Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case involves a landlord tenant dispute.  Plaintiffs Monty Rowan and Julie Searles, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated have brought a class action against Defendants Dolphin Marina LTD and GK Management Co. Inc. for engaging in construction activities affecting the common areas of the apartment complex in which they reside.  They claim the construction created pollution, noise, toxic dust, asbestos exposure, and toxic vapors.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the implied warranty of habitability, covenant of quiet enjoyment and created both a private and public nuisance endangering their residents, and have violated Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 by unlawfully charging full rent to tenants while the construction is ongoing.       

The operative complaint alleges 24 causes of action for (1) violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, (2) injunctive relief, (3) declaratory relief, (4) appointment of receiver, (5) breach of the implied warranty for habitability, (6) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) private nuisance, (8) public nuisance, (9) trespass to land, (10) premises liability, (11) constructive eviction, (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (13) general negligence, (14) negligence per se, (15) breach of contract, (16) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (17) breach of the implied covenant to perform work in a good and competent manner, (18) strict liability for engaging in ultra-hazardous activities, (19) fraud, (20) violation of Los Angeles County Rent Stabilization Ordinance, (21) elder abuse, (22) violation of Los Angeles County Covid 19 Resolution, (23) violation of California Tenant Protection Act of 2019, and (24) retaliation and harassment.   

This hearing is on Plaintiffs’ motion to continue the hearing date on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and demurrer from the currently scheduled date of February 22, 2024 to July 2, 2024.  Plaintiffs argue that the continuance is necessitated by counsel’s workload and the need to conduct limited discovery on the anti-SLAPP motion.  In addition to the requested continuance, Plaintiff seeks leave to lift the discovery stay and conduct limited discovery pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(g) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(g) provides: “All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision.” 

If a plaintiff believes that discovery is necessary to oppose an anti-SLAPP motion, Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(g) expressly requires the filing of a noticed motion.  (Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347.)   

A plaintiff must show “good cause” before taking any discovery after the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion. (CCP § 425.16(g).) “Good cause” means only discovery relevant to the plaintiff’s burden of establishing a “reasonable probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(3).)  Discovery that is not relevant to a legal defense being asserted by the defendant in the anti-SLAPP motion is not permitted.  (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 922.)  Plaintiff must demonstrate the facts they expect to uncover in their discovery.  (Id.) 

A trial court’s decision to disallow discovery will not be disturbed unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or a patently absurd determination.” (Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 604, 617.) 

DISCUSSION 

The Court concludes an extension of the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion is not warranted.  The Legislature has specified that anti-SLAPP motions should be heard within 30 days, except to the extent the docket conditions of the Court require a later hearing.  (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16(f).)  An early hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion accords with the legislative goal of “provid[ing] a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.”  (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 385.) 

Defendants set their anti-SLAPP Motion for February 22, 2024—55 calendar days (35 court days) after the filing date—which was the earliest date that the docket conditions of the Court permitted a hearing.  Delaying resolution of the anti-SLAPP motion by four months, as Plaintiffs request, would deny Defendants the statutorily mandated benefit of an early hearing on Plaintiffs’ claims, frustrating the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute.     

Plaintiffs lack good cause to continue the hearing on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.  Plaintiffs assert a right to continuance because Plaintiffs’ counsel has numerous other legal matters requiring his time.  Even if counsel’s workload were a basis to seek continuance, save for one matter, counsel fails to specify with particularity any relevant deadlines in the other matters.  The only deadline in another case specifically mentioned by Plaintiffs’ counsel is a motion for preliminary injunction in a case brought by another tenant represented by counsel against Defendants.  By stipulation of the parties, that motion must be filed by January 8, 2024.  Even if Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to do any work on an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion between December 29 (when the anti-SLAPP motion was filed) and January 8, he still would have 21 court days (and 30 calendar days) to prepare an Opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion after filing the motion for preliminary injunction in the other case.  This is compared to the minimum nine court days afforded under the law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).)     

Plaintiffs also seek continuance to conduct limited discovery on their habitability claims.  Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have in their possession, evidence of uninhabitable conditions including reports by contractors who were retained by Defendants to test for asbestos and mold.  Defendants also have in their possession, various citation notices by the Los Angeles County Public Health Department for multiple violations.  Defendants also hired various workers to inspect the property and make observations, and Plaintiffs seek leave to depose these workers.  Plaintiffs further aver that third party government entities have visited the property including AQMD and Public Health and/or building code inspectors, and their reports and testimony may also provide further evidence of uninhabitability.   

But this discovery is irrelevant to resolution of the anti-SLAPP motion.  The motion is not addressed to the habitability claims in Plaintiffs’ complaint.  Instead, the anti-SLAPP motion is addressed solely to the portions of causes of action that are based on Defendants’ service of three day notices and/or filing of eviction actions.  The anti-SLAPP motion argues that these claims are barred by litigation privilege, and even if they were not barred, (1) all claims premised on the alleged violation of the County of Los Angeles Covid-19 Tenant Protection Resolution fail because Plaintiffs do not allege and cannot show they meet the financial hardship criteria for rent deferral under the Resolution, (2) all claims premised on violation of the Tenant Protection Act fail because that statute does not apply to the property, since the property is subject to a Los Angeles County ordinance that requires just cause for termination of a tenancy, and (3) Plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful eviction fails because Plaintiffs do not allege and cannot show they have vacated the Property.   

All of these arguments can be resolved as a matter of law on the pleadings alone.  No evidence relating to alleged habitability issues is relevant to determine whether (1) the litigation privilege applies, (2) Plaintiffs met the financial hardship criteria for a rent deferral under the Resolution, or (3) the Tenant Protection Act applies to the property.  Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to show good cause for a continuance of the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion, and for the same reasons, Plaintiff has not shown good cause for relief from the stay on discovery.      

The Court also concludes there is no basis to continue the hearing on Defendants’ demurrer.  Plaintiffs’ motion articulates no basis for continuing the demurrer other than counsel’s workload, which is not a sufficient basis to seek continuance.  The limited discovery Plaintiff seeks is unrelated to the demurrer which is decided on the face of the pleadings and does not require (or allow) consideration of extrinsic evidence.   Also, Rule of Court 3.1320(d) requires that a demurrer be heard within 35 days of filing or the first date available to the court thereafter.  Continuing the demurrer by four months would place the hearing date well beyond 35 days and the Court’s first available hearing date.      

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions to continue the hearing on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and demurrer and to permit limited discovery on their habitability claims.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: January 30, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court