Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a dispute over an allegedly defective 2018 Ford Mustang.  In 2018, Plaintiff Cristina Dinulescu entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Ford Motor Company regarding a 2018 Ford Mustang, which was manufactured and or distributed by Ford.  (Compl. ¶10.)   

The warranty contract contained various warranties including a bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty and emission warranty.  (Id. ¶11.)  Plaintiff claims there were defects to the car during the applicable express warranty period including electrical system defects, engine defects, transmission defects, and body defects.  (Id. ¶15.)   

Plaintiff alleges Ford failed to promptly replace the car or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act (“SBA”).  (Id. ¶19.)  Plaintiff seeks incidental, consequential and general damages resulting from Ford’s alleged failure to comply with the SBA.  (Id. ¶25.) 

Based on these allegations, the operative complaint alleges five causes of action for (1) violation of Civ. Code §1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civ. Code §1793.2(b), (3) violation of Civ. Code §1793.2(a)(3), (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and (5) negligent repair.  The first to fourth causes of action are alleged against Ford, while the fifth cause of action is alleged against the dealer, Santa Monica Ford Lincoln.    

This hearing is on Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Ford argues that Plaintiff’s SBA claims fail because Plaintiff cannot bring claims under the Act against a manufacturer based on the purchase of a “used” car.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (Code Civ. Proc. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).)  “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]”  (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.)  

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.  Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (citations omitted).)   

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)   

Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be addressed to the pleading as a whole or to separate counts.  If addressed to the pleading as a whole, the motion must be denied if even one count is good.  (Lora v. Garland (1946) 27 Cal.2d 840, 850; Heredia v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1345, 1358.)  If addressed to separate counts, the motion may be granted as to some counts and denied as to others.  (Steiner v. Rowley (1950) 35 Cal.2d 713, 720; Heredia, 228 Cal.App.3d at 1358.) 

MEET AND CONFER 

A party moving for¿judgment on the pleadings must¿meet and confer in person or telephonically with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to determine if an agreement can be reached regarding the claims raised in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) The moving party must file a declaration detailing the¿meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a)(3).)  Ford submits the Declaration of Teresa Alarcon which attests the parties met and conferred by telephone.  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of § 439.   

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

 Ford requests judicial notice of the 2020 retail installment sales contract (“Sales Contract”) for Plaintiff’s purchase of the car.  The Court denies the request.   

Ford seeks judicial notice on the ground that it claims the 2020 Sales Contract is referenced in the Complaint.  Where a plaintiff references a document in her complaint, but fails to attach a copy of that document to the complaint, the Court may take judicial notice of the document.¿(See, e.g.,¿Ingram v. Flippo¿(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285 n.3¿(judicial notice appropriate where complaint referenced to, and excerpted quotes from, documents not attached as exhibits to the complaint).  Here, the Complaint does not reference the 2020 sales contract.  Rather, it references and relies on a 2018 warranty contract.  (Compl. ¶ 10.)  Accordingly, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the 2020 contract.         

DISCUSSION  

Ford argues that Plaintiff’s SBA claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot bring claims under the SBA against a manufacturer for a used car.  In doing so, Ford relies on the 2020 Sales Contract which the Court has declined to judicially notice.  Absent the Sales Contract, there is no basis for Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for judgment on the pleadings.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Ford Motor Company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.   

DATED: July 9, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court