Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Urtnowski & Associates, P.C., J. Brian Urtnowski, and Lisamarie McDermott 

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Derya Altay and Jason Rogers 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

 

  Plaintiffs Derya Altay and Jason Rogers sued Defendants Urtnowski & Associates P.C., J. Brian Urtnowski and Lisamarie McDermott (collectively “U&A”) based on U&A’s representation of their client, Defendant 2680 Barrington Associates, in a prior unlawful detainer action filed against Plaintiffs.  U&A successfully moved to strike all of Plaintiffs’ claims against them pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (the “Anti-SLAPP” statute).  U&A now moves for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $87,465 pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1).    

LEGAL STANDARD 

A prevailing defendant as to a special motion to strike is entitled to mandatory, reasonable attorney fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-1142; CCP § 425.16(c); Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶7:1120.)  The determination of a reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) 

An award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to filing the special motion to strike, but also the fees incurred in seeking mandatory fees under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16.  (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1141.)  The anti-SLAPP statute is “intended to compensate a defendant for the expense of responding to a SLAPP suit.  To this end, the provision is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit.”  (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 22.)  

To determine a reasonable attorney fee award for an anti-SLAPP motion, the California Supreme Court held that the lodestar approach should be applied.  (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1136.)  The lodestar is calculated “based on the reasonable hours spent, multiplied by the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community conducting noncontingent litigation of the same type.”  (Id. at 1133.)  The reasonable hourly rate is “the product of multiplicity of factors … [including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorneys’ reputation and the undesirability of the case.”  (Id. at 1139.)   The lodestar figure may be adjusted based on various factors including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”  (Id. at 1132.)   

 

DISCUSSION 

U&A is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party on an anti-SLAPP motion which resulted in the striking of all claims against it.  (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1141-1142.)  Plaintiffs contend U&A only prevailed in part on its anti-SLAPP motion because the Court did not strike the sixth cause of action for conversion against it.  This is a misreading of the Court’s order.  The Court struck all claims against Defendants Urtnowski & Associates, P.C., J. Brian Urtnowski and Lisamarie McDermott pursuant to Civ. Code §1714.10(a).  (12/15/2022 Minute Order at 9-10.) 

To determine the reasonable fees to award, the Court starts with the lodestar approach, which requires a determination of the reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable hours spent.   U&A seeks reimbursement based on an hourly rate of $500 for legal work performed by their counsel, Karen Adelman.  Plaintiffs do not argue that this hourly rate is too high.  U&A cites to several California cases as well as the declaration of Ms. Adelman to support its requested hourly rate.  Based on her declaration, Ms. Adelman is a partner at Berman Berman Schneider & Lowary LLP.  She is a graduate of University of California, Hastings College of Law and has 22 years experience litigating complex cases.   

Ms. Adelman’s hourly rate of $500 is in line with rates in other cases where courts have granted fee awards to attorneys with similar experience.  (See, e.g., Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2020) 336 F.R.D. 588, 601 (finding rates of $830 to $1,275 for partners reasonable); Infanzon v. Allstate Ins. Co. (C.D. Cal. 2020) 335 F.R.D. 305, 314 (finding lead counsel’s hourly rate of $575 in January 2020 reasonable); San Diego Comic Convention v. Dan Farr Productions (S.D. Cal. 2019) 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64418, at *39-*45 (finding reasonable hourly rates of $760 for partners with 28-29 years of experience and $685 for a partner with 14 years of experience); Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co. (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213045 at *39 (rates from $650 to $1,250 for partners or senior counsel are reasonable); Kikkert v. Berryhill (S.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127237 at *5 (finding hourly rate of $943 reasonable, citing other decisions in the district approving rates from $656 to $886); Medina v. Metropolitan Interpreters & Translators, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2015) 139 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1179 (finding reasonable hourly rate of $850 for a partner with 38 years of experience and $625 for a partner with 17 years of experience); Makaeff v. Trump Univ. LLC (S.D. Cal. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46749 at *11-*15 (finding reasonable rates of $600 to $825 for partners); Carr v. Tadin, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2014) 51 Supp.3d 970, 978 (awarding in 2014, hourly rate of $650 for a partner); Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Titan Auto Ins. of N.M., Inc., 2010 WL 11595919, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010) (hourly rates of $775 for a partner in 2010 are “consistent with the market rate for large, well-respected law firms in Southern California”).) 

