Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is a negligence and premises liability case.  Plaintiffs Brooke Barron and her minor son Jag Barron were bit by Defendant Donna Chadwick’s dogs.   

Plaintiffs allege that on August 11, 2023, they were heading to a birthday party for one of Jag’s friends in the Pacific Palisades. The birthday party was located at 530 Muskingum Ave, but Plaintiffs mistakenly went to 530 Muskingum Place, Chadwick’s home.  

Ms. Barron opened the unlocked gate on the side of Chadwick’s property and began walking down the side of the house towards the backyard.  Suddenly, and without warning, two dogs attacked Plaintiffs, biting both of them. Both Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries.  

Plaintiffs claim that Chadwick either knew or should have known of the dangerous propensities of her dogs prior to the attack. The Complaint alleges Defendant’s negligence was the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiffs'’ damages.  

This hearing is on Chadwick’s demurrer.  Chadwick argues that because Plaintiffs are admitted trespassers, Chadwick does not owe a duty to them, and accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for negligence or premises liability.  Chadwick also argues that the strict liability dog bite statute does not apply here because Plaintiffs were admitted trespassers.   

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 requires that before the filing of a demurrer, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3).)  Defendant submits the declaration of Kristine Tijam who attests that the parties had a telephonic meet and confer on February 14, 2025, which is more than five days before the demurrer was filed on February 21, 2025.  Accordingly, Defendant has met the meet and confer requirements of . § 430.41.     

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer to a complaint may be general or special. A general demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) The allegations in the complaint as a whole must be reviewed to determine whether a set of alleged facts constitutes a cause of action.¿(People v. Superior Court (Cahuenga's the Spot)¿(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1376.)¿A complaint need only meet fact-pleading requirements, which requires a statement of facts constituting a cause of action in ordinary¿and concise language, and should allege ultimate facts that, as a whole, apprise defendant of the factual basis of the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §425.10(a)(1);¿Navarrete v. Meyer¿(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.) 

A special demurrer challenges other defects in the complaint, including whether a pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)  The term “uncertain” includes the issue of whether the pleading is “ambiguous and unintelligible.”  (Id.) A demurrer for uncertainty should be sustained if the complaint is drafted in such a manner that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

A demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is disfavored and should be sustained only when the complaint is so incomprehensible that the defendant cannot reasonably respond since ambiguities may be clarified in discovery.¿(Lickiss v. Financial indus. Regulatory Auth.¿(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  Uncertain allegations should be liberally construed in testing a complaint for adequacy against a demurrer, particularly when the facts that are uncertain are presumptively within the defendant’s knowledge.¿(Childs v. State¿(1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 155, 160.)¿The particularity requirement in a pleading depends on the extent to which the defendant, in fairness, needs detailed information the plaintiff can conveniently provide, while less particularity is required when the defendant is assumed to have the knowledge. (Doheny Park Terrance Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch.¿(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.) 

In ruling on a demurrer, the court is guided by the following long-settled rules: The court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ¿The court may also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. Further, the court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Blank v. Kirwan¿(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend¿must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.¿(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully.¿(Id.;¿Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.)¿However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a¿demurrer¿without¿leave¿to¿amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). 

DISCUSSION 

Chadwick argues that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for negligence or premises liability because they are admitted trespassers and a landowner does not owe a duty of care to trespassers.  The Court disagrees. 

A negligence action requires duty, breach of duty, causation and damages.  (Public Utilities Comm'n v. Sup.Ct. (Millan) (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 364, 380.)  The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence.  Accordingly, a plaintiff asserting those claims must sufficiently allege a legal duty to use due care. (Jones v. Awad (2023) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.)  

Chadwick argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish a duty of care because they trespassed onto Chadwick’s property.  But pursuant to the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 118, the liability of a possessor of land¿no¿longer¿depends upon the “rigid common law classifications” of¿trespasser, licensee, and invitee.  That Plaintiffs were trespassers by itself does not preclude a finding of a duty.  Instead, we “approach the issue of the duty of the occupier on the basis of ordinary principles of negligence. [Citations.]” (Id.)  The cases on which Chadwick relies in support of her demurrer all preceded the decision in Rowland, and therefore, they are no longer controlling.  (See Marino v Valenti (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 830; Bauman v. Beaujean (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 7; Fullerton v. Conan (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 354.)   

This, however, does not end the inquiry.  Rowland¿listed a number of factors to be considered in determining whether there is a duty–“the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland,¿69 Cal. 2d at 112-113.) 

¿“The most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an¿exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care … is whether the injury in question was¿foreseeable.” (Kesner,¿ 1 Cal.5th at 1145; see¿Tarasoff, 17 Cal.3d at 434.) In examining foreseeability, “the court’s task … ‘is not to decide whether a¿particular¿plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a¿particular¿defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct¿at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed … .’” (Cabral,¿51 Cal.4th at 772; accord,¿Parsons, 15 Cal.4th at 476.) 

Chadwick argues that the harm suffered by Plaintiffs was not reasonably foreseeable because Chadwick kept her dogs on her private property behind a closed gate and could not have reasonably foreseen that Plaintiffs would trespass onto her property and open a closed gate.   

The Court agrees with Chadwick that the harm here was not reasonably foreseeable.   

While the possessor’s duty of ordinary care extends to invitees and trespassers alike, the foreseeability of injury, and hence the degree of care required of a landowner, continues to be influenced by the likelihood that persons will be present on the property at a particular time and place, a likelihood normally¿considerably greater for invitees than for trespassers.  Of note, Rowland held that negligence may be found where “the occupier of land is aware of a concealed condition involving in the absence of precautions an unreasonable risk of harm to those coming in contact with it and is aware that a person on the premises is about to come in contact with it…” (Id. at 119.)  Here, there are no allegations that there was a history of trespassers on Chadwick’s private property, nor any facts that would have put Chadwick on notice that she should have been reasonably aware of anyone opening her closed gate and wandering around inside her private property.         

Next, Plaintiffs cannot overcome the Rowland factors as to the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, or the moral blame attached to defendant’s conduct.  The connection between Chadwick’s conduct and Plaintiffs’ injuries are not close.  Chadwick put her dogs behind a closed gate on her private property, which would not have resulted in injury to Plaintiffs absent Plaintiffs’ opening the gate.  Similarly, there can be no moral blame attached to Chadwick’s conduct, because the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint establish that Defendant simply did what was reasonably required to safeguard her dogs from the public.   

Plaintiffs also cannot meet the Rowland factors as to the policy of preventing future harm and the burden on the defendants to do more than what Chadwick did here.  Public policy does not support requiring homeowners to do more to secure their dogs (beyond keeping them on private property behind a closed gate), on the off chance that individuals will intentionally decide to open the gate to their secured property.  

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs’ complaint.  The Court does so without leave to amend.  Plaintiffs made clear admissions in their Complaint that they entered into Chadwick’s property without permission and opened a closed gate securing Chadwick’s dogs from the public.  These admissions conclusively establish there was no duty.  Plaintiffs cannot amend around the allegations in their complaint without violating the sham pleading rule.  (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877–878 (“A plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the original complaint . . . , the plaintiff may not plead facts that contradict the facts or positions that the plaintiff pleaded in earlier actions or suppress facts that prove the pleaded facts false. [Internal citation omitted.]”).)     

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer without leave to amend. 

DATED: March 26, 2025        ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court