Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case relates to a dispute over a collective bargaining agreement.  The American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 3299 (“AFSCME”) represents a unit of approximately 10,000 service workers at UC campuses and medical centers, which includes the titles Food Services Worker, Senior Food Services Worker, Assistant Cook, and Cook. (Eaton Decl., Exh. E, p. 388 [Tr. 35:9-15], Exh. D, pp. 268-269.)  

Collective Bargaining Agreement.  On January 31, 2020, the Regents of the University of California (the “University”) and AFSCME entered into a collective bargaining agreement.  (Id. at Exh. C, pp. 44-225 [CBA].) Under Article 5 of that agreement, the University promised that it would no longer use contract workers to perform the everyday duties of bargaining unit employees.  It further agreed to use contract workers only occasionally, in exceedingly narrow circumstances. (Id. at pp. 72-74 [Arts. 5.A, 5.C].)  

Those narrow circumstances are set forth in Article 5.C, which provides that the University may only contract out if: (1) it uses contract labor “sparingly and . . . as an option of last resort to address temporary needs,” (2) it is “not . . . a means to replace employees with contractors,” and (3) a specific 5.C provision applies. (Id. at Exh. C, pp. 73-74 [Art. 5.C].)  The two 5.C provisions relevant here are:  

 

2. The employees capable of providing the required services are not available at the University location in sufficient quantity or do not possess the necessary level of expertise, or the services cannot be performed satisfactorily by University employees, or the services are of a specialized or technical nature and the expertise, knowledge, ability and/or equipment required is not available internally. This provision shall be interpreted narrowly and shall not be relied upon to avoid reasonable efforts to hire and train sufficient numbers of University employees.  

 

4. The services are of such an urgent, temporary, or occasional nature that the delay resulting from their performance by University employees hired under the University's regular or ordinary hiring process, or the inefficiencies or difficulties in utilizing University employees, would frustrate the University's goals giving rise to the need for the services. This provision shall be interpreted narrowly and shall not be relied upon to justify the ongoing use of temporary workers. (Id. at Exh. C, p. 73 [Art. 5.C].)  

The University also must provide notice of its contracting decisions to the Union, and AFSCME may challenge contracting decisions through an expedited arbitration process. (Id. at Exh. C, pp. 74-75, 77-78 [Art. 5.D, 5.H].)  If an arbitrator finds that the contract is inappropriate, the University must terminate the contract or, if the grievance was filed prior to the formation of the contract, the University “shall not proceed with the contracting process.” (Id. at Exh. C, p. 78 [Art. 5.H.7].) The only limit on an arbitrator’s remedial authority is that they “shall not include any type of monetary award, or provisions for fees.” (Id. [Art. 5.H.8].) 

University’s Use of Contract Labor.  Since at least 2018, UCLA has used four vendors, The Party Staff, TSC, Culinary Staffing Services, and Premiere Living Services, to provide ongoing contract labor for food services work. (Id.)  Aware of UCLA’s historic reliance on contract labor, AFSCME held meetings with UCLA to discuss recruitment throughout the fall and early winter of 2021. (Id. at Exh. D, pp. 300-301, 367-368 [Tr. 107:15-108:23, 111:4-112:113:19].)  

AFSCME proposed that, to attract candidates, UCLA remove English testing requirements from food services positions; offer free parking to applicants; offer full-time instead of part-time positions; assist with the application process; increase participation in a culinary training program; improve outreach to applicants; expedite promotions for internal applicants; and give the Union a list of candidates so it could help with outreach. (See, e.g., id. at Exh. D, pp. 281-301, 0372 [Tr. 128:1-9].)  

UCLA did not implement AFSCME's suggestions and it did not hire enough food services workers to serve the incoming student population, so it turned to contract labor. On December 17, 2021, UCLA informed AFSCME that it had retroactively extended contracts with four vendors for food services work.  (Id. at Exh. D, p. 243.)  

So began a years-long dispute, where AFSCME proposed ways to reduce or eliminate the need to contract out, and where UCLA refused to implement most of AFSCME’s suggestions.  Jobs were not posted or reflected in the search feature on UCLA’s main website. UCLA managers sometimes took months to respond to interested and qualified candidates. UCLA did not raise wages to address employee retention and recruitment, as was being done at other UC campuses.  It also did not give current food services workers shift bonuses to encourage overtime, create a float pool, or hire contract workers directly as UC employees. (Id. at Exhs. A, p. 8; D, pp. 260-263, 281-301, 372 [Tr. 128:1-9].)  

