Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is a negligence case.  Plaintiff Dalia Mahgerefteh claims she was injured when a cup of hot tea spilled on her.  Plaintiff claims the lid was not properly secured on the cup.  The cup was allegedly bought from a Starbucks kiosk inside a Vons store, located at 820 Montana Avenue, Santa Monica, California (the “Premises”).  (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 1.)   

Plaintiff’s companion, Moses Javaheri, bought one cup of hot tea and a cup of hot water from the Starbucks kiosk.  (UMF No. 5.)  Javaheri then removed the lids of both cups and took one of the tea bags from the cup of hot tea and placed it in the cup of hot water and replaced both lids.  (UMF No. 6.)  Javaheri carried both cups of hot tea in his bare hands to his parked car.  (UMF No. 7.)  When plaintiff and Javaheri got to his parked car, he handed one of the cups to Plaintiff.  (UMF No. 8.)   

Plaintiff claims that after she got into the car, she attempted to drink from the cup and the lid came off.  (UMF No. 9.)  Plaintiff claims that when the lid came off, she dropped the cup of hot tea onto her lap causing her injuries.  (UMF No. 10.)  Plaintiff was later treated for second degree burns at the hospital.  (Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) No. 12.)    

Starbucks claims it has no right to control the activities of the employees who manned the Starbucks kiosk.  Starbucks entered into a licensing agreement with Vons, whereby Vons operated the kiosk.  (UMF No. 13.)  Under the terms of the licensing agreement, Vons was an independent contractor, and Starbucks had no right to control, nor did it control, the employees of Vons in operating the kiosk, other than restrictions on the use of Starbucks trademarks and products to avoid dilution and tarnishment of said marks.  (UMF No. 19.)   

Starbucks at no time obtained the right to exercise, nor did it exercise, any possession or control of the Premises; rather, Vons had exclusive possession and control of the Premises.  (UMF No. 15.)  Starbucks had no responsibilities or rights to maintain the Premises and at no time conducted any such activities on the Premises.  (UMF No. 18.) 

This hearing is on Defendants Starbucks Corporation and The Vons Companies, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s sole claim for negligence.  Defendants argue that (1) there is no triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff can prove either Defendant caused her injuries as Jahaveri testified he removed the lids to both cups and replaced both lids; (2) there is no triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff can prove that the hot water was a dangerous condition or that either Defendant failed to warn Plaintiff of same; and (3) Starbucks did not cause or contribute to the accident because it had no control over the Premises nor over the employees who were manning the Starbucks kiosk. 

   

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The Court sustains Defendants’ objections to the Declaration of Ani Gregoryan. 

 

LEGAL STANDARD  

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Minor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67).   

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element of the claim(s) or by establishing an affirmative defense.  (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)  

Once the defendant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) 

DISCUSSION 

  Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show causation because her companion, Jahaveri, removed and replaced the lids on both cups.  The Court agrees. 

To prevail on a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff must present competent and admissible evidence which establishes an actual connection between defendants’ conduct and plaintiff’s injuries.  (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 774.)  “The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.  A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture or the probabilities are at least evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.”  (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205-1206.)  When reasonable minds cannot dispute the absence of causation, the issue of causation is one for the court to determine.  (Constance B v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, 207.) 

 Here, Jahaveri’s testimony is clear that after he bought one cup of hot tea and one cup of hot water, he removed the lids to both cups and took one of the tea bags from the cup of hot tea and placed it in the cup of hot water and replaced the lids of both cups prior to giving one of them to Plaintiff.  (UMF No. 6.)  Accordingly, Defendants could not have caused the lid to come off, resulting in the injuries to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff does not challenge this testimony, other than to argue that Jahaveri has made inconsistent statements.  (AMF Nos. 17-18.)  This is insufficient to raise a triable issue.  There is no evidence that Jahaveri made any inconsistent statements as to his role in removing and replacing the lids.  Plaintiff has simply submitted no evidence that Defendants failed to properly affix the lid to the cup of hot tea that was ultimately handed to Plaintiff.  She proffers only her speculation: “Plaintiff believes the lady, the sales person at Starbucks had not closed the lid well.”  (AMF No. 10.)   

Plaintiff argues that res ipsa loquitor applies to establish causation.  Res ipsa loquitor¿is applicable¿where Plaintiff establishes that: (1) the accident (in this case, the spilled hot tea) is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) the accident was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the accident was not due to any voluntary act or contribution by the plaintiff.¿ (Fields v. Yusuf¿(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1389.)  Where the evidence demonstrates that the instrumentality causing a Plaintiff’s injury was in the control of third parties, and not the particular defendant charged,¿res ipsa loquitor does not apply.  (Bergman v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 696, 704-05.) 

Here, the accident was caused by the unsecured lids which were not in the exclusive control of Defendants.  As discussed above, the lids were removed and replaced by Jahaveri.  Accordingly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply.   

Defendants also argue they had no duty to warn that the hot tea was hot because it was an obvious danger.  The Court agrees. 

California law recognizes the “obvious danger rule,” which provides that there is no need to warn of known risks under either a negligence or strict liability theory.  (Johnson v. American Standard Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 67.)  That the hot tea was hot and could expose plaintiff to burns was an obvious risk.  In any event, Plaintiff cannot establish that absence of any warning that the hot tea was hot and could expose plaintiff to burns in causing her injuries was a cause of her injuries.  The cause of her injuries was the unsecured lid which had been removed and replaced by Jahaveri.      

Plaintiff argues that the temperature of the hot tea was not in compliance with industry standards and Defendants’ employees failed to keep track of the temperature to ensure it was within the industry standards, which was a separate cause of her injuries.  According to Plaintiff, had Defendants properly complied with the industry standard, she would not have been injured even with an unsealed lid and accidental spill.  There is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim.  She simply cites to a website (https://pubmed.nchi.nlm,nih.gov/18226454) which she claims establishes that the industry standard for the temperature of hot tea is between 160 degrees to 185 degrees, whereas Defendants maintained the water temperature for hot tea at 180 to 200 degrees.  The website is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.         

Additionally, as to Starbucks, it claims it had no role in the accident because it did not control the Premises nor the employees who were manning the Starbucks Kiosk.  (UMF Nos. 13-20.)  The Court agrees.   

Starbucks has submitted the Declaration of Leslie Nelson whereby she attests that Starbucks had no possession or control of the Starbucks kiosk inside the Vons store or the employees who were manning the kiosk where Jahaveri allegedly purchased the hot tea, and as such, Starbucks bears no liability for Plaintiff’s injuries as a matter of law.  Plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence to refute Nelson’s declaration.  Plaintiff only points to the fact that Vons used Starbucks’ training materials, but that fact alone does not mean Starbucks had control or possession of the Premises.   

 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: March 26, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court