necessary factual grounds for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)     

To establish “malice”, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant intended to cause injury to plaintiff or (2) despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).).  “[A]bsent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs’ interest.  The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  (College Hosp. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  To establish “oppression,” Plaintiff must allege “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”  (Id.)  To establish “fraud,” Plaintiffs must allege “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”  (Id.)   

Malice and oppression both include a finding of despicable conduct.  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.

Here, Plaintiffs have not come close to alleging the facts necessary to support a punitive damages claim.  Plaintiffs only allege entitlement to punitive damages and refer to alleged intentional torts, without describing any conduct on the part of Defendant, much less alleging that the conduct rises to the level of malice, oppression or fraud.

Moreover, §3294 states that for a valid claim for punitive damages to be made against an employer, the employer must have had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her in conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others “or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct.”  With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”  Code Civ. Proc. §3294.  There are no such allegations in the Complaint. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages claim, although the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend as it is not clear that no amendment would cure the defect. 

Defendant also moves to strike the entire complaint brought by Plaintiff Laura Law.  Plaintiff Tehrani has filed and signed the Complaint on behalf of himself and Law.  But Tehrani has not identified himself as an attorney.  While a person may represent his or her own interests in legal proceedings, a nonlawyer may not represent the interests of others.  (J.W. v. Sup. Ct. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 969.)  “No person shall practice law (for another) in this State unless he is an active member of the state bar.”  Abar v. Rogers (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 862, 865 (citing Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125 and holding that pro per plaintiff should not have been permitted to represent both himself and his wife as plaintiffs.)  Accordingly, the Court also strikes the entire Complaint as to Law, although the Court will allow leave to amend to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to correct their error and properly sign the Complaint.   

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant Mandel Park’s demurrer to the entire complaint with leave to amend and GRANTS its motion to strike with leave to amend.  Plaintiffs have 30 days leave to amend.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATED: January 31, 2023                                                   ___________________________

Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court