Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District 

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action relates to a claim for professional negligence.  Plaintiff Frank Tufano is a YouTube influencer.  He underwent a cosmetic eye surgery with Defendant Mehryar Ray Taban MD, in Beverly Hills, California.  Dr. Taban is a member of the American Society of Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (the “Society”).  Plaintiff alleges Dr. Taban engaged in “clear malpractice,” and that after the surgery, Plaintiff was “near blind” and “deformed.”  Plaintiff further alleges the Society failed to recognize or prevent Dr. Taban’s malpractice.  (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 28-29.)   

This hearing is on the Society’s motion to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The Society argues that it is not subject to general jurisdiction because its contacts with California are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially “at home” in California, and the Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction because the Society’s minimal presence in California has no specific connection to the alleged incident that is the subject of this lawsuit.  There is no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

Code Civ. Proc. §418.10(a)(1) provides that a defendant may move “[t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  Although the defendant is the moving party, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to demonstrate sufficient minimum contacts exist. (Milhon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710 (“[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged by a nonresident defendant, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘minimum contacts’ exists between defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction.”).)  If the plaintiff is able to meet its burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.)¿  

To satisfy its initial burden of proof, a “plaintiff must do more than merely allege jurisdictional facts; plaintiff must provide affidavits and other authenticated documents demonstrating competent evidence of jurisdictional facts.” (BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal. App. 4th 421, 428–29 (citing In re Automobile Antitrust Cases (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 100, 110). When evaluating the evidence supplied in support of and in opposition to a motion to quash, a trial court is not required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff because to do so would improperly “lighten plaintiffs’ burden of proof of jurisdictional facts.” (Centerpoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4th 1101, 1119.) 

DISCUSSION 

General Jurisdiction 

 There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction, general and specific.  General jurisdiction over a corporation exists when that corporation might be “fairly regarded as at home” in that state.  (Brue v. Shabaab (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 578, 590.)  Traditionally, a corporation or limited liability company is “at home” in its place of incorporation and its principal place of business.  (Id.; James Malinchak Int'l, Inc. v. Suzanne Evans Coaching, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135825 at *5.)  “But in an exceptional case, a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that state.”¿(Brue, 54 Cal.App.5th at 590.)  To test that possibility, courts look to a variety of factors, including “maintenance of offices, the presence of employees, use of bank accounts and¿marketing or selling products¿in the forum state, to analyze whether a corporation’s contacts render it effectively at home in that state.”  (Id. at 590-591.) 

Here, the Society is a Florida not-for-profit corporation.  (Kehn Decl. ¶ 8.)  Its headquarters are in St. Paul, Minnesota.  (Id. at ¶9.)  It has no offices or employees in California.  (Id. at ¶10.)  It has never maintained an office in California.  It has only ever maintained offices in Minnesota and Florida.  (Id. at ¶13.)  It has no registered agents in California, nor does it own financial accounts or investments in California.  (Id. at ¶14.)  It is not a registered with the California Secretary of State to conduct business in California, and it does not conduct business in California.  (Id. at ¶¶11, 12.)   

On these facts, the Court concludes it has no general jurisdiction over the Society.  The Society has no contacts with the State that can be characterized as systematic or continuous sufficient to conclude it is “at home” in California.  The Society does not do any business in California.  It has no offices or employees in California.  Its headquarters are in Minnesota.  It does not maintain investments or financial accounts in California.  It has no registered agent in California.  Accordingly, the Court concludes the Society is not “at home” in California, and the Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over the Society.   

Specific Jurisdiction 

  For specific jurisdiction, “courts consider the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation.”  (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062.)  A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: “(1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.”  (Id.)   

To establish purposeful availment, the plaintiff must show the defendant acted to “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum.” (Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474–75.)  Purposeful availment may not be based “only on ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts,” but instead must be shown by actions that were purposefully directed at the forum. (Centerpoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4th 1101, 1117.)  

Here, Plaintiff fails to show purposeful availment.  That the Society grants membership to doctors who live and work in California is insufficient to prove purposeful availment.  The Society is a professional membership society, providing resources, education, and a community for oculofacial plastic surgeons. (Kehn Decl. ¶ 3.)  The Society is not a certifying or accrediting body. (Id. ¶ 7.)  The Society does not perform medical procedures.  (Id. ¶ 15.)  The Society did not seek out Dr. Taban as a member.  Like all members of the Society, Dr. Taban had to apply for membership. (Id. ¶ 16.) That physicians from California – like Dr. Taban – reach out to the Society to seek membership does not amount to purposeful availment by the Society.  