While the rate Ms. Adelman actually charges U&A is lower than $500, “[i]t is well established that an attorney who accepts a reduced rate from a client is not precluded from seeking a reasonable hourly rate pursuant to the lodestar method.”  (Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055.)  “‘The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate.  This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel.’”  (Id.)  Accordingly, in applying the lodestar method, the Court will use the reasonable hourly rate of $500 rather than the actual rate charged to U&A.  

The Court next considers the reasonable hours spent.  U&A seeks reimbursement for 119 hours spent in connection with litigating the anti-SLAPP motion and 53.2 hours for litigating the fees motion.  The hours were spent (1) analyzing the complaint, (2) performing legal and fact research into Plaintiffs’ claims, (3) drafting and revising the anti-SLAPP motion, (4) analyzing Plaintiffs’ opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion including cited cases and evidence, (5) drafting the reply brief, (6) preparing for and attending the hearing, (7) researching and drafting the attorneys’ fees motion, (8) analyzing any opposition to the attorneys’ fees motion, (9) drafting a reply to the attorneys’ fees motion, and (10) preparing for and attending a hearing on the attorneys’ fees motion.   

These hours are below the number of hours that California courts have determined are reasonable for litigating anti-SLAPP motions.  (See, e.g., Herring Networks Inc. v. Maddow (S.D. Cal. 2021) 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23163 at *30-31 (awarding attorneys’ fees based on 363 hours worked on anti-SLAPP motion); Lacoste v. Keen (C.D. Cal. 2020) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263559 at *10-11 (awarding attorneys’ fees based on 275 hours worked on anti-SLAPP motion); Open Source Sec., Inc. v. Perens (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98169 at *2 (awarding attorneys’ fees based on a total of 446 hours for anti-SLAPP motion).)  The Court also notes U&A’s papers demonstrated exceptional skill.  Accordingly, the Court concludes the amount of hours sought by U&A is reasonable. 

Plaintiffs argue the hours spent are excessive because U&A could have consolidated its anti-SLAPP and fees’ motion with the other Defendants’, and the other Defendants are seeking much lower fees.  U&A spent a total of 172.2 hours while Defendants Armand Derfner and Suzanne and Isaac Zaharoni spent 122.25 hours and Defendants 2680 Barrington Associates and Leticia Mercado spent 53.2 hours.  The Court disagrees.   

U&A was not required to have consolidated its motions with other Defendants.  U&A had arguments that were unique to its position as counsel for 2680 Barrington in the underlying litigation.  U&A also had a unique defense that Plaintiffs should have complied with Civ. Code §1714.10(a) before suing it.  Having aggressively sued many differently situated defendants, Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by Defendants in response.  (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1141 (“The amount of litigation on this issue typically lies in the plaintiff’s hands: having litigated the matter tenaciously, [plaintiffs] cannot . . . be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the [defendants] in response.”).)    

Further, U&A has presented sufficient evidence that it actually spent 172.2 hours which are in the ballpark of fees requested in similarly complex anti-SLAPP motions.  Moreover, U&A filed its motion for attorneys’ fees first, which provided the framework for the other Defendants’ motions for attorneys’ fees and which explains why the other Defendants were able to bill less on their fees’ motion.   

In making these rulings, the Court is mindful that the anti-SLAPP statute is “intended to compensate a defendant for the expense of responding to a SLAPP suit.  To this end, the provision is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit.”  (Wanland, 141 Cal.App.4th at 22.)  Further, “[b]y and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won, and might not have had he been more of a slacker.”  (Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow (S.D. Cal. 2021) 2021 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23163 at *30.)      

 U&A also seeks costs in the amount of $1,365.  The costs are for three first appearance fees (for each of the Defendants) and for a filing fee for the attorneys’ fees motion.  Plaintiffs do not address the costs sought by U&A.  The Court finds these costs reasonable.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Urtnowski & Associates, P.C., J. Brian Urtnowski, Lisamarie McDermott’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $87,465.00. 

 

DATED: March 1, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court