Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Satish Dass  

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Paul Edalat 

 

BACKGROUND 

The action arises from a business dispute.  Defendant Satish Dass was a business associate of Plaintiff Paul Edalat.  (Compl. ¶193.)  In 2021, a business dispute arose between them, which continues today.  (Id.)   

On or about May 21, 2022, Dass came to the gate of the community where Edalat lives.  Dass handed to the security officer at the gate a rifle and at the same time told the officer, “I have a problem with Paul Edalat [and two other neighbors of Mr. Edalat.]”  (Id. ¶194.)  Edalat was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of an illegal firearm.  (Id. ¶195.)  

On a different occasion, one or more individuals came to Edalat’s coffee shop in Orange County and threatened Edalat.  Edalat alleges these individuals were sent by or at the behest of Dass.  (Id. ¶196.)  

Edalat alleges two causes of action against Dass: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress (ninth cause of action) and (2) civil extortion (tenth cause of action).  (Compl. ¶¶193-201.)  The tenth cause of action is also alleged on behalf of Plaintiff Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Edalat’s company.   

This hearing is on Dass’s demurrer to both causes of action.  Dass argues that “there are simply no allegations that indicate that Mr. Dass ever threatened … Mr. Edalat, or Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc., nor are there allegations that Mr. Dass ever threatened criminal charges against Mr. Edalat.  Furthermore, there are no allegations that tie Mr. Dass to the alleged incident in the coffee shop – which are alleged on information and belief’ while failing to state any alleged facts as to when or where it allegedly occurred.  (See complaint at ¶s 194-201.)  Indeed, the allegations are razor thin and fall well below the standards required to state a claim.”   

LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

A demurrer to a complaint may be general or special.¿ A general demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)¿ A special demurrer challenges other defects in the complaint, including whether a pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)¿ The term uncertain means “ambiguous and unintelligible.”¿ (Id.)¿ A demurrer for uncertainty should be sustained if the complaint is drafted in such a manner that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿ 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  

DISCUSSION 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Dass argues that Edalat has not stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Court disagrees. 

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1036.)   

Threats of physical violence or death can support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  (Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. Cal. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 229-230.)   The threat can be direct or implied.  For example in Kisesky, statements such as “Since you do not seem concerned about your safety and well-being, maybe you will be concerned about the well-being of your wife and children” was found to constitute outrageous conduct.  (Id. at 230.)  Here, Dass’s announcement “I have a problem with Paul Edatlat” was accompanied by Dass’s carrying an illegal weapon to Mr. Edalat’s entrance gate.  This was an implied threat of bodily harm and satisfies the requirement of outrageous conduct.   

Dass’s argument that the allegations are not specific is without merit.  Demurrers for uncertainty under¿Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e)¿are disfavored. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority¿(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc.¿(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant’s knowledge. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 976, p. 389.)  Here, the allegations about the gun are specific as to date, location and what Dass said and did.  Any ambiguities as to the incident can be clarified with discovery, and the details of the incident is presumptively within Dass’s knowledge.   

This threat alone is sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Court need not consider the lack of specificity of allegations relating to the coffee shop incident.  (Kiseskey, 144 Cal.App.3d at 229-230 (implied threatening statement “taken alone” was sufficient to allege outrageous conduct).) 

Civil Extortion 

Dass argues that the complaint does not state a claim for civil extortion because there are no allegations of wrongful threats of criminal or civil prosecution.  The Court agrees in part. 

Extortion is obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by wrongful use of force or fear.  (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 326-328.)  Fear for purposes of extortion may be induced by a threat to do an unlawful injury to the person.  (Id., quoting Penal Code § 519.)   

The threat need not be specific.  In Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, Stenehjem sued his employer Akon and its CEO Sareen for wrongful termination.  Stenehjem sent an email to Akon’s attorney offering “one last opportunity to settle this in a gentlemens manner.”  (Id. at 1421 n.12.)  Stenehjem further stated, “I never wanted … to involve the United States Attorney General … I do not wish to make a Federal case out of this …. It is not my first choice to proceed with the Qui Tam option …”  The implication was that if Akon did not settle Stenehjem’s suit, Stenehjem would institute a false claims act claim against his former employer.  (Id. at 1422-1423.) 

Akon and Sareen cross-claimed against Stenehjem for civil extortion.  Stenehjem argued there was no clear threat, simply “a desire to resolve the matter face to face.”  (Id. at 1424.)  The court disagreed holding, “The absence of either an express threat or a demand for a specific sum of money in the e-mail does not negate its fundamental nature as an extortionate writing.”  (Id.)  “The fact that Stenehjem’s e-mail may have been less than explicit – in that it did not contain conditional language such as ‘Unless Sareen pays me for my claims, I will report him to the federal authorities for violations of the federal False Claims Act’ – does not make its character any less illegal.  No precise or particular form of words is necessary in order to constitute a threat under the circumstances.  Threats can be made by innuendo and the circumstances under which the threat is uttered and the relations between [the defendant] and the [target of the threats] may be taken into consideration in making a determination of the question involved.”  (Id.)      

Stenehjem holds, therefore, that (1) we must consider the context in which the statement was made, (2) a vague or veiled threat can constitute extortion, and (3) a specific demand need not be made.  In this case, Dass and Edalat were involved in litigation.  Dass showed up where Edalat lives with a gun and a message, “I have a problem with Edalat.”  This was a threat by innuendo, and in context where there was a dispute between the parties which was in litigation, it was a demand to drop or settle a dispute.   

However, the Court agrees with Dass that the allegations are not specific as to Vivera.  There is no allegation how the business dispute relates to Vivera.  There is no implied threat against Vivera, as the threatening statement attributed to Dass does not reference Vivera at all.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERULES IN PART the demurrer with 20 days’ leave to amend.   

 

DATED:  August 29, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Cou