Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 200 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is an unlawful detainer action.  Plaintiff Edward Brodsky leased the property located at 27 Paloma Avenue, in the City of Venice (the “Premises”), to Defendant Haysbert Moultrie LLP (“LLP”).  The Lease provides that the Premises were to be occupied by Defendant Nazareth Haysbert as his personal residence.  (Ex. 2 to Haysbert Decl.)  The Lease commenced on June 1, 2020.  (SSOF No. 22; Ex. 2 to Haysbert Decl.) 

Paragraph 34 of the Lease provides in relevant part:  

A. TENANT REPRESENTATION; OBLIGATIONS REGARDING OCCUPANTS; CREDIT: Tenant warrants that all statements in Tenant’s rental application are accurate.  … Tenant authorizes Landlord and Broker(s) to obtain Tenant's credit report periodically during the tenancy in connection with the modification or enforcement of this Agreement. Landlord may cancel this Agreement: (i) before occupancy begins, upon disapproval of the credit report(s), or upon discovering that information in Tenant’s application is false; (ii) After commencement date, upon disapproval of an updated credit report or upon discovering that information in Tenant’s application is no longer true. 

 

(Ex. 2 to Haysbert Decl.)  The Lease was prepared by Plaintiffs’ agent.  (SSOF No. 20; Haysbert Decl. ¶24.) 

To secure the Lease, Haysbert completed a rental application on behalf of the LLP.  (Separate Statement of Fact (“SSOF”) No. 6; Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)  The rental application listed the LLP as the “applicant”.  (SSOF No. 7; Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)  However, the cover email to the application identified Haysbert as the applicant, and on the application form, Haysbert provided his personal information, rather than the LLP’s.  (Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.) 

Section 3.K of the rental application asked “Has applicant been a party to an unlawful detainer action or filed bankruptcy within the last seven years?”  Haysbert checked the box for “No.”  (SSOF No. 8, Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)  At the time of the application, the LLP had never been a party to an unlawful detainer action and had never filed for bankruptcy.  (SSOF No. 9; Haysbert Decl. ¶18.) 

Section 3.L of the rental application asked “Has applicant or any proposed occupant ever been asked to move out of a residence?” Haysbert checked the box for “no.”  (SSOF No. 10; Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)  The response in section 3.L of the rental application was untrue at the time it was provided because Haysbert was a proposed occupant and had previously been asked to move out of a residence.  (SSOF No. 15; Haysbert Decl. ¶21.) 

On March 17, 2022, Plaintiff served a 3-day “NOTICE TO QUIT-NON CURABLE BREACH OF LEASE” which purported to cancel the Lease based on a breach of the warranty pursuant to paragraph 34 of the Lease which required that “all statements in Tenant’s rental application are accurate”.  (SSOF Nos. 3, 24; Ex. 1 to Haysbert Decl.)  The notice stated that Defendants breached the warranty by giving inaccurate responses in sections 3.K and 3.L of the rental application.  (SSOF No. 5; Ex. 1 to Haysbert Decl.) 

Specifically, the notice advised that the statements in the rental application were untrue because “[o]n or about June 18, 2018, you were asked to vacate the premises by your then current Landlord, Hamid Rafii, when you failed to pay the rent owed pursuant to the 3 day notice to pay rent or quit notice that was served upon you.  On June 25, 2018, your then Landlord Mr. Rafii was forced to file an unlawful detainer against you in LASC 18STUD06749.”  (Ex. 1 to Haysbert Decl.) 

Defendants did not quit the Premises within 3 days, and accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant action for unlawful detainer on March 23, 2022.  (SSOF No. 1.)  The Complaint sought forfeiture of the Lease, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and rent at the daily rate of $333.33 commencing on March 23, 2022.  (Ex. 16 to Haysbert Decl.)   

After the unlawful detainer action was filed, Defendants surrendered possession of the Premises on January 18, 2023.  (SSOF No. 2; Haysbert Decl. ¶28.)  By operation of law, the case was converted to an ordinary civil action once Defendants surrendered possession.  (Civ. Code §  1953.3(a).) 

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Defendants argue that the terms of the Lease did not permit Plaintiff to cancel the Lease after it commenced, based on false statements in the rental application.  Even if it did, Defendants argue that Plaintiff could not terminate the Lease absent a material breach, and Defendants’ false statement on the application was not a material breach.   

LEGAL STANDARD  

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)  Because a motion for summary judgment is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.  

The court cannot consider an impleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant's motion for summary judgment may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 1334,1342.) 

Second, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiffs cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (quoting Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2)).) 

Third, once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause(s) of action alleged or the affirmative defense(s) claimed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) 

In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 843.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party's evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Lipson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.) 

DISCUSSION 

 

Defendants argue that they did not breach paragraph 34 of the Lease because their response to section 3.K of the rental application was accurate, and their response to section 3.L was inaccurate at the time of the application and the Lease only permits cancellation if the response became inaccurate after the Lease commenced.  The Court agrees in part.   

As to Defendants’ response to section 3.K of the rental application, there is at least a triable issue whether the response is accurate.  Section 3.K of the rental application asked “Has applicant been a party to an unlawful detainer action or filed bankruptcy within the last seven years?”  Haysbert checked the box for “No.”  (SSOF No. 8, Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)   

Defendants argue that the response was accurate because LLP was listed as the applicant, and at the time of the application, the LLP had never been a party to an unlawful detainer action and had never filed for bankruptcy.  (SSOF No. 9; Haysbert Decl. ¶18.)  But the cover email to the application listed Haysbert as the applicant, and where the application sought “personal information” about the applicant, Haysbert provided his personal information, not the LLP’s.  (Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)  Accordingly, a fact finder could reasonably conclude that Haysbert was the applicant, and therefore, the response in section 3.K was inaccurate. 

