Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from an employment dispute.  Plaintiff Liam Horgan was employed by Defendant Urban Outfitters, Inc. as an hourly non-exempt sales associate and “keyholder”.  (Compl. ¶5.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a single cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).  Plaintiff asserts his PAGA claims on behalf of himself and other current or former aggrieved employees.  (Id. ¶ 1.) 

Plaintiff claims Defendant (1) failed to compensate the aggrieved employees for all required overtime pay and failed to properly calculate the overtime rates paid, (2) failed to compensate the aggrieved employees with at least minimum wages for all hours worked, (3) failed to provide meal periods, (4) failed to provide accurate and complete wage statements, (5) failed to pay all earned wages during employment, (6) failed to pay all earned wages upon termination, (7) required aggrieved employees to search for and/or find replacement workers in order to use paid sick days, (8) threatened to discharge or in any manner discriminate against aggrieved employees for using or attempting to exercise the right to use accrued sick days; (9) failed to provide suitable seating; (9) failed to immediately exclude all COVID-19 cases and employees with close contact with any COVID-19 cases from the workplace; and (10) failed to pay exclusion pay to any employees with close contact with any COVID-19 cases who were excluded from the workplace.  (Id. ¶46.)   

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.  Defendant argues that a valid arbitration agreement exists which requires arbitration of the individual PAGA claims asserted by Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the non-individual PAGA claims pursuant to Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1916.  After Defendant filed the motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his individual PAGA claims. 

 

OVERSIZED BRIEFS 

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration exceeds the page limits for a moving paper.  The limit is 15 pages, and Defendant’s motion is 17 pages.  The Court has discretion to¿disregard Defendant’s oversize brief.  An¿oversize brief is treated the same as a late-filed brief. (Cal. R. Ct. 3.1113(g).)  The Court has discretion to¿disregard late-filed papers and therefore also has discretion to consider or¿disregard oversize briefs.  (See¿Cal. R. Ct. 3.1300(d).)  In the interest of moving this case forward toward expeditious disposition on the merits, the Court will exercise its discretion to consider the oversize brief in this one instance.  The parties should not rely on similar indulgence in the future. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.  (See Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355 [260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1] (“[T]he presence of interstate commerce is not the only manner under which the FAA may apply. … [T]he parties may also voluntarily elect to have the FAA govern enforcement of the Agreement”].)   

Here, the arbitration agreement states: “This Agreement is governed by the FAA … The Company’s business and your employment with the Company affect interstate commerce.”  (Ex. B to King Decl. at 7(g).)  The language of this provision is unambiguous: the parties specified that the FAA governs the arbitration agreement. (Cf. Victrola 89, LLC, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 343, 348 (contracting parties’ explicit “reference to ‘enforcement’ under the FAA required the court to consider the [defendants’] motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.”).) 

Under the FAA, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration …”.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24–25.  This federal policy favoring arbitration preempts any state law impediments to the policy’s fulfillment.  If a state law interferes with the FAA’s purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, the FAA preempts the state law provision, no matter how laudable the state law’s objectives. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352.)  Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2), the FAA requires any conflicting state law to give way. (Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C. v. Howard (2012) 133 S.Ct. 500, 504). 

However, while the arbitration agreement here is governed by the FAA, the agreement may be enforced via the summary procedures provided by California arbitration law.  (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 394, 409-410.)  It is a “general and unassailable proposition . . . that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts,” even though the controversy is governed by substantive federal law.  (Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138.)  By the same token, however, a state procedural rule must give way “if it impedes the uniform application of the federal statute essential to effectuate its purpose, even though the procedure would apply to similar actions arising under state law.” (McCarroll v. L.A. County etc. Carpenters (1957) 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61, 62.)   

“We think it plain the California procedures for a summary determination of the petition to compel arbitration serve to further, rather than defeat, the enforceability policy of the [FAA.]”  (Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 409.)  Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2 and 1290.2 are neutral as between state and federal law claims for enforcement of arbitration agreements.  (Id.)  “They display no hostility to arbitration as an alternative to litigation; to the contrary, the summary procedure provided, in which the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement is decided by the court in the manner of a motion, is designed to further the use of private arbitration as a means of resolving disputes more quickly and less expensively than through litigation.”  (Id.) 

As with federal law, under California law, public policy favors arbitration as an efficient and less expensive means of resolving private disputes.  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.)  To further that policy, Code Civ. Proc. §1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless it finds (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists, (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived, (3) grounds exist for rescission of the agreement or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues.    

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of evidence.  (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.)  It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions.  (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause.  (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination.  (Id.)   

