Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

 

  This is a slander case.  Plaintiff Adam Tenser is an entertainment lawyer.  (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 15.)  He did transactional work for Blake Leibel.  (Id.)  Leibel was arrested and later convicted of the gruesome murder of his girlfriend who was mutilated and drained of blood.  (Id.)   

While attending Leibel’s trial, Tenser was accused of stalking a juror.  The juror was frightened and was relieved of jury duty by stipulation of counsel.  (Id. ¶ 22.)  The Court said: “I don’t want anyone following jurors,” and juror #9 responded: “I really don’t think he was following me, I’m paranoid now.”  (Id.)   

Defendant Catherine Townsend is a journalist and hosts a weekly podcast called “Blood Money” that covers true crimes.  (Id. ¶ 25.)  Townsend reported on the Liebel trial, and as relevant here, stated that “During the trial ... weird things started to happen.  A juror went to the judge Mark Windham and said that she had been followed by a guy she recognized.  She claimed that she was being stalked by Jeremy Tenser, Blake’s friend.  The judge said QUOTE: ‘This juror was so frightened by the behavior that she described that this court was forced to relieve her.”  END QUOTE.  Now Jeremy Tenser completely denied this; he said that this charge was ridiculous – but the judge ended up banning Jeremy from the rest of the trial.  The juror was so freaked out that she had to be replaced.”    

Tenser argues that the foregoing was slander because Townsend failed to report the juror’s statement that: “I really don’t think he was following me, I’m paranoid now.”  (FAC ¶27.)  Tenser brings a single claim for defamation/slander per se against Townsend.   

Townsend filed a special motion to strike the FAC pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §425.16(e).  There was no opposition filed to the anti-SLAPP motion.  The Court granted the motion.   

This hearing is on Townsend’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  Townsend argues that she is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees as the prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion.  Townsend also seeks a 2x multiplier because her counsel took the case on a “flat fee contingency basis” and the case involved “novel issues.”  Townsend requests $138,718.94 in total fees and costs.     

LEGAL STANDARD 

California’s¿anti-SLAPP¿statute provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”¿ (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16(c)(1);¿see also¿Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (“[A]ny SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.”).¿The fee provision of the anti-SLAPP statute includes compensation for “all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim.”¿ (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1141.)  

“[O]nly those attorney fees and costs related to the special motion to strike, not the entire action, may be recovered under section 425.16, subdivision (c).” (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92.)  “The fees awarded should include services for all proceedings, including discovery initiated by the opposing party pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (g), directly related to the special motion to strike.” (Id.)¿¿ 

The award of fees and costs in an anti-SLAPP case must be reasonable, and courts have broad discretion to determine what is reasonable.¿ (Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 18.)  California courts apply the lodestar approach for determining a reasonable fee award in an anti-SLAPP case.¿ (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1131-1132.)  For the lodestar approach, the Court begins by fixing a lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. ¿(Id. at 1132.) 

The Court may then adjust the lodestar amount based on factors including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” ¿(Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.) 

To determine a reasonable hourly rate, the Court looks to the “hourly rate … prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (Bernardi v. Couny of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)  In this case, the relevant market is the Southern California legal market.  The burden is on the successful party to prove the appropriate market rate to be used in calculating the lodestar.¿(Blum v. Stenson¿(1984) 465 U.S. 886, 895, fn. 11.) However, the moving party may satisfy its burden¿through its own affidavits, without additional evidence.¿(Davis v. City of San Diego¿(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903.)  Moreover, in assessing a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court is allowed to consider the attorney’s skill as reflected in the quality of the work, as well as the attorney’s reputation and status. (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1139.) 

To determine whether the hours expended were reasonable, a “court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to the tasks completed in an action because he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1111.)  A losing party cannot litigate tenaciously then be heard to complain about the time spent or tasks performed by the prevailing party in response.  (City of Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561, 580, fn.11.)¿ 

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.) “[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence and arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id. at 564.)  

DISCUSSION 

Reasonable Hourly Rate 

Townsend’s counsel, Jeff Lewis, has an hourly rate of $800.  He has been practicing for 25 years (Lewis Decl. ¶7), and his hourly rate of $800 has been deemed reasonable by judges of the Los Angeles, San Francisco and Orange County Superior Courts.  (Lewis Decl. ¶ 9.)  Indeed, this Court found Lewis’ hourly rate to be reasonable in connection with a similar anti-SLAPP motion in Bisignano v. TMZ, Case No. 22SMCV02628.  (Lewis Decl. ¶9.)   

Lewis staffed the case with one associate (Kyla Dayton), who has an hourly rate of $400.  Dayton is a graduate of Lewis & Clark Law School and has been practicing for two years.  (Lewis Decl. ¶ 5.)  She has assisted Lewis in making and opposing over half a dozen anti-SLAPP motions.  (Id.)  Other courts have found even higher hourly rates ($450) for associates in Lewis’ firm to be reasonable.  (Lewis Decl. ¶ 9.)  The Court concludes Dayton’s hourly rate is reasonable for an associate in the Los Angeles legal market.   