Regardless, Defendants concede that the response in section 3.L was inaccurate.  (SSOF No. 15.)  Section 3.L of the rental application asked “Has applicant or any proposed occupant ever been asked to move out of a residence?” Haysbert checked the box for “no.”  (SSOF No. 10; Ex. 3 to Haysbert Decl.)  The response in section 3.L of the rental application was untrue at the time it was provided because Haysbert was a proposed occupant and had previously been asked to move out of a residence.1  (SSOF No. 15; Haysbert Decl. ¶21.)   

The issue then becomes whether under the Lease, an inaccurate response at the time the application was provided can constitute a basis to cancel the Lease once the Lease commences.  Defendants argue that the Lease only allows the Landlord to cancel the Lease based on a statement in the rental application that was inaccurate at the time it was made “before occupancy begins.”  (Ex. 2 to Haysbert Decl.)  Once the Lease commences, the Landlord can only cancel the Lease “upon disapproval of an updated credit report or upon discovering that information in Tenant’s application is no longer true.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Court agrees with Defendants. 

If the¿plain¿language of an instrument is¿unambiguous, a court may not read into the document additional terms in order to conform its meaning to what the court's intuition tells it the parties must have intended.  Rather, the court is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) ¿Here, paragraph 34 clearly and explicitly permits the Lease to be cancelled post-commencement only “upon disapproval of an updated credit report or upon discovering that information in Tenant’s application is no longer true”.  

Only information that was once true is capable of “no longer” being true.  The Merriam-Webster dictionary explains that “no longer” is “used to say that something that was once true or possible is not now true or possible”.  Here, the inaccurate response that Haysbert gave in the rental application was untrue at the time it was made.  (SSOF No. 15.)  Therefore, because this response was not “no longer true,” it cannot be the basis of a post commencement cancellation under paragraph 34 of the Lease.  

This conclusion is reinforced by the clause immediately prior, which deals with cancellation before occupancy begins.  This clause permits a landlord to cancel the Lease pre-occupancy “upon discovering that information in Tenant's application is false.” The use of “is false” in one clause and “is no longer true” in the next clause demonstrates that “is no longer true” is not merely the poorly drafted equivalent of “is false,” but reflects the intentional choice to provide different triggers for the right to cancel before and after occupancy.  (See Civ. Code § 1641 (“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”).)   

It is true that the Court cannot interpret a contract that would lead to an absurd result.  (Civ. Code, § 1638 (contractual language governs so long as it is¿clear, explicit, and not¿absurd).)  Here, however, giving effect to the clear and explicit language in the Lease does not result in an absurd outcome.  Information in the rental application that may have been relevant to the initial decision to lease the property becomes less relevant and less salient after the lease term commences and the tenant has taken possession, making it reasonable that a different rule would apply once occupancy begins.  

In reaching its conclusion, the Court is also guided by the principle that a condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly construed against the party for whose benefit it is created.  (Civ. Code § 1442).  “Forfeitures are not¿favored¿by the courts, and if an agreement¿can be reasonably interpreted so as to¿avoid¿a forfeiture, it is the duty of the court to avoid it. The burden is upon the party claiming a forfeiture to show that such was the unmistakable intention of the instrument.¿[Citations omitted.] ‘A contract is not to be construed to provide a forfeiture unless no other interpretation is reasonably possible. [Citations omitted.]’” (Nelson v. Schoettgen (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 418, 423.)  The Court thus interprets the Lease against Plaintiff and finds that the termination provision of paragraph 34 does not apply.   

California’s doctrine of contra proferentem¿also applies here.  To the extent there is any ambiguity at all as to the meaning of “no longer true”, it must be interpreted against the drafter.  “In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.” (Civ. Code § 1654.)  Plaintiff, with the assistance of his agents, prepared the lease and presented it to Haysbert to sign.  (SSOF No. 20.)  Therefore, any ambiguity in the contract should be interpreted against Plaintiff, the drafter. 

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that even if the facts do not support their claim for an unlawful detainer, once Defendants moved out of the Premises, their claim became one for damages under Civ. Code § 1951.2.  Plaintiff argues there is at least a triable issue whether they are entitled to damages for the period Defendants remained in possession of the Premises and failed to pay rent.   

Civ. Code § 1952.3 provides, in part: “(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), if the lessor brings an unlawful detainer proceeding and possession of the property is no longer in issue because possession of the property has been delivered to the lessor before trial or, if there is no trial, before judgment is entered, the case becomes an ordinary civil action in which: ‘(1) The lessor may obtain any relief to which he is entitled, including, where applicable, relief authorized by Section 1951.2; but, if the lessor seeks to recover damages described in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 1951.2 or any other damages not recoverable in the unlawful detainer proceeding, the lessor shall first amend the complaint...” (Emphasis added). No amendment of the complaint is necessary unless relief is sought under Civil Code, Section 1951.2(a)(3).  

Plaintiff is seeking damages under Civ. Code § 1951.2(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4).  Subdivision (a)(1) states the lessor may recover from the lessee “the worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination.”  Subdivision (a)(2) allows recovery of “[t]he worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided.”  And subdivision (a)(4)  states that the lessor may recover “[a]ny other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee's failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom.” 

Under the foregoing statutes, while a landlord is precluded from recovering the unpaid rent for the balance of the lease term under subpart (a)(3), all other damages may be recovered without any necessity to amend the complaint, including all detriment caused to the landlord or any rent that became due up to the date of the judgment. Nothing in the moving papers addresses Plaintiff’s entitlement to such relief.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: May 22, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court