Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

 

This case arises from a landlord-tenant dispute.  Plaintiff Judy Sharinger was a tenant of property located at 14979 La Cumbre Drive, Pacific Palisades, Ca 90272 (the “Property”).  Defendant Eva Field (“Defendant”) owns and manages the Property.  Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to return her security deposit when she vacated the Property.  Plaintiff further alleges Defendant cut off her utilities and access to the Property prior to her vacating.  In addition, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to properly maintain the Property. 

The operative complaint alleges claims for (1) tortious breach of warranty of habitability, (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (3) negligence, and (4) violation of Civil Code section 1950.5. 

A proof of service of the summons and complaint was filed with the Court which states Defendant was served by substitute service on October 26, 2023.  The complaint was left with “Daniel Field” who is described as 25, Caucasian, male, 150 pounds, 5’5” height, black hair and eyes is listed as “other.”   

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons.  Defendant argues that contrary to the proof of service, she was not properly served.  Plaintiff’s process server made only one attempt at personally serving Defendant at her residence prior to leaving the summons and complaint on the ground in her driveway.  Further, Plaintiff never mailed a copy of the summons and complaint thereafter.     

LEGAL STANDARD 

“Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”¿ (AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev (2018) 21¿Cal.App.5th 189, 202.)¿ “To establish personal jurisdiction, compliance with statutory procedures for service of process is essential.”¿ (Kremerman v. White (2021). 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371.)¿  

But the statutory requirements are to be liberally construed to uphold jurisdiction, rather than defeat it.  (Pasadena Medi-Center Assocs. v. Sup.Ct. (Houts)¿(1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778 (“The provisions of this chapter should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has been received by the defendant,¿and in the last analysis the question of service should be resolved by considering each situation from a practical standpoint.”)  

Defendant’s knowledge of the action does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.¿ (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.)  However, as long as the defendant receives actual notice of the lawsuit,¿substantial compliance¿with the Code provisions governing service of summons will generally be held sufficient.  (Summers v. McClanahan¿(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 410-411 (“It is well settled that strict compliance with statutes governing service of process is not required.  Rather, in deciding whether service was valid, the statutory provisions regarding service of¿process should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has been received by the defendant.”).) 

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow” may move “to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her” that results from lack of proper service.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc. §418.10(a)(1).¿ A defendant has 30 days after the service of the summons to file a responsive pleading.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., §412.20(a)(3).)¿¿ 

“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process, ‘the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’” (Summers, 140 Cal.App.4th at 413.)¿      

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff claims she was not personally served.  That is not in dispute.  The issue is whether substitute service is effective.  Plaintiff argues that it is not, because the process server only attempted personal service once, as evidenced by the proof of service.  The Court agrees. 

“[A]n individual may be served by substitute service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first been made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b); Evartt v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 795, 801.) “Ordinarily, two or three attempts at personal service at a proper place and with correct pleadings should fully satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence and allow substituted service to be made.” (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 373; see also Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Ham (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 330, 337.)   

Here, Plaintiff showed no “reasonable diligence”.  Plaintiff’s process server’s declaration of diligence signed under penalty of perjury admits he only attempted personal service once on Defendant. (Ex. A to Affourtit Decl.)  This does not meet the reasonable diligence standard required before Plaintiff can proceed with substituted service.  

Even assuming one service attempt was sufficient, Plaintiff’s process server did not mail a copy of the summons and complaint to Defendant’s address as required under Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20 subd. (b).  Plaintiff’s proof of service did not check the box attesting that the process server mailed (by first-class, postage prepaid) copies of the documents to Defendant. (Ex. A to Affourtit Decl.)  No date of mailing or declaration of mailing was provided. (Id.)  Plaintiff therefore failed to satisfy yet another substituted service requirement. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that there was only one attempt at personal service or that no mailing was done.  Rather, Plaintiff argues the motion to quash is untimely.  Defendant had 40 days to file a responsive pleading, or by December 4, 2023.  Plaintiff agreed to extend Defendant’s time to respond so long as Defendant was not going to attack service.  Because Defendant is attacking service, this violates the parties’ agreement on extensions, and the original deadline of December 4, 2023 applies.  Defendant filed a motion to quash on October 7, 2024, well after the response deadline.  Accordingly, the motion is untimely. 

Defendant argues the extension was given without the condition that Defendant was not going to attack service.  According to Defendant, “the parties had agreed to an open extension for responding to the complaint, however, it was not documented in writing.”  (Reply at 3: 7-8.)  However, Defendant did not submit a declaration in support of this claim.  In contrast, Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of her representation that the agreement to extend was conditioned on Defendant not attacking service.  (Kellener Decl. ¶6.)  The Court credits Plaintiff’s claim and concludes the time to respond had expired, and Defendant’s motion to quash is not timely.     

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons.   

 

DATED:  November 6, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court