Not surprisingly, then, UCLA increased its reliance on contract labor — going from approximately 50 contract workers per month between September 2021 and June 2022, to approximately 90 contract workers per month between November 2022 and June 2023.  (Id. at Exhs. B, pp. 37-38; D, p. 380.)   

First Grievance/Arbitration.  On April 4, 2022, AFSCME filed a grievance alleging that UCLA was contracting out bargaining unit work in violation of Article 5. (Id. at Exhs. A, p. 8; D, pp. 265-266.)  In early 2023, Arbitrator Joe Lindsay heard AFSCME’s grievance.   

On June 1, 2023, after the record was closed but before Arbitrator Lindsay issued a decision, UCLA informed AFSCME that it had issued an RFP for contract labor to provide food services work. (Id. at Exh. C, pp. 226-239.)  The RFP was for the identical work at issue in the Lindsay arbitration.  

On June 15, 2023, AFSCME filed a second grievance, challenging the June 1, 2023 RFP as a violation of Article 5. (Id. at Exh. C, pp. 240-241.)  The Union argued that no Article 5.C provision applied because UCLA had contracted out the work on an ongoing basis, “year after year rather than recruiting, hiring, and training a sufficient number of bargaining unit employees.” (Id.)  

On September 5, 2023, Arbitrator Lindsay issued an award finding that UCLA violated Article 5 by extending and renewing its food services contracts. (Id. at Exh. B, pp. 42.)  He found that UCLA’s ongoing use of contract workers violated Article 5’s “clear prohibition on contracting out of bargaining unit work,” was not done as an option of “last resort,” and was not used “sparingly.” (Id. at Exh. B, pp. 39, 42; see also Exh. C, pp. 73-74 [Article 5.C].)  

Arbitrator Lindsay ordered UCLA to terminate the contracts as soon as reasonably possible but gave UCLA a three-month period to do so, so it could fill open positions. (Id. at Exh. B, p. 43.) UCLA did not petition to vacate Lindsay's award, and pursuant to Article 5.H, the Award is “final and binding.” (Id. at Exh. C, p. 78 [Art. 5.H.9].)  

Despite Arbitrator Lindsay’s decision that UCLA’s use of contract workers violated Article 5, UCLA did not make any renewed effort to recruit dining workers and proceeded with the RFP to contract out food services work. On September 1, 2023, UCLA notified six vendors that they had been selected under the RFP, three of which were those at issue in the Lindsay arbitration. (Id. at Exh. E, p. 398 [Tr. 70:2-6; 71:6-72:2].)   

Second Grievance/Arbitration.  On September 19 and 20, 2023, the parties arbitrated the second grievance before Arbitrator R. Douglas Collins. The evidence in that hearing was largely the same as the evidence presented to Arbitrator Lindsay.   

On March 4, 2024, Arbitrator Collins issued an award (the “Award”), rejecting UCLA's argument that Arbitrator Lindsay’s decision was wrongly decided and finding that UCLA violated Article 5 by issuing the June 1, 2023 RFP.  Because UCLA circumvented Arbitrator Lindsay’s decision by soliciting new contracts and using contract workers for 200 or more vacant positions, the Union requested an order prohibiting UCLA from proceeding with the contracting process for the same food services work.  

Recognizing that Article 5.H limited his remedial authority to equitable relief only, Arbitrator Collins ordered UCLA to not enter into any contracts under the June 1, 2023 RFP and void any contracts that it had entered into as a result of the RFP.  He also directed UCLA not to enter into or continue any verbal agreements, side agreements, or contract extensions for work covered by the Award by using a less formal process than the RFP procedure.  He gave UCLA 60 days to comply with the Award. (Eaton Decl., Exh. A, p. 20.)  

Dissatisfied with the Award, UCLA submitted a “Motion for Reconsideration,” which raised identical arguments to its papers in this action. (Id. at Exh. F, pp. 469-472.) UCLA argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that the award was harsh, unjust and against public policy.  Arbitrator Collins considered and rejected these arguments. (Id. at Exh. G, pp. 475-476, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.6.) 

