Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Sheila Nasre and Defendant Benham Kazemi Movahed bought a property located at 603 North Doheny Drive, #2B, Beverly Hills, CA 90210 (“Property”) with the intent of living there together and holding it for long-term investment.  Shortly after moving in, Plaintiff and Defendant began a brief romantic relationship which Defendant claims to have ended.  Plaintiff thereafter decided she no longer wanted to own the Property with Defendant and initiated this partition action.   

The parties entered into a Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) on February 21, 2024.  (Ex. B to Schiffer Decl.).  Defendant moved to enforce the Agreement, and the Court ordered Defendant to list the property on the MLS.  Defendant is a licensed real estate agent/broker and requested that the Property be listed at $1,475,000, using his MLS.  To date, there has been no offers by any buyers. 

Pursuant to the Agreement, “in the event that the counsels do not agree, either party may pay for an independent appraisal and that amount determined by the independent appraisal shall be used as the sales price.”  Plaintiff had an independent appraisal done on the Property, which valued the Property at $1,375,000.  Plaintiff requested Defendant to lower the MLS listing to $1,375,000, but Defendant has not done so.  Plaintiff obtained another independent appraisal, which now values the Property at $1,300,000.  Plaintiff submitted a copy of that appraisal as an exhibit to a supplemental declaration filed on October 28, 2024. 

This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement to require Defendant to lower the sales price to $1,300,000.  Plaintiff also seeks $2,700 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to the terms of the Agreement which entitles the party who prevails on a motion to enforce the Agreement to attorneys’ fees.   

Defendant filed a late opposition to the motion on October 28, 2024, along with a request for leave to file a late opposition.  Defendant’s opposition states that defendant has recently obtained his own appraisal that values the Property at $1,460,000.  Defendant filed along with his opposition a declaration that states that his new appraisal is attached to the opposition as “Exhibit A,” but no such attachment was filed. 

The Court grants leave for Defendant to file his late opposition filed on October 28, 2024 and grants leave to Plaintiff to file her supplemental declaration also filed on October 23, 2024. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

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Code Civ. Proc. §664.6 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”¿¿ 

In hearing a Code Civ. Proc. §664.6 motion, the trial court may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment.¿ (Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, 732.)  The Court may also receive oral testimony in addition to declarations. (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.)   

The Court may interpret the terms and conditions of the settlement (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566), but the Court may not create material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.   (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810).¿ 

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute.¿ (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.)¿ The party seeking to enforce a settlement “must first establish the agreement at issue was set forth ‘in a writing signed by the parties’ (§ 664.6) or was made orally before the court.¿ [Citation.]”¿ (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 304.)¿¿ 

The settlement must include the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement, and against whom enforcement is sought.¿ (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.)¿ “[A] writing is signed by a party if it is signed by … [a]n attorney who represents the party.”  (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §¿664.6(b)(2).)   

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff asks this Court to enforce the requirement in the Agreement that should the parties disagree, an independent appraisal will set the sales price.  Plaintiff obtained an independent appraisal for $1,300,000, which pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, sets the sale price.  Plaintiff submitted copies of both appraisals to the Court.  Defendant claims that he recently obtained an appraisal for $1,460,000 but has submitted no admissible evidence of such an appraisal.  The Court therefore orders Defendant to lower the sales price in the MLS listing to $1,300,000.     

Plaintiff also seeks attorneys’ fees pursuant to the provision in the Agreement that “if either Party files a motion to enforce the terms of this AGREEMENT under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6, the prevailing PARTY shall be entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees.”  Plaintiff seeks $2,700 which is based on hourly rate of $450 and six hours spent on the motion.   

The Court concludes that the hourly rate is reasonable for the prevailing market.  Counsel has approximately 10 years of experience.  He bills his clients at the customary rate of $450 which is proof that the rate is reasonable.  The actual rate that the attorney can command in the market is “highly relevant proof of the prevailing community rate.”  (Elser v. I.A.M. Nat. Pension Fund (C.D. Cal. 1984) 579 F. Supp. 1375, 1379; see also Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997 (a court should consider “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work”.) 

The Court also concludes that the number of hours billed (six) is reasonable.  There is a legal presumption that the attorneys’ fees sought were reasonable and necessarily incurred. (Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 987 (“verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous...”).)   

Under California law, “[a]n attorney’s testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.”  (Steiny and Company v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 285, 293; Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559). Courts are not expected to “closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour but have instead used information on attorney time spent to ‘focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.’”  (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 505 (citations omitted).)  “By and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case[.]”  (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.)  The critical factor in determining the reasonableness of the fee is “the degree of success obtained.” (Farrar v. Hobby (1992) 506 U.S. 103, 114 (citation omitted).)  Here, Plaintiff’s position was ultimately successful, and her attorney’s testimony as to the number hours worked is sufficient evidence that the hours were necessarily incurred.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement and for attorneys’ fees.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: November 4, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court