Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and his homeowner’s association.  Plaintiff Hooton Farahmand owns two homes in the Bel Air Crest community.  Bel Air Crest is divided in two parts: a section of smaller single family homes that were designed and built by a developer (“Canyon Section”) and a section of larger custom homes (“Custom Section”).  (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 7, 11.)  Plaintiff purchased a home in the Canyon Section in 2011 and a second home in the Custom Section in 2020.  (Id.)   

Each section has its own homeowners association.  The Canyon Section has the Bel Air Crest Canyon Homes Association and the Custom Section has the Bel Air Crest Custom Homes Association (the “Custom Association”).  A third homeowners association, Defendant Bel Air Crest Master Association (the “Master Association”), handles common issues shared among the entire neighborhood such as roads and common areas.  All residents are members of their respective sub-association, depending on which section of the neighborhood their home is located, as well as the master association (collectively with the Custom Association, the “HOA Defendants”).   

Plaintiff’s complaint revolves around his dispute with another homeowner, Hootan Melamed.  Melamed was a former business partner of Plaintiff, in a pharmaceutical wholesale business.  (Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 26.)  Plaintiff parted ways with Melamed when Melamed was indicted for health care fraud and mail fraud, relating to taking unlawful bribes and kickbacks.  (Id. ¶ 27.)  Melamed plead guilty to the charges and was sentenced to prison. (Id.)  When he was released, Melamed moved into his mother’s home as a tenant in Bel Air Crest.  (Id. ¶ 31.)  Plaintiff claims Melamed threatened him and his family, stating that he would “kill” Plaintiff, “send someone to rape his wife” and “kill” his children.  (Id. ¶ 34.)  Plaintiff notified the police and received a temporary restraining order.  (Id. ¶38.)    

Plaintiff claims that Melamed’s actions were instigated by a board member of the HOA Defendants, Defendant Michael Moussa Yedidsion.  (Id. ¶32.)  Plaintiff and Yedidsion had previously been friends and later went into business together.  (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.)  They, through a limited liability company, purchased, held and leased a commercial building.  (Id. ¶ 22.)  However, Plaintiff later sued Yedidsion, claiming he had mismanaged and misappropriated assets of the LLC.  (Id. ¶ 23.)  Because of this prior suit, Plaintiff claims Yedidsion desired to exact revenge, and as a result, Yedidsion befriended Melamed and encouraged him to go after Plaintiff and his family.  (Id. ¶ 32.) 

Plaintiff alleges he notified the HOA Defendants’ board that Melamed was making threats against Plaintiff and his family and that Plaintiff feared for their safety.  (Id. ¶ 41.)  He informed them that Yedidsion, a board member, who was aware of Melamed’s volatile nature and dislike for Plaintiff, was inciting Melamed to go after Plaintiff and his family.  (Id. ¶ 42.)  He also informed them that he had obtained a restraining order against Melamed, and since the issuance of the order, Melamed had sent people to stake out Plaintiff’s home.  (Id. ¶ 42.)  Plaintiff also told the HOA Defendants that out of fear for his and his family’s safety, he was upgrading his security system and installing additional gates in front of his home.  (Id.)   

Plaintiff asked the Board to take affirmative steps to protect Plaintiff from Melamed.  (Id.)  Plaintiff also asked that his report be kept confidential and that the report would not be provided to Yedidsion, which he claims the HOA Defendants’ manager, Defendant Fiona Cole, assured him the report would be kept confidential and Yedidsion would not be involved in evaluating the complaint.  (Id. ¶ 43.)       

Despite his request, Plaintiff claims the HOA Defendants refused to investigate his report and disavowed any responsibility to get involved in a “personal” dispute between Plaintiff, Yedidsion and Melamend.  (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.)  Plaintiff claims this refusal was due to Yedidsion’s personal vendetta against Plaintiff and the personal friendships between Yedidsion and the other directors.  (Id. ¶ 48.)  Plaintiff also claims the despite Cole’s assurances, HOA Defendants transmitted a copy of his report to Yedidsion who then gave it to Melamed for the purpose of further inciting Melamed to cause harm to Plaintiff and his family.  (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.)   

Plaintiff claims that the HOA Defendants’ refusal to investigate was in violation of several “governing documents” including the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (“CC&R”), bylaws, articles of incorporation, rules and regulations, and compliance policies.  (Id. ¶¶ 61-72.)  Specifically, Plaintiff claims the HOA Defendants’ bylaws require their Board to “investigate, provide written notice to affected members, conduct an evidentiary hearing, permit the affected members an opportunity to present oral and written evidence, and render a ruling in the matter.”  (Id. ¶¶ 68, 70.)   