Motion to Confirm/Vacate.  This hearing is on the AFSCME’s motion to confirm, and the University’s motion to vacate, the Award.  The University argues that the Award violates public policy and the arbitrator exceeded his authority under Article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement.  AFSCME argues, in turn, that there is no basis to correct or vacate the award under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1285 through 1290.6. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Statutes set forth specific grounds upon which an¿arbitrator’s award may be¿vacated (Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.2) or corrected (Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.60).  Except on these grounds,¿arbitration awards are immune from judicial review in proceedings to challenge or enforce the award.¿(Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase¿(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 12-13;¿Zazueta v. County of San Benito¿(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 106, 110.)  In deciding an application to vacate an arbitration award, every presumption is made in favor of upholding the arbitration award.  (Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 448, 451.) 

An award may be vacated only for fraud, corruption, misconduct, an undisclosed conflict, or similar “circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or with¿the fairness of the arbitration process.”¿(Moncharsh,¿3 Cal.4th at 12, see¿Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a).)  “[B]y voluntarily submitting to arbitration, the parties have agreed to bear the risk [of uncorrectable legal or factual error] in return for a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive resolution to their dispute.” (Moncharsh,¿3 Cal.4th at 11.) 

An award may be set aside entirely if the court finds any of the following grounds,¿Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(a)(1)-(6): 

(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means. 

(2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators. 

(3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator. 

(4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. 

(5) The rights of the party were¿substantially prejudiced¿by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by¿other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title. 

(6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in¿Section 1281.91¿but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision. However, this subdivision does not apply to arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement between employers and employees or between their respective representatives…” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2(a)(1)-(6).)  

Limiting grounds for judicial review effectuates the parties’ agreement that the award be final.  It also reflects that arbitrators ordinarily need not follow the law and may base their decisions on “broad principles of justice and equity” – “paths neither marked nor traceable by judicial review. ”¿(Moncharsh, 3 Cal.4th at 11;¿Nogueiro v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals¿(1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1195.)   

The merits of the controversy are generally not reviewable by the court when a petition to confirm or vacate is presented.¿(Moncharsh, 3 Cal.4th at 11.)  Thus, courts will¿not review¿the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award.¿(Morris v. Zuckerman¿(1968) 69 Cal.2d 686, 691.) 

Nor will courts pass upon the¿validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning.¿The court simply may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator.¿ (Morris v. Zuckerman, 69 Cal.2d at 691;¿Department of Pub. Health of City & County of San Francisco v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 790¿(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 429, 433, fn. 4 (“we do not see any logic in the arbitrator’s [decision] … however … the arbitrator had the power [to so decide]”).) 

Finally, and most importantly here, errors of law are not reviewable.  Generally, errors of law committed by the arbitrator, no matter how gross, are not grounds for challenging the arbitrator’s award under California law.¿(Moncharsh, 3 Cal.4th at 11;¿Richey v. AutoNation, Inc.¿(2015) 60 C4th 909, 916;¿Baize v. Eastridge Cos.¿(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 293, 300-302.)    

There are two reasons:  First, the parties contracted that the arbitrator’s decision, right or wrong, would be conclusive.  Second, the risk of arbitral error has been reduced by statutory provisions allowing courts to vacate or correct for “serious problems with the award itself or with the fairness of the arbitral process.”  (Moncharsh,¿3 Cal.4th at 12.) 

Thus, for example, awards have been upheld despite erroneous application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, erroneous application of res judicata, consideration of inadmissible evidence and erroneous denial of attorney’s fees.  (See¿State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Guleserian¿(1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 397, 402;¿see also¿Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 782, 789;¿Moshonov v. Walsh¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 771, 779.) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

AFSCME requests judicial notice of (1) Regents of the University of California Policy 5402 and (2) University of California Office of the President Business and Finance Bulletin: BUS-43.  The Court grants the request pursuant to Evid. Code 451(a), which allows for judicial notice of public statutory law, and 452(b), which allows for judicial notice of administrative regulations or legislative enactments of public entities in the United States.  The University is an “arm of the state” and is a statewide administrative agency.  (Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe (1997) 519 U.S. 425, 427; Ishimatsu v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 863.)  “Policies established by the Regents according to their constitutionally derived rulemaking and policymaking power . . . have the force and effect of statute.” (Alkella v. Regents of the Univ. of California (2021) 61 Cal. App. 5th 801, 817.)  Policy 5402 and BUS-43 are official policies of the Regents, and therefore are a proper subject for judicial notice.  

DISCUSSION 

The University argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because the Award violates public policy and goes beyond the arbitrator’s remedial authority under the collective bargaining agreement.  The Court disagrees.   

