Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from a dispute between a school district and one of its students.  Plaintiff Liav Mann alleges that as a member of the wrestling team at Beverly Hills High School, he was physically and verbally abused by his wrestling coach, Ryan Faintich.  Faintich would tell members of his team to kick Plaintiff in the genitals and instructed Plaintiff not to fight back.  (Compl. ¶¶10-13.)  On one occasion, Faintich wrestled with Plaintiff, purposely headbutting him, leaving lumps on his forehead.  (Compl. ¶ 22.)  Ultimately, Faintich dismissed Plaintiff from the wrestling team, and as Plaintiff alleges, prevented Plaintiff from enrolling in a regular P.E. class, resulting in an “F” grade that sunk his grade point average.  (Compl. ¶¶39-42.) 

The operative complaint alleges claims for (1) negligence against Defendant Beverly Hills Unified School District (“BHUSD”), (2) negligence against Faintich, (3) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against BHUSD, (4)  intentional infliction of emotional distress against both defendants, (5) breach of fiduciary duty against both defendants.   

This hearing is on BHUSD’s demurrer of and motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint.  BHUSD demurs to (1) the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on the ground that Plaintiff has alleged no facts that would constitute extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of BHUSD and (2) the breach of fiduciary duty claim because there is no fiduciary relationship between the district and a student.  As to the motion to strike, BHUSD moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the ground that the district, as a public entity, is immune from punitive damages under Gov. Code §818.        

LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §437.)¿ 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”); Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).)  The burden is on the plaintiff to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a)(3), 435.5(a)(3).)  BHUSD submits the Declaration of Antoine Pitts, which shows that BHUSD’s counsel attempted to meet and confer by telephone or in person, but counsel received no response from Plaintiff.  These efforts are sufficient to comply with the meet and confer requirements.  The Court cautions the parties to cooperate in meeting and conferring. 

 

DISCUSSION 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim 

BHUSD argues that Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) fails because Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the district.  The Court agrees.  

The elements of a claim for IIED are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”  (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.)  To be outrageous, conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”  (Id.)  The defendant must have engaged in conduct “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.  It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous.  It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.”  (Christenson v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)   

To avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with “great specificity the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.”  (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)  “Whether behavior is extreme or outrageous is a legal determination to be made by the court, in the first instance.”  (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34, 44.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his wrestling coach physically and verbally abused him or directed others to abuse him, while he was a member of the wrestling team.  He does not allege any extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of the school district.  His sole contact with any administrators of the school regarding Faintich came after Faintich had removed Plaintiff from the wrestling team and Plaintiff was attempting to transfer to a regular P.E. class.  (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 39.)  Plaintiff does not allege he reported Faintich’s alleged abuse to the district.   

Plaintiff’s IIED claim also fails because it is a common law tort claim unsupported by a statute imposing liability on a public entity.  Sections 815, subdivision (a) and 815.6, require an authorizing statute or enactment before a governmental entity such as the school district can be liable in tort. (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 798.)  Plaintiff does not identify any statute allowing a claim for IIED against BHUSD.  (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176 (overruled on other grounds by C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 861 (trial court properly sustained demurrer on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against school district where plaintiff failed to identify any statute imposing such liability on a public entity).)   

On these facts, the Court cannot conclude the district’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, nor has Plaintiff identified a statute authorizing an IIED claim against the school district.  Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiff’s IIED claim. 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty 

BHUSD argues that a school district does not have a fiduciary relationship with its student.  The Court agrees. 

“[W]e have not found, any authority stating that a fiduciary relationship exists between a school district and an individual student.”  (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. 189 Cal.App.4th at 1176.)   

A fiduciary obligation requires both undivided loyalty and confidentiality.  (Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102.)  The imposition of a fiduciary duty on school districts to students would be untenable as a district could not possibly act on a daily basis with “undivided loyalty” owed to every single student when decisions must be made which necessarily favor some students over others.  A district also owes legal obligations to its employees, and to the public, which prevent a district from acting solely in the best interests of one student.   

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against BHUSD. 

Motion to Strike 

BHUSD moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages on the ground the district is immune from liability for punitive damages.  Gov. Code §818 provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”  Accordingly, because BHUSD is a public entity, it is immune from liability for punitive damages pursuant to Gov. Code §818, and the Court grants the motion to strike the punitive damages claim against BHUSD. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer without leave to amend.  The Court also GRANTS the motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages without leave to amend.  Plaintiff has not opposed the demurrer and motion to strike, and accordingly, has not met its burden to show it could successfully amend its complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the demurrer and motion to strike.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: December 7, 2023 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court