Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Margaret Yining Jiang 

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Azar Mouzari and Hassan Nafchi, Trustees of Savannah Kiam Group Associates, Partners and Family Revocable Trust 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from a landlord-tenant dispute.  Plaintiffs Azar Mouzari and Hassan Nafchi as Trustees of Savannah Kiam Group Associates, Partners and Family Revocable Trust (“Landlord”) own real property located at 960 N. Tigertail Road, Los Angeles, California (the “Property”).  Landlord leased a 1-bedroom guesthouse located at the Property to Defendant Margaret Yining Jiang (“Tenant”), pursuant to a written lease agreement (the “Lease”).   

Landlord alleges Tenant caused substantial damage to the Property by installing an unpermitted gas line.  Tenant then allegedly refused access to the unit to fix the gas line, or for a city inspector to inspect the unit.  Tenant has also failed to pay rent as of February 2023 and utility fees from at least October 2022.  Tenant further refused to vacate the Property when Landlord elected to terminate the Lease.   

The operative complaint alleges claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) private nuisance and (4) waste.   

This hearing is on Tenant’s special motion to strike the Complaint.  Tenant claims that all of Landlord’s causes of action arise from Tenant’s protected activity of communicating with the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”) which ultimately led that agency to issue code violation notices.       

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Tenant seeks judicial notice of (1) the complaint in this action and (2) a January 25, 2023 notice of code violation issued to Landlord by the LADBS.  The Court grants the request for judicial notice pursuant to Evid. Code §§ 452(c), 452(d), 452(h) and 453.    

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The Court sustains Landlord’s Objection Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 11 to the Declaration of Margaret Yining Jiang and overrules Objection Nos. 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 to the same declaration.  The Court overrules Landlord’s Objection Nos. 1-4 to the Declaration of Joshua Greer.  The Court overrules Tenant’s objections to the Declarations of Azar Mouzari and Nilofar Nouri.     

LEGAL STANDARD 

“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims arise from protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.  Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’  If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.”  (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)    

PAGE LIMITS 

Tenant argues that Landlord exceeded the page limit because the opposition averages 32 lines of text as opposed to the traditional limit of 28 lines of text.  Tenant asks the Court to disregard the last two pages of the opposition, which includes Tenant’s request for attorneys’ fees and conclusion.  Tenant cites no support for its 28 line per page rule.  Even assuming Tenant is correct, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the last two pages of Landlord’s opposition. 

DISCUSSION 

On the first prong, “courts are to consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.  The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.”  (Bonni, 11 Cal.5th at 1009.)  “A defendant need only make a prima facie showing at this stage.”  (Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1035–1036.)   

Where the plaintiff alleges multiple factual bases for a particular cause of action and the defendant moves to strike the entire cause of action, the defendant must demonstrate that each factual basis qualifies as protected activity and supplies an element of the challenged claim, as opposed to being merely contextual or incidental.¿ (Bonni, 11 Cal.5th at 1011-1012.)¿ If a defendant seeks to strike an entire cause of action with multiple factual bases, it is defendant’s burden to address each factual basis.¿ (Id. at 1011.)¿ If the defendant fails to address a particular subpart or factual basis, the defendant fails to carry its first prong burden as to that subpart or claim.¿ (Id.)¿ “If a cause of action contains multiple claims and a moving party fails to identify how the speech or conduct underlying some of those claims is protected activity, it will not carry its first-step burden as to those claims.”¿ (Id.)¿¿¿ 

Here, Tenant has not carried her burden to show that Landlord’s causes of action arise from protected activity.  The Court agrees that Tenant’s communications with the LADBS constitute protected activity.  (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1255-1256, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507 (neighbor’s complaints to City of Santa Monica planning staff regarding an unpermitted playhouse constitute protected activity); Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal. App. 3d 400, 406 (tenant’s persistent complaints to various government agencies regarding the mobile home park constituted protected activity).) 

However, Landlord’s claims do not arise from those communications or the resulting code violation.  Rather, the claims are based on Tenant’s failure to pay rent and utility fees, installation of an unpermitted gas line and refusal to permit Landlord to remedy the defect.  (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, 29, 36, 37, 42, 47, 50.)   

While Landlord’s claims do refer to a “City Order” requiring her to evict the Tenant (see, e.g., Compl. ¶37), this peripheral reference does not support a finding that the claims arise from protected activity.  As one court explained, “if the allegations of protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, the mere mention of the protected activity does not subject the cause of action to an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 414.)   

That Landlord’s suit was filed after Tenant’s communications with the LADBS also does not mean this action is based on protected activity.  The California Supreme Court has explained that “the mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.”  (Naveiller, 29 Cal.4th at 49.)  “California courts rightly have rejected the notion that a lawsuit is adequately shown to be one ‘arising’ from an act in furtherance of the rights of petition or free speech so long as suit was brought after the defendant engaged in such an act, whether or not the purported basis of the suit is the act itself.”  (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 77.)  Here, as explained above, communications between Tenant and LADBS are not the wrongs complained of in the Complaint.   

As Tenant has not met her burden to show Landlord’s claims arise from protected activity, the burden does not shift to Landlord to prove their claims have minimal merit. 

Landlord seeks attorneys’ fees and costs on the ground that Tenant’s special motion to strike is frivolous because Landlord’s claims already survived a demurrer and therefore, Tenant knew the second prong could not be met.  Section 425.16(c) provides that “[i] f the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to¿Section 128.5.”  The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s special motion to strike is frivolous simply because of the Court’s prior ruling on the demurrer.  On the second prong, Landlord was required to show both that their claims are legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to obtain judgment if their evidence is credited.¿ (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821;¿DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 562, 568¿(holding that it is insufficient under the¿second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute to¿survive a demurrer, and that the allegations must be substantiated).)  The determination whether a plaintiff can establish a probability he or she will prevail “cannot be based on allegations but must be based on evidence.”¿(DuPont, 78 Cal.App.4th at 564.)¿ For this reason, the Court cannot conclude that Tenant’s special motion to strike was frivolous simply because Landlord’s complaint already survived a demurrer, and accordingly, the Court denies Landlord’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s special motion to strike.  The Court also DENIES Landlord’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: April 27, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court