Violates Public Policy.  An arbitrator can exceed his powers by making an award that violates a well-defined and dominant public policy. (Cotchett, Pitre & Mccarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1416, as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 21, 2010).)  For an award to be vacated based on violation of public policy, there must be an “explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy” that is drawn from a “positive law” including statutes, regulations, or interpretive case law.  (Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 17 (2000) 531 U.S. 57, 63.)  Furthermore, the public policy must be “one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” (Aramark Facility Services v. Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 1877, AFL CIO (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3d 817, 823.)  

An arbitrator exceeds its powers by issuing an award that violates a party’s statutory rights or “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (Cotchett, 187 Cal.App.4th at 1416; Richey v. Autonation, Inc. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1525 (“an arbitrator exceeds his or her power within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 and the award is properly vacated when it violates an explicit legislative expression of public policy”); Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200, 1203 (arbitrator’s award properly vacated where it reformed a memorandum of understanding already approved by the Legislature, in violation of the Ralph C. Dills Act and thus in contravention of the “public policy of legislative oversight of employee contracts”).)  

The public policy exception also recognizes the need not to require parties to do something unlawful in order to abide by the award. (Palo Alto, 77 Cal.App.4th at 338–340 (arbitration award reinstating an employee who had threatened another employee, and who had been enjoined by court order from going to the workplace, was irreconcilable with the public policy requiring obedience to court orders).)  

Here, UCLA argues the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing an award that contravenes public policy.  UCLA claims the Award is directly contrary to the Budget Act enacted and updated each year, which requires the University to address food insecurity. (See e.g., Budget Act of 2023, Schedule 5440.)  UCLA argues the Award eliminates food avenues on campus, creating food insecurity and is contrary to the legislative directive expressed in the State Budget Act.   

But the University has not demonstrated the Award contravenes the policy underlying the 2023 Budget Act.  It makes no cogent argument that the Award would prohibit the University from spending its Budget Act funds on meal donation programs, food pantries, and CalFresh enrollment, or other initiatives to address food insecurity on campus, which are each listed in the Budget Act.  The Budget Act also provides no explicit obligations that apply to staffing. (Aramark, 530 F.3d at 823 (the public policy must be “one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator”) (emphasis added).)  To the extent inadequate staffing has resulted in food insecurity, there is no reason the University could not do more to increase staffing with employees, by for example, holding more dining-specific job fairs, raising wages, posting job openings on its website and paying hiring and retention bonuses.  In short, given the options available to UCLA to both comply with the Award and reduce food insecurity, it cannot establish that the Award violates the public policy underlying the Budget Act.     

UCLA next argues that the Award contravenes Regents Policy 1111, which creates an explicit public policy to honor UC’s contractual commitments because it has the same force and effect as legislation.  Regents Policy 1111 generally states that the University should conduct business “in conformance with legal requirements, including contractual commitments undertaken by individuals authorized to bind the University to such commitments.” (UC Opp., Attachment A.)  

Even accepting the University’s argument that UC policies can create an explicit public policy, there is a competing policy–Regents Policy 5402—which would also apply here.  In contrast to Regents Policy 1111’s general statement that UC should comply with its contracts, Regents Policy 5402 is specific and creates a clear policy that public employees should do public employee work.  It provides that “[c]ontracting out should be used sparingly and treated as an option of last resort to address temporary needs, not as a means to replace employees with lower-wage contractors. . . . [¶] The University will utilize its employees to perform covered services that have been customarily performed by University employees to the greatest extent possible before resorting to the use of private contractors to provide such services.”  (Ex. 1 to RJN.)  

The University also ignores that Regents Policy 1111 would create an equally strong public policy for the University to comply with its contractual commitments to AFSCME.  

Further, even if the University has shown an explicit public policy related to its contractual commitments exists, it has not demonstrated the Award contravenes that policy. The University offers only conclusory statements that complying with the Award would result in a breach of its contracts.  The University offers no details about the terms of these contracts or even when they went into effect.   

Exceeds Remedial Authority.  Arbitrators are afforded broad deference in fashioning an appropriate remedy. So long as the award bears a “rational relationship” to the underlying contract and “even arguably” construes or applies the contract, the award should not be vacated. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Ca1.4th 362, 367, 378.)  Nor can an award be vacated simply because the relief awarded was not authorized by a specific term of the contract. (Id. at 381; see, e.g., San Francisco Housing Authority v. SEIU, Local 790 (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 933, 945-946 (arbitrator was within their authority to order reinstatement of an employee with back pay to a position not previously held because no “express term[]” of the MOU prohibited the arbitrator from doing so); Social Services Union v. Alameda County Training & Employment Bd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1464 (arbitrator had the authority to order an employer to promote an employee because nothing in the collective bargaining agreement “expressly prohibited” that remedy).)  

