Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is a breach of contract case.  Plaintiff Maxim Commercial Capital, LLC entered into a written Equipment Finance Agreement (the “Agreement”) with Defendant Stoneridge Construction LLC, whereby Plaintiff agreed to finance Stoneridge’s purchase of certain equipment.  As consideration, Stoneridge agreed to make certain specified monthly payments to Plaintiff.   To induce Plaintiff to enter into the Agreement, Defendant Onesimo Martinez Jr. executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Guaranty (the “Guaranty”) whereby he unconditionally guaranteed payment and performance obligations under the Agreement.  

Stoneridge defaulted on the Agreement by failing to make the payments.  As a result of the default, Plaintiff accelerated the balance due under the Agreement and made demand on Stoneridge for immediate payment of the accelerated balance.  The accelerated balance due under the Agreement at the time of the Complaint was $121,748.22, plus interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per annum pursuant to Civil Code §3289(b). The accelerated balance has not been paid.  Martinez also breached the Guaranty by failing to make the payments that Stoneridge failed to pay. 

On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging three claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of guaranty, (3) common count (money lent) and (4) recovery of personal property.   

On October 6, 2023, this Court entered a default judgment against Defendants.  This hearing is on Defendant Martinez’s motion to set aside default and default judgment.     

LEGAL STANDARD 

“Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction.  Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.  Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service.”  (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)   

“When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time.”  (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 (trial court properly granted motion for relief from default and default judgment based on Code Civ. Proc. §473(d) where defendants argued there was no valid service of process and they lacked minimum contacts with California).)   

A defendant may therefore move to set aside a default and default judgment based on improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction under Code Civ. Proc. §473(d).  (Id. at 1250.)  A defendant need not bring a motion to quash prior to or in conjunction with a motion for relief from default and default judgment pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §473(d).  (Id.) 

It is always the plaintiff’s burden to establish the existence of jurisdiction.  (Id. at 1250-1251; Dill v. Berquist Const. Co., Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439-1440.)  Thus, even though defendant is the moving party on a motion to quash or a motion to set aside a void judgment under Code Civ. Proc. §473(d), the burden is on plaintiff to establish proper service.  (Dill, 24 Cal.App.4th at 1439-1440.)  A valid proof of service gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of valid service.  (Id. at 1441-1442.)  But the presumption may be overcome by contrary evidence.  (City of Los Angeles v. Morgan (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 726, 731.) 

The statutory requirements of service are construed to uphold jurisdiction, rather than defeat it.  (See Pasadena Medi-Center Associates v. Sup.Ct. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778.)  As long as the defendant receives actual notice of the lawsuit, substantial compliance with the Code provisions governing service of summons will generally be held sufficient.  (Id.).   

DISCUSSION 

Martinez argues default judgment should be set aside because he claims he was not properly served with the summons and complaint.  The Court disagrees. 

The proof of service filed on July 10, 2023 states that Martinez was served at 5104 N. Cynthia Street, McCallen Texas 78504 (“Cynthia Street address”).  Martinez claims he does not live at the Cynthia Street address, and he lives at 6418 Azul Street, Edinsburg, Texas 78542 (the “Azul Street address”).  (Ex. 101; Martinez Decl. ¶6.)  Martinez’s father bears his same name and resides at the Cynthia Street address.  (Ex. 102; Martinez Decl. ¶6.)  Martinez claims the process server served his father. 

The declaration of diligence by the process server, however, states that the process server attempted to serve Martinez at the Azul Street address, where Martinez concedes he resides.  (Ex. E to Beyer Decl.)  The address is located in a gated community, and the process server was unable to get to Martinez’s home after four attempts.  (Id.)  On June 13, 2023, the process server called the number on the call box, 956-270-9264 and made contact with Martinez who told the process server to meet him at the Cynthia Street address.  (Id.)  A skip trace report shows that the number belongs to Martinez.  (Ex. F to Beyer Decl.)  The process server met Martinez at the Cynthia Street address; he confirmed he was speaking with Martinez, and Martinez stated he already knew about the case and was taking care of it.  (Ex. E to Beyer Decl.)   

The Court credits the declaration of the process server and concludes that Martinez was properly served.  Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to set aside default and default judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to set aside default and default judgment.   

 

DATED:  July 2, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court