Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants The Standard Fire Insurance Company and Colin Kennedy 

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Raymond Sarraf 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is an insurance coverage suit arising out of a homeowners insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued by Defendant, The Standard Fire Insurance Company (“Standard Fire”) to Plaintiff Raymond Sarraf.  Plaintiff also names Standard Fire’s adjuster, Colin Kennedy (“Kennedy”) as a defendant.  The Policy provided coverage for Plaintiff’s home located at 906 North Crescent Drive, Beverly Hills, California (the “Property”).  Plaintiff alleges that the Property sustained water damage, and he is entitled to additional Policy benefits beyond what was already paid by Standard Fire. 

Plaintiff alleges that Standard Fire (1) failed to properly and fully investigate and evaluate his claim, (2) failed to treat his interests with equal regard as its own, (3) failed to objectively evaluate his claim based on all available evidence rather than the evidence it believed supported its own position, (4) failed to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of Plaintiff’s claim, (5) caused Plaintiff to pay “additional living expenses” out of pocket as a result of delays in resolving the claim, and (6) compelled Plaintiff to institute a lawsuit to recover amounts due under the Policy.  (Compl. ¶¶ 119, 129).      

The operative complaint alleges four causes of action for: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) unfair business practices in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (“UCL”) and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The first three causes of action are alleged only against Standard Fire, while the fourth cause of action is alleged only against Kennedy.   

This hearing is on Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike.  As to their demurrer, Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff’s UCL claim is defective as it is an equitable claim and Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law; additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged an unlawful business practice, and (2) Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails because Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous conduct or that he has suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.  Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, request for attorneys’ fees, and in relation to the breach of contract claim, a claim for emotional distress damages.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”); Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  

DISCUSSION 

Business and Professions Code §17200 

To bring a claim under the unfair competition law (UCL) codified at Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et seq., a plaintiff must show either an “(1) unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice, or (2) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” (Adhav v. Midway Rent A Car, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 954, 970 (internal quotations omitted).)    

A UCL claim is equitable in nature, and damages cannot be recovered under the law.  (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.).  Instead, a private plaintiff’s remedies under the UCL are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.  (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 950; Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 300 fn. 3.)   

Defendant demurs to the UCL claim on grounds Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, and therefore, cannot seek equitable relief.  The Court disagrees. 

While equitable relief is not permitted where a plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy in the form of monetary damages (Ramona Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1140), and while pleading alternative factual allegations in the same count is not permitted, there is no prohibition against pleading alternative theories of relief based on the same set of facts.  (Gebert v. Yank (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 544, 554; see also Tearjen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 43029 at *3 (overruling demurrer to UCL claim because while plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, he can also plead alternative theories of recovery such as a claim for injunctive relief).) 

Defendants next argue that even if Plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law, his claim for injunctive relief is too uncertain to be granted.  “An injunction properly issues only where the right to be protected is clear, injury is impending and so immediately likely as only to be avoided by issuance of the injunction.” (East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1126.) 

Plaintiff alleges Standard Fire’s “conduct described herein should be enjoined and [Standard Fire] should be ordered to disgorge their profits.”  (Compl. ¶ 132.)  It is unclear what conduct Plaintiff seeks to enjoin.  Plaintiff alleges past acts in the mishandling of his claim, but those are not the proper subject of an injunction.  (Cisneros v. U.D. Registry Inc. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 548, 574 (injunctions are not intended as punishment for past acts).)  Plaintiff has failed to plead the specific acts Standard Fire is currently taking that he wants the Court to enjoin.  Plaintiff argues in opposition that he is seeking to enjoin Defendant from failing to properly adjust his insurance claim.  (Opp. at 4.)  But this request is too vague to be the subject of a request for injunctive relief, and it would require the Court to supervise Defendants’ day-to-day insurance claim adjusting duties.     

Plaintiff’s claim for “disgorgement” of profits is also improper.  A UCL plaintiff can only obtain disgorgement of profits to the extent he gave the defendant the profits or has an ownership interest in them.  (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1149 (“The object of restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.”).)   

The only thing Plaintiff paid to Standard Fire was his policy premiums.  But Plaintiff is not seeking to rescind the policy and get back his policy premiums.  Rather, he is seeking policy benefits he claims were wrongfully withheld.  This claim seeks contract damages, not restitution.  (Bailey v. Stillwater Ins. Co., 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 71097 at *2-*3 (striking claim for “disgorgement of benefits” as amounts defendants were required to pay but failed to pay under the policy are contract damages).) 

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s UCL claim does not identify the statute that was allegedly violated, and to the extent the statute is California Insurance Code 790.03, it cannot form the basis of a UCL claim pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s holding in Moradi Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304.   

Business and Professions Code § 17200 establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. (Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647.)  Plaintiff has alleged all three types of UCL claims.  (Compl. ¶129.)  