If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) 

DISCUSSION 

Existence of Arbitration Agreement 

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law  help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541; Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 734, 835.)  Even when the FAA applies, “interpretation of the arbitration agreement is governed by state law principles.”  (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. Bridge Banc, LLC (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.) 

Although “[t]he law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties” (Player v. Geo. M. Brewster & Son, Inc. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 526, 534), “there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate[.]” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal. App. 3d 350, 353..)¿ “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1518¿(“Because arbitration is a contractual matter, a party that has not agreed to arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to do so.”).)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿  

Here, the Arbitration Agreement provides that “all disputes, claims, complaints or controversies (“Claims”) that you now have or in the future may have against Urban Outfitters, Inc. …. or that the Company now has or in the future may have against you … are subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and will be resolved by arbitration and NOT by a court or jury.”  (Ex. B to King Decl., at 1(a).)  The Agreement states in bold capital letters: “THE PARTIES HEREBY FOREVER WAIVE AND GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO HAVE A JUDGE OR A JURY DECIDE ANY COVERED CLAIMS.”  (Id.)  The Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of claims it covers, including:  

“[C]laims for overtime, wages, compensation, penalties or restitution, including but not limited to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) . . . and any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law, arising out of and/or directly or indirectly related to your application for employment with the Company, and/or your employment with the Company, and/or the terms and conditions of your employment with the Company, and/or termination of your employment with the Company.  

 

(Id. (emphasis added).)   

While Plaintiff did not sign the Agreement, he accepted the Agreement by beginning or continuing employment with Defendant.  The Agreement provides that:  

Execution Of Agreement: You can signify your acceptance of this Agreement in one of several ways. Signing or accepting this Agreement electronically will be deemed acceptance of this Agreement. In addition, if you begin or continue working for the Company without signing this Agreement, and do not revoke it as explained in Section 4 above, this Agreement will be effective, and you will be deemed to have consented to, ratified, and accepted this Agreement through your knowledge of it and your acceptance of and continued employment with the Company.  

 

(Ex. B to King Decl. at 7(h) (emphasis in original).)  It further states:  

 

“You understand that your affirmative signature and/or acknowledgement of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced. If you begin or continue working for the Company without signing this Agreement, and do not revoke it as explained in Section 4 above, this Agreement will be effective, and you will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through your knowledge of it and your acceptance of and continued employment with the Company.”  

 

(Id. at 7(i) (emphasis in original).) 

Continuing employment after receiving an arbitration agreement constitutes implied in fact acceptance of the agreement, particularly where as here the Agreement expressly provides that acceptance may be accomplished by continued employment.  (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420.)  “California law in this area is settled: when an employee continues his or her employment after notification that an agreement to arbitration is a condition of employment, that employee has impliedly consented to the arbitration agreement.”  (Diaz v. Sohnen Enterprises (2019) 34 Cal. App. 5th 126, 130.) 

In Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App. 4th 373, the California Court of Appeal held that an employee agreed to an arbitration agreement through commencement of employment where complying with the arbitration agreement contained in an employee handbook was a condition of the employment offer and the handbook provided that “the employee was deemed to have consented to the agreement by virtue of acceptance of the Employee Handbook,” even though the employee claimed he never signed an arbitration agreement.  (Id. at 384.)  As the Harris court noted, “Plaintiff cannot have it both ways, acceptance of the at-will job offer with all its emoluments and no responsibility to abide by one of its express conditions.”  (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 781, Mitri v. Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164 and Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511 (2012) is unavailing because none of these cases discuss acceptance of a standalone arbitration agreement by continued employment; instead, all three discuss arbitration provisions embedded within an employee handbook that did not include language that an employee would accept the arbitration agreement through continued employment.  

Plaintiff’s argument that he was never informed of the conditions of the Agreement is equally unavailing. “[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it.’”  (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163 (1993).)  Plaintiff was required to open and view the standalone Agreement.  (King Decl. ¶ 14.)  He signed a form acknowledging that he received a copy of the Agreement.  (Id. ¶ 17, Ex. C.)  Plaintiff then began employment with Urban, demonstrating mutual assent and an intent to enter into the Agreement.  Plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration merely by claiming that he does not remember reading the Agreement.  (Harris, 248 Cal.App.4th at 383 (where the arbitration agreement is provided to the employee, his “ch[oic]e not to read or take the time to understand these provisions is legally irrelevant”).) 

Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement.   

