Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from claims of elder abuse and neglect.  Plaintiff Peder Robert Tarbox is a dependent adult, with physical and mental limitations restricting his ability to carry out daily activities.  Defendant 413 SM Meridian Holdings LLC dba Meridian at Ocean Villa owns and operates a Residential Care Facility for the Elderly (“RCFE”).   

Plaintiff became a resident at the RCFE after suffering multiple strokes.  Plaintiff claims the RCFE failed to properly appraise Plaintiff for changes in condition, failed to properly develop plans to safely address his deteriorating mobility, and failed to implement a plan to safely transport him for hygienic cleaning.   

While under the care of Defendants, Plaintiff was dropped twice when being transferred to a wheelchair.  Defendants did not report either incident to his family.   

When Plaintiff’s personal physician checked on Plaintiff, he observed unreported injuries and demanded that Plaintiff be taken to the hospital immediately.  While at the hospital, imaging revealed that Plaintiff had suffered fractures to both of his legs in multiple locations, and he was found to be suffering from a severe urinary tract infection, dehydration and sepsis.   

The operative complaint alleges two claims for (1) elder abuse and neglect and (2) negligence.  

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  Defendants argue that a valid arbitration agreement exists which requires arbitration of Plaintiff’s elder abuse and neglect and negligence claims.     

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.  (See Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355 (“[T]he presence of interstate commerce is not the only manner under which the FAA may apply. … [T]he parties may also voluntarily elect to have the FAA govern enforcement of the Agreement”].)   

Here, the arbitration agreement states: “By signing below, you agree that any and all claims and disputes arising from or related to this Agreement or to your residency, care or services at the Community …. shall be resolved by submission to neutral, binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act.”  (Ex. A to Ajello at p. 17.)  The language of this provision is unambiguous: the parties specified that the FAA governs the arbitration agreement. (Cf. Victrola 89, LLC, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 343, 348 (contracting parties’ explicit “reference to ‘enforcement’ under the FAA required the court to consider the [defendants’] motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.”).) 

Under the FAA, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration …”.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24–25.  This federal policy favoring arbitration preempts any state law impediments to the policy’s fulfillment.  If a state law interferes with the FAA’s purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, the FAA preempts the state law provision, no matter how laudable the state law’s objectives. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352.)  Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2), the FAA requires any conflicting state law to give way. (Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C. v. Howard (2012) 133 S.Ct. 500, 504). 

However, while the arbitration agreement here is governed by the FAA, the agreement may be enforced via the summary procedures provided by California arbitration law.  (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 394, 409-410.)  It is a “general and unassailable proposition . . . that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts,” even though the controversy is governed by substantive federal law.  (Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138.)  By the same token, however, a state procedural rule must give way “if it impedes the uniform application of the federal statute essential to effectuate its purpose, even though the procedure would apply to similar actions arising under state law.” (McCarroll v. L.A. County etc. Carpenters (1957) 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61, 62.)   

“We think it plain the California procedures for a summary determination of the petition to compel arbitration serve to further, rather than defeat, the enforceability policy of the [FAA.]”  (Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 409.)  Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2 and 1290.2 are neutral as between state and federal law claims for enforcement of arbitration agreements.  (Id.)  “They display no hostility to arbitration as an alternative to litigation; to the contrary, the summary procedure provided, in which the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement is decided by the court in the manner of a motion, is designed to further the use of private arbitration as a means of resolving disputes more quickly and less expensively than through litigation.”  (Id.) 

As with federal law, under California law, public policy favors arbitration as an efficient and less expensive means of resolving private disputes.  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.)  To further that policy, Code Civ. Proc. §1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless it finds (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists, (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived, (3) grounds exist for rescission of the agreement or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues.    

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of evidence.  (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.)  It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions.  (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause.  (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination.  (Id.)   

If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) 

 

DISCUSSION 

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law  help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541; Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 734, 835.)  Even when the FAA applies, “interpretation of the arbitration agreement is governed by state law principles.”  (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. Bridge Banc, LLC (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.) 

Although “[t]he law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties” (Player v. Geo. M. Brewster & Son, Inc. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 526, 534), “there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate[.]” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal. App. 3d 350, 353.)¿ “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1518¿ (“Because arbitration is a contractual matter, a party that has not agreed to arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to do so.”).)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿  

Here, there is no dispute Plaintiff did not sign the arbitration agreement.  Rather, the agreement was signed by Plaintiff’s sister, Laura Tarbox.  The parties dispute whether Ms. Tarbox had the authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of her brother.  Plaintiff argues Defendants have not presented evidence that Ms. Tarbox was her brother’s actual or ostensible agent.  In reply, Defendants point to a conservatorship agreement which is illegible in critical parts.  As the conservatorship agreement was submitted for the first time in reply, moreover, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to address whether the agreement confers agency.  Should the Court be unpersuaded by their conservatorship argument, Defendants also request limited discovery into Ms. Tarbox’s authority to enter into the arbitration agreement.     

Given the illegibility of the conservatorship agreement and the fact it was submitted for the first time in reply, the Court will continue the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration to June 14, 2024 to allow Defendants the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on Ms. Tarbox’s authority to bind her brother to the arbitration agreement and to allow Plaintiff the opportunity address the conservatorship agreement.  The parties are directed to file simultaneous briefing on this issue by May 31, 2024.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court continues the hearing on Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay of proceedings to June 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: March 15, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court