Under its “unlawful” prong, “the UCL borrows violations of other laws … and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL.” (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1505.) Thus, a violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL’s unlawful prong.  (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1133.)  A plaintiff bringing a claim based on the unlawful prong must identify the particular law that was allegedly violated and must describe “with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.”  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619.)   

Here, Plaintiff has not identified any statute that was allegedly violated.  (Compl. 127-132.)  Plaintiff may be relying on Cal. Ins. Code 790.03 (“UIPA”), which specifies unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, including (1) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of an insured’s claim, (2) not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of an insured’s claim, and (3) compelling an insured to institute litigation to recover amounts due under the policy.   

But the California Supreme Court has held that UIPA does not create a private cause of action.  (Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal.3d at 304 (“[n]either section 790.03 nor section 790.09 was intended to create a private civil cause of action against an insurer that commits one of the various acts listed in section 790.03 subdivision (h)”.))  A plaintiff cannot bootstrap an alleged violation of the UIPA onto the UCL in order to create a private right of action.  (Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Superior Court (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1491, 1494 (1990) (appellate court directed trial court to enter an order granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment as there was no merit to plaintiff’s UCL claim based on alleged UIPA violations).) 

That Plaintiff has not met the unlawful prong, however, is not the end of the analysis.  The Court must still look to whether Plaintiff has alleged a fraudulent or unfair practice.  “The “fraud” prong of [the UCL] is unlike common law fraud or deception.  A violation can be shown even if no one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage.  Instead, it is only necessary to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” (Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1167.)  The Complaint does not allege how members of the public are being deceived by Standard Fire.  Accordingly, Plaintiff has also failed to allege a fraudulent business practice.   

As to the “unfair” prong, the test to determine whether a business practice is unfair differs depending on whether the plaintiff in a UCL case is a competitor or a consumer. (See, e.g., Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 187, fn. 12 (differentiating between competitor and consumer claims); Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1273–1274 (same).)  

In consumer cases, there is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal, which have applied three different tests for unfairness. (See generally Davis v. Ford Motor Credit LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 581, 593–598 (tracing split in authority among Courts of Appeal in consumer cases); Bardin, 136 Cal.App.4th at 1267 (noting split of authority).)  Plaintiff alleges a claim under two of the three tests. 

The test applied in one line of cases requires “that the public policy which is a predicate to a consumer unfair competition action under the ‘unfair’ prong of the UCL must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.” (Bardin, 136 Cal.App.4th at 1260–1261; see Davis, 179 Cal.App.4th at 595–596; Gregory, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.) Under this test, plaintiff’s claim fails for the reasons stated above with respect to the unlawful prong.  Plaintiff has not identified a law that was violated.   

The test applied in a second line of cases is whether the alleged business practice “is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers and requires the court to weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” (Bardin, 136 Cal.App.4th at 1260; see Davis, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 594–595; see also Ticconi v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 528, 539.)  While Standard Fire’s mishandling of Plaintiff’s claim was not “immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”, a reasonable inference could be drawn that it was substantially injurious to Plaintiff.  (Ticconi, 160 Cal.App.4th at 539.)    

The test applied in a third line of cases draws on the definition of “unfair” in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(n)), and requires that “(1) the consumer injury must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.” (Davis, 179 Cal.App.4th at 597–598; see Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403.)  Construing the allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, the court concludes Plaintiff has alleged he was substantially injured by Standard Fire’s mishandling of his claim; there are no countervailing benefits to Standard Fire’s slow-rolling and bungling the claims process, and the injury was not one Plaintiff could have avoided.   

However, while Plaintiff has alleged an unfair business practice, he has failed to allege the specific acts he seeks to enjoin or the amounts for which he seeks restitution.  Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiff’s UCL claim with leave to amend. 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress  

The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.)   

To be outrageous, conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”  (Id.)  The defendant must have engaged in conduct “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.  It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous.  It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.”  (Christenson v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)   

To avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with “great specificity the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.”  (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)  “Whether behavior is extreme or outrageous is a legal determination to be made by the court, in the first instance.”  (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34, 44.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege extreme or outrageous conduct.  The Court agrees.   

Courts have rejected liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress where, for example, the insurer delayed or denied insurance benefits, Coleman v. Republic Indemnity Ins. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403, 416; the insurer refused to accept a settlement demand within policy limits, Isaacson v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (1998) 44 Cal.3d 775, 788-789; or where the insurer failed to properly investigate a claim, Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 132 Cal.App.3d 886, 893-95 (1982).  Moreover, in the absence of physical injury, California courts have not allowed recovery of damages for emotional distress arising solely from property damage or economic injury to the plaintiff.  (Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228.) 

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating outrageous conduct by Kennedy.  The Complaint describes incompetence and delay in the investigation process and a failure to pay additional policy benefits to which Plaintiff claims he is entitled.  These facts do not amount to conduct beyond the pale of decency; they amount to a simple breach of contract.    