Scope of Arbitration Agreement  

Once the Court concludes an arbitration agreement exists, it must then consider whether the agreement covers the claims at issue.  (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 966, 960.)  Here, Plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged violations of the California Labor Code which fall squarely within the Agreement’s scope.  The Complaint asserts a single cause of action under PAGA for failure to pay overtime wages, minimum wages, and meal premiums; failure to provide and maintain compliant wage statements; failure to timely pay all wages during employment; failure to timely pay all final wages; requiring employees to search for replacement workers to use sick pay days; threatening to discharge employees for using or attempting to exercise the right to use accrued sick days; failure to provide suitable seating; and failure to exclude employees and pay exclusion pay.  (See Compl. ¶¶ 47- 112.)  The Agreement specifically covers claims related to “overtime, wages, compensation, penalties or restitution” under federal, state, or local law.  (Ex. B to King Decl. at 1(a).)  Thus, the Agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant. 

Unconscionability  

The Court must next consider whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.  Unconscionability generally includes the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms that unreasonably favor the other party. (Carboni v. Arrospide (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 76, 82-83.)  Unconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element.  (A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 486.)  An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both procedural and substantive unconscionability is shown. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.)   

Procedural unconscionability focuses on whether there is “oppression” arising from an inequality of bargaining power or “surprise” arising from buried terms in a complex printed form. (Id. at 1280.)  Substantive unconscionability addresses the existence of overly harsh or one-sided terms.  (Id.)   

Plaintiff has the burden of proving both procedural and substantive unconscionability. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet. Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165).  Both, however, need not be present to the same degree.  A sliding scale is applied so that the “more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1317; see also A & M Produce Co., 135 Cal.App.3d at 486.)   
Here, while there is unequal bargaining power between the parties, there is no lack of disclosure of the arbitration agreement.  (Robinson v. City of Mateca (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 452, 459 (“Procedural unconscionability requires an inequality in bargaining power accompanied by lack of disclosure of material provisions.”)  The Agreement was not hidden nor buried among other documents.  It was a stand-alone, seven page document with a clear heading of “Mutual Arbitration Agreement.”  (Ex. B to King Decl.)  The Agreement contains numerous descriptive subsection headings and describes the terms and conditions of arbitration in detail, including clauses in bold, capital letters, and underline.  (Id.)  As a result, Plaintiff cannot credibly claim any surprise about the Agreement’s terms.  Accordingly, the Agreement is not procedurally unconscionable. 

In any event, “a finding of procedural unconscionability does not mean that a contract will not be enforced, but rather that courts will scrutinize the substantive terms of the contract to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided.” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469.)   We now address whether the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. 

“Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness or overly harsh effect of the contract term or clause.”  (Harper, 113 Cal.App.4th at 1406-1407.)  Pursuant to Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Svcs., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 101, a mandatory employment arbitration agreement must: (1) provide for neutral arbitrators; (2) provide adequate discovery; (3) provide for a written award; (4) provide for relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) require no unreasonable costs and arbitration fees to be paid by the employee.  (Id. at 102.)   

The agreement here fully complies with each of the Armendariz factors.  First, the agreement requires the use of a neutral arbitrator.  The agreement specifically provides that the parties will use Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”), subject to its employment arbitration rules and procedures.  (Ex. B to King Decl. at 5(a).)  JAMS’ rules require the use of a neutral arbitrator.  (Ex. A to Gonnel Decl., Rule 7.) 

Second, the agreement provides for adequate discovery through its incorporation of JAMS’ or alternatively the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA’s”) rules, which both provide for information exchanges and discovery in arbitration.  (Ex. A to Gonnell Decl. at Rule 17; Ex. B to Gonnell Decl. at Rule 9.)  Courts have concluded that JAMS’ and AAA’s discovery rules provide adequate discovery under Armendariz.  (Saline v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (Feb. 9, 2009 C.D. Cal.) 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138960¿at *14-18 (collecting cases).) 

Third, the Agreement provides for a written award.  The Agreement states that the arbitrator must render a “final and binding written award.”  (Ex. B to King Decl. at 4.) 

Fourth, Plaintiff will not be required to pay unreasonable costs or the arbitrator’s fees. The Agreement provides that Defendant will pay “any amount of the JAMS or AAA fee in excess of the filing fee” including “any other JAMS or AAA administrative fees, the arbitrator’s fees, and any additional fees unique to arbitration.”  (Id. at 4.) 

Fifth, the agreement does not limit statutory remedies and grants the “same affirmative rights to individual damages and other relief and the same limitations regarding damages and ability to obtain other relief as would have applied in a judicial forum.”  (Id. at 5.) 