To further reduce fees, Lewis assigned tasks to two paralegals who were billing at the lower rate of $250 per hour.  One had 14 years experience as a paralegal, and the other had three years experience.  (Lewis Decl. ¶6.)  Other courts have found substantially similar hourly rates ($225) for paralegals in Lewis’ firm to be reasonable.  (Lewis Decl. ¶ 9.)  The Court concludes these rates are reasonable for paralegals in the prevailing market.     

Tenser argues that the hourly rates are excessive because Lewis only charged Townsend $10,000.  But California appellate authorities generally allow for the award of reasonable fees over and above the amount billed.  (See¿Nemecek & Cole v. Horn¿(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 641¿(affirming award of contractual attorney fees based on Lodestar method even though fees were paid by malpractice carrier at discounted rates);¿see also Syers Props. III v.¿Rankin¿(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 701 (affirming the award of fees at a higher rate than actually billed); Chacon v. Litke¿(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260¿(“The¿reasonable¿market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of a reasonable hourly¿rate. This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel.”);¿accord,¿Center for Biological Diversity v. County of 'San Bernardino¿(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619.) 

Reasonable Time 

Townsend seeks an award for 126.1 hours of attorney work and 40.4 hours of paralegal work.  Townsend’s counsel attests that all of the work was performed in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion.  (Lewis Decl. ¶ 3.)     

At first blush, these hours seem excessive given this Court granted the anti-SLAPP motion without opposition from Plaintiff.  But this matter was not originally assigned to this Court.  Following the filing of this lawsuit in August 2023, Townsend filed an anti-SLAPP motion in November 2023.  Rather than simply opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, Tenser made the litigation needlessly complex.   

Tenser applied ex parte for relief to oppose the scheduling of the anti-SLAPP motion alternatively arguing the anti-SLAPP motion was premature and then the motion was too late. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 15.)  Townsend’s counsel was required to attend four ex parte hearings filed by Tenser.  

Tenser then filed a first and second amended complaint despite the bar on amending complaints once an anti-SLAPP motion was on file. This required the filing of a second anti-SLAPP motion to the amended complaint.  (Lewis Decl., ¶ 15.)  

Tenser then filed a motion to strike the anti-SLAPP motion rather than opposing the anti-SLAPP motion.  Although Tenser’s motion to strike was denied, Townsend was still required to brief and argue it.  

A party who unnecessarily increases the costs of litigation cannot then complain about the time spent or tasks performed by the prevailing party in response.  (City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 580, fn.11.)¿  

Tenser argues that the hours are excessive and unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion.  Tenser does not specify the amount of hours that he claims are unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion and so the Court cannot properly assess his claim or determine the hours that should be reduced.  Also, his argument that hours billed on the first anti-SLAPP motion cannot be recovered is without merit.  Because the work on the first anti-SLAPP motion carried over to the second anti-SLAPP motion, Townsend is entitled to recover fees related to the first anti-SLAPP motion.   

Multiplier 

Townsend also seeks a¿multiplier¿of 2, given her counsel was retained on a¿contingency¿fee¿basis.  The court may apply a multiplier based on contingent risk.  In contingent fee cases, a fee enhancement compensates the lawyer for having taken the case despite the risk of receiving no payment in the event of a loss or the risk of a delayed payment in the event of a victory.  (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132-1133, 1137-1138.)  The enhancement “is intended to approximate market-level compensation for” cases taken on contingency, “which typically includes a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees.” (Id. at 1138.)  While the Court recognizes that defense counsel was retained under a contingency fee agreement, the Court does not find that this litigation warrants a fee enhancement.  The anti-SLAPP motion was typical, not exceedingly complex and did not involve novel issues, and therefore, a lodestar multiplier is not warranted. 

Fees Motion 

The fee provision of the anti-SLAPP statute includes compensation for “all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim.”¿ (Id. at 1141.)  Townsend spent 10 hours to prepare this motion.  (Lewis Decl., ¶ 4.)  Townsend’s attorney expects to spend an additional 10 hours to review opposition, prepare a reply and attend the hearing.  (Lewis Decl., ¶ 12.)  The Court concludes that these fees are reasonable.   

Costs 

The fee provision of the anti-SLAPP statute is “broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extricating herself from a baseless lawsuit.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 99 Cal.App.4th at 446.)  Townsend seeks costs and expenses of $808.94 including filing fees, attorney service fees and superior court fees.  The Court concludes these costs are reasonable.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant Catherine Townsend’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  Townsend is awarded $72,138.94 in fees and costs.   

   

DATED: October 30, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Co