Plaintiff’s reliance on Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, is unavailing.  Fletcher did not contain any discussion of what constitutes “outrageous conduct” because in that case, the insurer conceded their conduct was outrageous.  Moreover, the acts of the insurer were far more egregious than the conduct alleged here.  There, Plaintiff insured was injured on the job and filed a claim with defendant disability insurer.  Defendant refused to pay benefits under the injury provisions of a policy, accused plaintiff of misrepresentation, demanded return of benefits paid under sickness provision, and impliedly threatened expensive litigation.  Unlike in Fletcher, here Kennedy has not conceded his acts were outrageous, and his alleged acts do not rise to the same level as those in Fletcher where there were threatened and actual bad faith refusals to make payments under a policy, maliciously employed in concert with false and threatening communications directed to the insured for the purpose of causing him to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle a dispute.  

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS with leave to amend the demurrer to Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Kennedy.   

Punitive Damages 

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.  Defendant argues Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations that she is entitled to punitive damages without stating facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  The Court agrees.    

A motion to strike is the proper procedure to challenge a claim for punitive damages.   

(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2008) 7:185, p: 7(l)-69; Caliber Bodyworks. Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 385 overruled on other grounds by ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal. 5th 175, 195.)  

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (citations omitted).)  

Allegations that merely plead the statutory phraseology are wholly insufficient to state a basis for recovery of punitive damages.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)  Conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct as willful, intentional or fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of the necessary factual grounds for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)     

To establish “malice”, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant intended to cause injury to plaintiff or (2) despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code §3294(c)(1).).  “[A]bsent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs’ interest.  The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  (College Hosp. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  To establish “oppression,” Plaintiff must allege “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”  (Id.)  To establish “fraud,” Plaintiffs must allege “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”  (Id.)   

Malice and oppression both require a finding of despicable conduct.  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.)   

Here, the factual allegations in the complaint do not support a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  “Evidence that an insurer has violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing does not thereby establish that it has acted with the requisite malice, oppression or fraud to justify an award of punitive damages.”  (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 328 (1992).)  An insurer’s “inept and negligent handling of a claim” does not support a punitive damages claim.  (Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co., 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576, 267 Cal.Rptr. 24 (1990).)  And a disagreement regarding payable benefits is insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Mock, 4 Cal.App.4th at 328 (denial of benefits alone cannot support a claim for bad faith, and punitive damages requires significantly more than bad faith).)     

In Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287, the court reversed an award of punitive damages against an insurer where it found the insurer’s behavior was merely bad faith and overzealous, noting that “claims handling that is witless and infected with symptoms of bureaucratic inertia does not add up to malice or oppression.”  (Id. at 1288.)   The court observed that the actions of the insurer may be found to be “negligent (failing to follow up on information provided by the insured), overzealous (taking an unnecessary deposition under oath of the insured), legally erroneous (relying on an endorsement which was not shown to have been delivered), and callous (failing to communicate).”  (Id.)  However, they do not amount to conduct which could be described as “evil, criminal, recklessly indifferent to the rights of the insured or with a vexatious intention to injure.”  (Id.) 

As in Tomaselli, Standard Fire’s claims handling may be found to be slow, incompetent, sloppy, contradictory, or even reckless.  However, it cannot be said to be conduct beyond the pale of decency or “having the character of outrage frequently associated with a crime.”  (Id. at 1287.)  At its core, Plaintiff’s complaint is about a disagreement over policy benefits, which is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.      

Moreover, Section 3294(b) provides that for a valid claim for punitive damages to be made against an employer, the employer must have had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her in conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others “or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct.”  “With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”  The Complaint is lacking in any allegations required by Code Civ. Proc. § 3294(b).   

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, with leave to amend. 

Mental and Emotional Distress 

The Complaint’s Prayer for Relief seeks “general damages for mental and emotional distress” in relation to the breach of contract action.  (Compl. at p. 22, line 23.)  Defendants move to strike these damages on grounds that Plaintiff cannot recover for mental suffering and emotional distress for a breach of contract.  Plaintiff does not oppose the motion to strike.   

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for mental and emotional distress in relation to his claim for breach of contract.   

Attorneys’ Fees    

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees because there is no agreement that contains an attorney fees’ clause nor are there any statutes cited in the Complaint that would allow Plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees.  The Court agrees.   

Attorney fees are only recoverable when authorized by contract, statute or law.  (Code Civ. Proc. 1033.5(a)(10).)  Otherwise, the “American rule” prevails, and each party must bear his or her own attorney’s fees.   

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for attorneys’ fees. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ demurrer.  The demurrer is sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend as to the third cause of action for unfair business practices and the fourth cause for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike.  Specifically, the Court will strike with 20 days’ leave to amend Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages in page 19, lines 4-10, page 22, lines 4-11, page 23, lines 8-9, and without leave to amend Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees in page 22, lines 20-21 of the Complaint and Plaintiff’s request for “general damages for mental and emotional distress” in page 22, line 23.     

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: March 7, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court