Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

 

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants and Cross-Complainants Joseph Campion and Samantha Georges 

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Ruth Preven and Eric Preven 

 

BACKGROUND 

 

  This case arises from a dispute between members of a homeowners’ association.  Plaintiffs Ruth Preven and Eric Preven allege Defendants Joseph Campion and Samantha Georges have violated various provisions of “governing documents” by engaging in unapproved constructions on their property.  Plaintiffs also allege a pattern of harassment by Defendants including Defendants replacing Plaintiffs’ artwork with a pile of garbage; placing in the entryway a large plastic frame covered in excrement; placing garbage in the walkway, and pouring red paint on Plaintiffs’ front door.  The operative complaint alleges four causes of action for (1) declaratory and injunctive relief re breach of governing documents, (2) harassment, (3) misrepresentation/fraud and (4) intentional bodily injury.   

Defendants previously moved to strike Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for   misrepresentation/fraud pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §425.16.  The Court’s tentative ruling was to grant the special motion to strike.  Two days after the tentative ruling was issued and prior to the hearing on the motion, Plaintiffs dismissed their third cause of action.  At the hearing, the Court revised its tentative ruling and denied the special motion to strike as moot.   

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.  Defendants argue that while Plaintiffs’ dismissal mooted the special motion to strike, the Court still has jurisdiction to award fees and costs and should do so here, as the Court already concluded in its tentative that Defendants would have prevailed on their special motion to strike.  Defendants seek $12,240 in attorneys’ fees and $147.74 in costs for a total of $12,387.74.     

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of their third cause of action does not moot Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §425.16.  “[A] defendant who has been sued in violation of [the anti-SLAPP statute] is entitled to an award of attorneys fees … even if the matter has been dismissed prior to the hearing on that motion.”  (Law Offices of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang (2009) Cal.App.4th 869, 879; Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 218; Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 751.) 

Where there has been a voluntary dismissal, the trial court must first rule on the merits of the special motion to strike, and award attorney fees “when a defendant demonstrates that plaintiff's action falls within the provisions of subdivision (b) and the plaintiff is unable to establish a reasonable probability of success.” (Liu, 69 Cal.App.4th at 752.)   

Here, the Court’s tentative ruling evaluated Defendants’ motion under the two-step analysis for a special motion to strike.  The Court concluded Plaintiffs’ third cause of action arose from protected activity, namely Defendants’ statements during a court proceeding, and Plaintiffs had not shown that their fraud claim had at least minimal merit as the allegedly fraudulent statements were barred by the litigation privilege.  Accordingly, Defendants are the prevailing party and are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Civ. Code Proc. §425.16(c).)    

In setting a fee award under § 425.16, courts apply the lodestar approach which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.  (Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal. App. 5th 1050, 1055.)  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Id.) 

Defendants seek an hourly rate of $450 for an attorney with over twenty years’ experience.  (Ross Decl. ¶4.)  The Court concludes that the hourly rate is reasonable and in line with rates charged by attorneys with similar experience in the Southern California legal market.  (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249 ($500 hourly rate in Southern California 15 years ago was a reasonable rate); Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1237 (Southern California attorneys’ hourly rate of $550 in 2007 was reasonable).    

However, the number of hours expended by Defendants’ counsel on a relatively simple anti-SLAPP motion is excessive.  Defendants also include tasks that are questionable including “traveling to/from and attending hearing” when the minute order shows counsel attended via CourtConnect.  The Court has the discretion to reduce the amount of fees (or deny recovery altogether) when the amount of attorney fees is inflated.  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635; Meister v. Regents of the Univ. of California (1998) 67 Ca. App. 4th 437, 455.)  The Court reduces the hours from 27.2 to 13, representing 6 hours for preparing the special motion to strike, 1 hour for reviewing the opposition, 1 hour for preparing for and attending the hearing on the special motion to strike, 2 hours for preparing the motion for attorneys’ fees, 2 hours for reviewing the opposition and drafting a reply, and 1 hour for preparing and attending the hearing on the motion for attorneys’ fees.          

Based on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees of $5,850 plus costs of $147.74 for a total of $5,997.74.        

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.  The Court awards attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $5,997.74, which shall be paid by Plaintiffs within 30 days of this Order.   

DATED: May 10, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court