Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a landlord tenant dispute.  Plaintiff Jorie Esposito entered into a lease agreement with Defendant Essex Property Trust, Inc. for property located at 4750 Lincoln Blvd, Marina Del Rey, California (the “Property”).  Upon moving in, Plaintiff noticed the kitchen sink pipe was loose; the pipe was leaking, and the inside of the kitchen cabinet had water damage and a moldy smell.  (Compl. ¶ 9.)  The washer and dryer also needed to be replaced.  (Id.)   

After Plaintiff requested a repair, Defendant replaced the washer dryer and fixed the leaking pipe.  (Id. ¶12.)  Defendant also scheduled an inspection with Benchmark, an environmental company that conducts mold tests, to address the mold and water damage in the kitchen cabinet.  (Id. ¶13.)  Defendant relocated Plaintiff to another unit until the work on her kitchen cabinet was completed.  (Id. ¶15.)   

Plaintiff requested a second mold inspection report from Benchmark, and Defendant informed Plaintiff that the second report showed it was safe for Plaintiff to move back into her unit.  (Id. ¶17.)  Plaintiff then requested that all filters and vents be replaced and cleaned by Defendant.  Defendant replaced the filters, but did not clean the vents.  (Id. ¶18.)   

Thereafter, Plaintiff ordered a professional mold test from a different company, and its report showed untreated elevated levels of mold present in Plaintiff’s unit.  The report concluded a large portion of the unit was uninhabitable until proper remedial measures were taken.  (Id. ¶21.)   Plaintiff also saw a lung specialist who concluded that Plaintiff had mycobacterium adium complex, a condition associated with mold exposure.  (Id. ¶20.) 

The operative complaint alleges claims for (1) breach of warranty of habitability (violation of Civil Code § 1941.1), (2) breach of warranty of habitability (violation of Health & Safety Code § 17920.3), (3) negligence – premises liability, (4) nuisance, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) breach of contract, (7) breach of the covenant of quiet possession, (8) fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation of fact, and (9) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion for leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff for breach of contract and failure to pay rent.  Defendant argues there exists good cause for the amendment because its claims arise out of the same tenancy as the Complaint.  Defendant also argues there will be no prejudice to Plaintiff if leave to file a cross-complaint is granted as trial is not until February 24, 2025; Plaintiff has not conducted any discovery, and any discovery on the failure to pay rent will be minimal and straightforward.  No opposition was filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling.   

 

LEGAL STANDARD 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50 states, “(a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial. (c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b).¿ Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.”¿ 

A cross-complaint is compulsory when a related cause of action existed at the time of serving the defendant’s answer to the complaint.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.30, subd. (a); see also Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864.)¿ A related cause of action is “. . . a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10, subd. (c).)¿ Leave must be granted to file a compulsory cross-complaint when the defendant is acting in good faith.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.)¿ 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant has not argued that its cross-complaint is compulsory.  A cross-complaint is compulsory if it existed at the time of the answer.  Here, Defendant claims that it could not have filed the cross-complaint at the time of its answer because Plaintiff had not yet vacated the property, and damages were not yet conclusive.  (Motion at 3:3-5.)   

If the proposed¿cross-complaint¿is¿permissive,¿leave¿of court may be granted “in the interests of justice” at any time during the course of the action.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 428.50(c).) On the other hand, if the proposed cross-complaint is compulsory, leave must be granted so long as defendant is acting in good faith.¿Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.  

The Court concludes that the interests of justice support granting Defendant’s motion for leave to file a cross-complaint.  Defendant did not unduly delay in seeking leave to file.  The parties have been engaged in settlement discussions, which only failed recently on September 9, 2024.   

There is no prejudice to Plaintiff in allowing the cross-complaint.  Trial is not until February 24, 2025.  Plaintiff has conducted no discovery over the past two years.  Any discovery relating to the failure to pay rent will be minimal and straightforward.   

Moreover, judicial economy is best served by allowing Defendant to assert its causes of action in this case, rather than filing a separate lawsuit, particularly as it involves the exact same tenancy and the same exact parties.  This would save the court and the parties significant time and avoid the expense and vexation of an entirely new lawsuit.  (Bracey v. Gray (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 282, 285-286 (“The purpose of allowing a cross-complaint is to enable all matters in dispute between the parties relating to or depending upon the contract, transaction or subject matter upon which the action is brought or affecting the property to which it relates to be determined in a single judgment.  In other words, to avoid a multiplicity of suits and thereby save vexation and expense.”).)            

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for leave to file cross-complaint.     

DATED: October 28, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court