Even assuming Plaintiff has shown purposeful availment, Plaintiff has not shown that the Society’s de minimus contacts with California are related to the event giving rise to his claim.   Specific jurisdiction may only extend “to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 918-19.).  Here, the Society did not certify or accredit Dr. Taban.  (Kehn Decl. ¶ 3.)  It had no knowledge of Dr. Taban’s alleged prior malpractice.  Before it was sued, the Society never received any complaints about Dr. Taban.  (Id. ¶ 18.)  It had no involvement in or knowledge of the surgery at issue.  (Id. ¶ 20.)  It did not communicate with Plaintiff about any services, or otherwise encourage him to retain Dr. Taban.  (Id.)  That Dr. Taban was a member of the Society and happened to allegedly commit malpractice does not satisfy the second prong for specific jurisdiction.  Indeed, the Complaint does not even allege that Plaintiff retained Dr. Taban because of his membership in the Society.   

Finally, even if Plaintiff could show some tenuous relationship between the Society and his injuries, traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would not support the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.   The Society is a Florida non-profit entity that is headquartered in Minnesota.  Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania resident.  The Society had no involvement in the procedure at issue except for Dr. Taban’s membership in the Society, which the Society itself did not solicit.   

In sum, because the facts do not support the exercise of either general or specific jurisdiction, the Court will quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS specially appearing Defendant American Society of Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: May 7, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

 

 

Superior
Court of California

County
of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

 

FRANK TUFANO,                           Plaintiff,             v.   MEHRYAR RAY TABAN, et al.,                             Defendants.

Case No.: 25SMCV00041   Hearing Date: May 7, 2025   [TENTATIVE] order RE:   DEFENDANT AMERICAN board OF   cosmetic surgery’s DEMURRER to   AND motion to STRIKE complaint

 

 

This case arises out of a claim for
professional negligence.  Plaintiff Frank
Tufano, a “YouTube Personality”, alleges Defendant Mehryar Ray Taban, M.D.
performed a cosmetic eye procedure on Plaintiff which left him “deformed” and
“near blind.” 

Plaintiff alleges Dr. Taban is a member of
various organizations including Defendant American Board of Cosmetic Surgery (the
“Board”).  Plaintiff has sued the Board claiming
that it “failed to recognize Dr. Taban’s clear malpractice in their respective
areas of expertise, whether it’s a general procedure that should not be
performed in a cosmetic application, having knowledge of surgical risks to be
conveyed to the patient, performing cosmetic procedures with sub-par skill
level and high error rates, and clear lack of knowledge in treating
complications arising from orbital surgery.” 
Plaintiff requests that the Board pay 11% of the purported $484,396,666 in
damages he allegedly suffered as a result of his medical care.

            The
operative complaint alleges claims for (1) informed consent, (2) standard of
care-surgical errors, (3) injury and (4) damages.  Plaintiff is appearing in pro per.

            This
hearing is on the Board’s demurrer and motion to strike.  The Board argues that (1) there is no cause
of action for “informed consent,” and therefore the claim is unclear, vague and
ambiguous, and in the event Plaintiff meant to allege a claim for “lack of
informed consent” nothing in the Complaint identifies any representations made
by the Board regarding any care Plaintiff was to receive from Dr. Taban; (2) there
is no cause of action for “standard of care – surgical errors,” and to the
extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim for medical negligence against the Board,
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support such a claim because the Board
did not provide or withhold any care to Plaintiff; (3) “injury” is not a
standalone cause of action, and in any event, the Complaint does not identify
any act or omission by the Board directed at Plaintiff; (4) “damages” is not a
claim, and additionally, the Complaint does not identify any wrongdoing by the
Board that would entitle Plaintiff to the hundreds of millions of damages he
seeks, and (5) the amount of damages stated in the Complaint must be stricken
because in a personal injury action, “the amount demanded shall not be stated”
(citing Code Civ. Proc. § 425.20, subdv. (b).)

Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires
that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party
“shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the
pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of
determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the
objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41(a),
435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and
confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).) 
Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration
detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41(a)(3),
435.5(a)(3).) 

The Board submits the Declaration of Alexander
Farkas which fails to show compliance with Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.  Mr. Farkas attests he sent a meet and confer
letter to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff never responded.  (Ex. B to Farkas Decl.)  The letter was sent by email and USPS.  (Id.) 
Mr. Farkas does not represent he ever called Plaintiff (even though
Plaintiff’s telephone number is on the complaint, Ex. A to Farkas Decl.), and
the meet and confer letter he sent never provided the dates on which he was
available to meet and confer (Ex. B to Farkas Decl.).  Additionally, the meet and confer letter does
not identify the ground on which the Board was moving to strike.  Accordingly, the Court concludes the Board woefully
failed to satisfy its meet and confer obligations.  The Court therefore continues the hearing on
the Board’s demurrer and motion to strike to May 26, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. to allow
the Board time to meet and confer in person or by telephone with Plaintiff, on
all of the grounds raised in its moving papers.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2025                                                            ___________________________

Edward
B. Moreton, Jr.
Judge of the Superior Court