Here, the Parties agreed that the only limitation on the Arbitrator’s remedial power is that he or she “shall not include any type of monetary award, or provisions for fees.” (Eaton Decl., Exh. C, p. 62 [Article 3.J.10], pp. 77-78 [Article 5.H].)  The Arbitrator expressly acknowledged this limitation, noting that he could not issue a monetary award. (Id. at Exh. A, p. 19.)   

In addition, Article 5.H.7.b of the collective bargaining agreement provides: “If the arbitrator determines that the contract is inappropriate the contract shall be terminated. If the grievance was filed prior to the formation of a contract, the University shall not proceed with the contracting process.” (Eaton Decl., Exh. C, pp. 77-78 [Article 5.H.7].)  The Award falls squarely within this framework because it directs the University to stop the contracting process: “the Employer may not enter into or continue any verbal agreements, side agreements, or contract extensions for work covered by this Award using a less formal process than the proposed RFP.” (Id. at Exh. A, p. 20.) More to the point, Article 5.H.7.b does not limit an arbitrator’s authority — it simply provides that the contracting process “shall” be terminated or stopped. The very next contract provision, Article 5.H.8 provides for the limit on the arbitrator’s authority: that they must not include a monetary award.  No limitation on equitable relief is mentioned. 

The University argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his remedial authority because the Award renders the University unable to contract out food services work in the future, even in the case of emergencies, which would be contrary to Article 5.  But the Arbitrator’s remedy made no such prohibition.  The Arbitrator ordered the University to not enter into any contracts under the June 1, 2023, RFP.  The Award does not prohibit the University from issuing another RFP to contract out dining work.  If circumstances change, such as an emergency arises, UCLA could issue another RFP and provide the required contractual notice to AFSCME.  If AFSCME chose to challenge the contracting decision, UCLA could argue to an arbitrator that circumstances had sufficiently changed for it to contract out the work.  Because UCLA can issue a new RFP at any time, the University’s assertions that the Award prohibits it from contracting on a prospective basis are unsupported.  

The University also argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his remedial authority because the Award directs the University to not enter into or continue any verbal agreements or other informal arrangements to contract out work covered by the Award.  This portion of the Award merely prevents UCLA from using back channels to secretly contract out dining work under the same circumstances that two arbitrators have now found to be impermissible.  If UCLA could enter verbal or informal arrangements with vendors for the same work, it would render Article 5.H’s enforcement procedures meaningless.  

State law and UC policy already require the University not to enter into informal agreements and to use the formal RFP process.  The Public Contract Code mandates that UC competitively bid contracts for services, like those at issue here, with an annual value over $100,000. (Pub. Contract Code § 10507.7.)  UC Policy BFB-BUS-43, Purchases of Goods and Services, Supply Chain Management (“BUS-43”) requires the University to competitively bid contracts worth over $100,000 and sets forth the process for soliciting, evaluating, and awarding contracts through the RFP process.  (RJN, Exh. 2, pp. 15-16 [using the term “RFx” to include “Requests for Proposals”].) Under BUS-43, the University also must issue a written RFP soliciting bids; bidders then compete for the project, and the winning bid is selected based on one of the criteria in BUS-43. (Id. at pp. 15-19.)  

When an RFP is issued, Article 5.D of the parties’ agreement requires the University to notify AFSCME so that it can challenge contracting decisions. (Eaton Decl., Exh. C, pp. 74 [Art. 5.D.1, 5.H].)  The University must provide AFSCME with a copy of the RFP at the time it is issued, which must include information to help AFSCME evaluate the proposed contract and the specific 5.C provision to justify contracting out the work. (Id. [Art. 5.D.1-2].) After receiving the notice, AFSCME may either file a grievance challenging the decision or request a meeting with the University propose alternatives. (Id. at pp. 74 [Art. 5.D.3], pp. 77-78 [Article 5.H].) The University must consider the proposed alternatives and adopt them if feasible. (Id. at p. 75 [Art. 5.D.4].) Article 5.H permits AFSCME to challenge the University’s contracting decisions through an expedited grievance and arbitration process.  If the University does not prove that its contracting decision was justified under Article 5.C, the contract must be terminated and the contracting process stopped. (Id. at pp. 77-78 [Art. 5.H].)  

