Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 22SMCV02628, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV02628 Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 Dept: 205
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – West District
Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205
GINA BISIGNANO,
Plaintiff, v.
TMZ ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants. |
Case No.: 22SMCV02628
Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ INDEMNITY OF DEFENDANT HEATHER MCDONALD’S ATTORNEYS FEES, TO VACATE PLAINTIFF’S DEBTOR’S EXAM AND FOR VOIR DIRE OF THE COURT RE CONFLICT OR BIAS
|
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Gina Bisignano
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Heather McDonald
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gina Bisignano has sued various defendants for their coverage of her provocative comments during a COVID-19 lockdown protest and her participation in the January 6, 2021 protests at the United States Capitol. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ actions resulted in the demise of her previously “thriving” beauty salon business in Beverly Hills.
One of those defendants is Heather McDonald, a comedian and podcaster. McDonald interviews celebrities and covers reality TV and other entertainment news. In May 2021, McDonald hosted another defendant, Josh Flagg, on her podcast, “Juicy Scoop”. McDonald and Flagg discussed Flagg’s interview of Bisignano after she was filmed calling a COVID-19 counter-protestor a “faggot” and the person filming her a “Nazi” and a “new world order Satanist”. McDonald and Flagg also discussed Bisignano’s arrest at the Capitol, with Flagg claiming that Bisignano called him to ask for money while she was in jail. During the interview, McDonald and Flagg referred to Bisignano as a “crazy lady,” a “Qanon person” and a “terrorist.”
The operative complaint alleges eight causes of action for (1) misappropriation of likeness or identity, (2) violation of California Civil Code §3344, (3) invasion of privacy false light, (4) business defamation, (5) tortious interference with business relations, (6) tortious interference with contractual relations, (7) unfair business practices, and (8) declaratory relief.
The Court previously granted McDonald’s special motion to strike, finding that Plaintiff’s claims were based on protected activity and had no merit as they were time-barred and Plaintiff could not prove the essential element of actual malice. The Court also awarded McDonald her attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $28,411.13.
This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s indemnity, to vacate her debtor’s exam, and for voir dire of the Court for conflict or bias. Plaintiff contends her attorney intends to pay the attorney’s fees and thus there is no need for a debtor exam, and in any event, Plaintiff is not competent to be examined. Plaintiff also seeks to voir dire the court for possible conflict of interest or actual or appearance of bias, based on this judge’s previous employment as an Assistant United States Attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, which is currently prosecuting Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that because her attorney intends to pay the attorneys’ fees owed to McDonald, the Court should order that McDonald’s fee award should be against Plaintiff’s counsel and not against Plaintiff and that McDonald should be barred from adding on any additional attorneys’ fees beyond the ordered award amount. There is no support provided for this request. While Plaintiff’s counsel is free to voluntarily pay the outstanding fee award, he cannot compel McDonald to substitute him for Plaintiff as the sole judgment debtor. As to the request to cut off the “fees for fees”, it is well established that a defendant who prevails in an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to fees for filing the anti-SLAPP as well as fees for collecting against plaintiffs who fail to pay. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 (holding that “an award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16”).)
As to the motion to vacate the debtor’s exam, there is also no basis for the request. Plaintiff argues her competency must be determined before she can submit to a debtor’s examination and the costs of such an examination should be borne by McDonald. Plaintiff cites no authority for her request. If Plaintiff were truly incompetent, there are procedures available for her to appear through a guardian ad litem under Code Civ. Proc. section 372. No effort has been made to comply with section 372.
As to the motion for voir dire of the Court, Plaintiff has not made any showing that the Court is conflicted or biased. The sole reason for the purported need for a voir dire is that this judge worked for the Department of Justice 17 years ago. The general rule regarding disqualification related to prior employment is found in CCP 170.1(a)(2), which provides, a judge shall be disqualified if:
(2)¿(A)¿The judge served as a lawyer in the proceeding, or in any other proceeding involving the same issues he or she served as a lawyer for a party in the present proceeding or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action or proceeding.
(B)¿A judge shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if within the past two years:
(i)¿A party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party, was a client of the judge when the judge was in the private practice of law or a client of a lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the private practice of law.
(ii)¿A lawyer in the proceeding was associated in the private practice of law with the judge.
(C)¿A judge who served as a lawyer for, or officer of, a public agency that is a party to the proceeding shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if he or she personally advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in the proceeding.
Here, the Department of Justice is not a party to this proceeding. Since the applicable protests at the Capital occurred on January 6, 2021, nearly 14 years after this judge left the Department of Justice, this judge could not have had past involvement in criminal proceedings involving Plaintiff. Thus, there was no duty on the part of this judge to disclose prior employment with the Department of Justice or to recuse himself in this case. There is similarly no basis to voir dire the Court based on this long ago employment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s indemnity, to vacate debtor’s exam, and for voir dire of the Court.
DATED: October 5, 2023 ___________________________
Edward B. Moreton, Jr.
Judge of the Superior Court