Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from a dispute between shareholders of an out-of-state corporation.  Petitioner James Davidson is a former FBI agent.  He is a 50% shareholder of Respondent The World Protection Group, Inc. (“WPG”), a security services company incorporated in Nevada.  The other 50% shareholder is Respondent Kent Moyer.   

 During 2011, the relationship between Davidson and Moyer soured, and Moyer stopped providing Davidson with key information pertaining to WPG.  Davidson claims Moyer unilaterally and improperly increased his own salary, unilaterally made his wife another director of WPG, had WPG make other improper payments to him and his wife and engaged in other wrongdoing as to WPG and its finances.  Davidson further alleges that despite WPG being very profitable, he has not received any dividends, distributions or other payments.   

Davidson filed a verified petition for writ of mandate (“Writ Proceeding”) against Moyer and WPG. The Writ Proceeding seeks to (1) permit Davidson to inspect the books and records of WPG and (2) require a WPG shareholders’ meeting and election of new directors. In response, Moyer filed an action seeking dissolution of WPG (the “Dissolution Action”). In both actions, Moyer has argued that Davidson could not legally hold a financial interest in WPG while he was an active FBI agent, without violating the Department of Justic’s conflict of interest prohibitions and the FBI Ethics and Integrity Program Policy Director and Policy Guide. 

This hearing is on Moyer’s motion to compel Davidson’s further responses to his requests for production sets one and two and for sanctions.  The requests seek documents relating to Davidson’s employment with the FBI. Moyer argues that the discovery is available in this special proceeding; the documents he seeks are relevant to ascertaining and establishing the legality of Davidson’s investment and involvement in WPG, and Davidson’s objections are boilerplate and lack merit.  ¿¿¿ 

DISCUSSION 

On April 4, 2023, Moyer served his Request for Production (Set One), Request Nos. 1-10 on Davidson. On May 4, 2023, Davidson served verified responses to the document requests. Moyer had 45 days from the service of the verified response or until June 18, 2023 to file a motion to compel. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310(c). (“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response … the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to this demand.”).)  

The 45-day deadline to bring a motion to compel further responses is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sassoon, Inc. v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681, 685 (the court acts in excess of its jurisdiction by considering an untimely motion to compel further response to interrogatories); Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406-1410 (applying rule to motions to compel production of documents).) The deadline is jurisdictional insofar as it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them. (Sexton, 58 Cal.App.4th at 1410.)  

Here, Moyer did not file a motion to compel by June 18, 2023. Instead, Moyer served Requests for Production Nos. 11-20 on Davidson, which were identical to his prior Requests for Production Nos. 1-10. Moyer cannot re-serve the same requests to restart the 45 day deadline. If it were otherwise, the 45 day deadline would be toothless. (Cf. Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 493-494 (“[W]here a party has clearly failed to meet the time limits, may he reset the clock through the stratagem of asking the same question again? … [P]laintiff’s ploy cannot succeed …. [I]t would be an absurdity to say that a party who fails to meet the time limits … may avoid the consequences of his delay and lack of diligence by propounding the same question again. The Legislature has explicitly stated that unless a party moves to compel further response within 45 days of the unsatisfactory response, he waives any right to compel a further response. We hold that this means what it says; plaintiff’s motion was therefore untimely.”).)  

Moyer argues that the 45 day deadline is not triggered when only objections are served. Moyer provides no support for this broad proposition. His citation to Appleton v. Sup. Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636 is unavailing. There, the issue was whether sanctions were mandatory when a party provides unverified responses to requests for admissions. The Court concluded that they were because unverified responses were no responses at all. As relevant here, the Court did not hold that the 45 day deadline was not triggered by the filing of objections alone.    

Accordingly, the Court denies Moyer’s motion to compel as untimely. The Court declines to consider the other arguments raised by Davidson for denying the motion to compel. The Court also denies each side’s request for sanctions as the Court concludes there is no misuse of the discovery process by either side.  

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: December 15, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court