Finally, the arbitration agreement is bilateral as it binds both Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s claims which arise out of their employment relationship to arbitration.  The Agreement requires both Plaintiff and Defendant to waive their rights to a jury trial and to resolve all covered disputes by arbitration.  (Id. at 1.) 

In sum, the Court finds that there is no procedural or substantive unconscionability.  Dismissal of Individual PAGA Claims 

Plaintiff next contends that the Court should dismiss the individual portion of his PAGA claim and permit the remaining, non-individual portion to proceed in court.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot bring a non-individual PAGA claim only.  The Court disagrees. 

Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal. App. 5th 533 supports Plaintiff’s position.  There, the trial court struck Balderas's “non-individual” representative PAGA action because Balderas alleged she was not suing in her individual capacity and was pursuing only non-individual claims.  The appellate court reversed concluding that to establish standing, Balderas need not have filed an individual PAGA claim: “The¿Adolph¿court concluded that the¿Viking River¿requirement of having to file an individual PAGA cause of action to achieve standing to file a representative PAGA suit was incorrect. There are only two requirements for PAGA standing. The plaintiff must allege that he or she is (1) someone who was employed by the alleged violator and (2) someone against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”  (Id. at 538-539 (internal quotations and citations omitted).) 

Defendant argues that Balderas is inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s holding in Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal., Inc. (2020) 9 Cal .5th 73, 87.  Not so.  Kim held “[a] plaintiff's inability to obtain individual relief is not necessarily fatal to the maintenance of a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.”  (Id. at 85.)  This holding aligns with the ruling in Balderas that a plaintiff need not have an individual claim to pursue a non-individual PAGA claim.  

Defendant also argues that it is procedurally impossible to dismiss the individual portion of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim, because both the individual and non-individual portions are part of a single claim.  Defendant’s argument cannot be squared with the holding in Balderas.  If a plaintiff can bring only a non-individual PAGA claim, it follows that an individual and non-individual PAGA claim are severable and can be addressed separately.       

Defendant next argues that even if Plaintiff were to dismiss his “individual” claim, he is still bound to arbitrate the threshold issue of whether he is an aggrieved employee.  The Court agrees.  Plaintiff cannot under the guise of litigating non-individual PAGA claims, ask the court to resolve issues relating to an individual PAGA claim, i.e., whether Plaintiff personally suffered a violation of the Labor Code.  Any such holding would effectively render the arbitration agreement null and would be preempted by the FAA.   

“The ‘principal purpose of the FAA is to ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 344. Therefore, “[t]o ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms, the FAA preempts all state laws that apply of their own force to limit those agreements against the parties’ will or to withdraw the power to enforce them.”  (Cronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge Servs. (2005) 35 Ca1. 4th 376, 385).    

Plaintiff’s Non-Individual PAGA Claims 

 

The question remains as to what to do with Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims.   

In¿Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the FAA, a plaintiff could be required to arbitrate individual PAGA claims, and suggested that once compelled to individual arbitration, the plaintiff would lose standing to pursue the representative PAGA claims in court.¿ (142 S. Ct. at 1925.)  Relying on state law standing principles, the California Supreme Court in¿Adolph v. Uber Techs, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 held that, even if a plaintiff’s individual claims were compelled to arbitration, the plaintiff retained standing to represent other aggrieved employees in court.  (Id. at 1125-1126.)   

Defendant argues that the FAA -- which expressly governs the Agreement -- preempts Adolph.  The Court disagrees.  As the Ninth Circuit has concluded, there is nothing in Adolph that is inconsistent with the FAA.  (Johnson v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC (2024) 93 F.4th 459, 464-465.)  Adolph had to do with whether there is standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims that were not subject to arbitration.  As these claims were not subject to arbitration, they could not conceivably implicate the FAA. 

Stay of Proceedings 

Defendant argues that if the Court orders arbitration of the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff is an aggrieved employee, it must stay the action pending arbitration.  The Court agrees.   

A stay is mandatory under California law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4 (“Where a party has applied for an order to arbitrate a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State and such application is undetermined,” the court “shall” “stay the action or proceeding until the application for an order to arbitrate is determined and, if arbitration of such controversy is ordered, until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.”) (emphasis added).)  “The stay’s purpose is to preserve the status quo until the arbitration is resolved, preventing any continuing trial court proceedings from disrupting and rendering ineffective the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to decide the issues.” (Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc. (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 947, 966.)1  Accordingly, the Court will stay proceedings on Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.  The Court compels arbitration of the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff is an aggrieved employee and stays Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: August 20, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court