Taking BUS-43, Public Contract Code section 10507.7, and Article 5 together, then, Arbitrator Collins’ remedy does not impose any new obligation on the University: it just requires the University to follow the law and give proper notice to AFSCME if it wants to contract out dining work. And the Arbitrator’s remedy was well-founded: between January 29, 2024, when the University terminated the contracts at issue in the Lindsay arbitration, and February 7, 2024, before the University entered into new contracts with vendors pursuant to the RFP, UCLA apparently used contractors without any formal contract. (Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.)  The University also disregarded Arbitrator Lindsay’s order to terminate the contracts no later than December 31, 2023, as it maintained vendor contracts until January 29, 2024.  Now, UCLA continues to contract out dining work in direct contravention of the Award. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 6.)  

A finding that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by directing the University to not enter into any informal arrangement for work covered by the Award would strip AFSCME of the benefit of its bargain. The University agreed it would not proceed with the “contracting process” for any contracts that were successfully challenged under Article 5.H.  If the University could turn around and enter into informal contracts to provide the very same services at issue in the arbitration, Article 5’s remedies would be meaningless.  The remedy issued by Arbitrator Collins is therefore reasonably related to, and grounded in, the terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. 

Incorrect Burden of Proof.  The University also argues the arbitrator exceeded his authority by applying a different burden that that stated in the collective bargaining agreement, thereby modifying the parties’ agreement.  According to the University, the contract provides that the University must make reasonable efforts to hire to fill vacancies. (JX 1, Art. 5.C.2.)  Rather than holding the University solely to the reasonableness standard, the University argues the arbitrator required the University to show “compelling” evidence of “significant” efforts to try to fill vacant positions. (Attachment 8(c) to Amended Petition and Notice of Errata; Exh. C.)  This is true, even though the Union and not the University had the burden of persuasion at all times. (JX 1, Art. 3.P.)  In shifting the burden of proof and requiring “compelling” and “significant” efforts rather than “reasonable” efforts, the University argues the arbitrator acted beyond his authority because his actions impermissibly “add to, amend, modify, nullify or ignore” the parties’ negotiated agreement directly in contravention of the arbitrator’s authority. 

We conclude that the University’s argument are, at core, challenges to the legal and factual findings of the arbitrator which are beyond the permissible scope of our review.  That the arbitrator misconstrued the parties’ contract is not a basis to vacate the award.  (Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp. (1960) 363 U.S. 593, 599 (“so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerning  construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him¿because their interpretation of the contract is different from his”); Advanced Micro Devices 9 Cal.4th at 381 (“Arbitrators are not obliged to read contracts literally, and an award may not¿be vacated merely because the court is unable to find the relief granted was authorized by a specific term of the contract.”).)  We decline the University’s invitation to review the correctness of the arbitrator’s award. (Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., supra, 43 Cal.4th at 1184¿(holding “[a]rbitrators do not ordinarily exceed their contractually created powers simply by reaching an erroneous conclusion on a contested issue of law or fact, and arbitral awards may not ordinarily be vacated because of such error”).)    

Inconsistency.  Finally, the University argues the arbitrator found that Catering may need to occasionally utilize contract workers, consistent with the parties’ Agreement. (Attachment 8(c) to Amended Petition and Notice of Errata; Exh. C to McDonough Dec.)  The University claims this finding is inconsistent with the Award’s requirement that the University cancel all third-party culinary staffing contracts.  Therefore, at a minimum, the University argues the Award should be vacated and/or corrected to permit usage of the contracts for Catering.   

The University has cited no authority that the Court may vacate or correct an award based on inconsistency.  That the arbitrator’s reasoning is internally inconsistent is nothing more than an attack on the arbitrator’s factual and legal findings, and therefore, is not a basis to vacate an award.  (Deluxe Labs., Inc. v. Int’l Alliance, Local 683 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18099 at *21 (“[I]f factual errors and misinterpretation of the collective bargaining agreement are not proper grounds for setting¿aside arbitration awards, it is untenable for Deluxe to argue that an award may be¿vacated¿simply because it is¿internally¿inconsistent.”); Department of Pub. Health of City & County of San Francisco v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 790, 215 Cal.App.3d at 433, fn. 4 (“we do not see any logic in the arbitrator’s [decision] … however … the arbitrator had the power [to so decide]”).) 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition to confirm the arbitration award and DENIES the motion to vacate the arbitration award. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: September 13, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court