Plaintiff also complains that the HOA Defendants’ board “unlawfully and arbitrarily attempted to strip Plaintiff of his reserved parking spaces in front of his residence.”  (Id. ¶ 73.)  Plaintiff alleges that the HOA Defendants’ “rules and regulations” provide that the area in front of a home is reserved for residents of that home and their guests.  (Id. ¶¶ 74-75.)  Plaintiff complained to Cole that cars were unlawfully parking in front of his home in violation of the rules and regulations, and Cole agreed with him.  (Id. ¶ 78.)  Plaintiff claims the HOA Defendants did nothing about his complaint because of Yedidsion’s animus towards Plaintiff.  (Id. ¶80.) 

The original complaint alleged two causes of action against the Master Association for (1) breach of fiduciary duty and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).  The current (third amended) complaint now alleges nine causes of action for (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) IIED, (3) breach of covenant/equitable servitude, (4) breach of contract, (5) estoppel, (6) misrepresentation, (7) nuisance, (8) declaratory relief and (9) negligence.  The TAC also adds more defendants including the Custom Association, volunteer directors of each of the HOA Defendants, as well as the former property manager who previously worked for the HOA (Cole).  (TAC ¶¶ 10-14.) 

This hearing is on the Master Association’s demurrer and motion to strike the TAC.  The Master Association argues that (1) the breach of fiduciary duty claim cannot survive because the alleged governing documents on which Plaintiff relies were not violated; (2) the IIED claim cannot survive because under California law, Plaintiff may not recover emotional distress damages based upon an obligation arising from contract unless the contract is one in which Plaintiff’s emotional distress is an object, and here, none of the governing documents were entered into for Plaintiff’s emotional condition; (3) the claims for breach of covenant, estoppel, misrepresentation, nuisance, negligence and declaratory relief all fail because they are “anchored” on the continued existence of the TRO against Melamed, which was dissolved by the Superior Court in 2022; and (4) the claims against the individual board members must be dismissed because the only “real” allegations against them is against Yedidsion, and in light of the Superior Court’s dissolving the TRO, “these are now irrelevant;” moreover, the volunteer board members are protected under the Volunteer Protection Act (“VPA”).   

LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a)(3), 435.5(a)(3).)  The HOA Defendants submit the Declaration of James M. Gilbert who attests the parties met and conferred by telephone on January 22, 2025, at least five days before the demurrer and motion to strike was filed (on February 24, 2025).  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of §§430.41 and 435.5.  

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Master Association requests judicial notice of (1) Minute Order dated September 15, 2022, in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 21STRO06277, Hootan Troy Farahmand v. Hootan Melamed; (2) Minute Order dated September 29, 2022, , in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 21STRO06277, Hootan Troy Farahmand v. Hootan Melamed; and (3) Minute Order in this action, dated October 25, 2024 regarding Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike the First Amended Complaint.  The Court denies the request for judicial notice. 

As to requests (1) and (2), judicial notice is properly taken of the existence of a factual finding in another proceeding, but not of the truth of that finding. (Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1749; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (d), 459, subd. (a); 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Judicial Notice, § 24, pp. 118–119.) “A court may take judicial notice of [another] court’s action, but may not use it to prove the truth of the facts found and recited. [Citations.]” (O'Neill v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1405, italics added.)  

As our Supreme Court explained, judicial notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true; it means only that those findings of fact were made. (Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590 [63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 936 P.2d 473].) “[N]either a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding … .” (Id.) 

“There exists a mistaken notion that [taking judicial notice of court records] means taking judicial notice of the existence of facts asserted in every document of a court file, including pleadings and affidavits. However, a court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file.” (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564, italics omitted.) 

In Sosinsky v. Grant, the appellate court held, while the existence of any document in a court file may be judicially noticed, the truth of the matters asserted in those documents, including the factual findings of the judge who was sitting as the trier of fact, is not entitled to notice. (Id. at pp. 1562–1569.)  Sosinsky explained, “[u]nder the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required.’” (Id. at p. 1564.) Thus, the court reasoned, taking judicial notice of the truth of a judge's factual finding, even after a contested adversary hearing, is “tantamount to taking judicial notice that the judge's factual finding must necessarily have been correct and that the judge is therefore infallible. We resist the temptation to do so.” (Id. at p. 1568.)  In sum, a court may take judicial notice that a prior order was entered, but it may not take judicial notice of the truth of factual findings made therein. (Id. at pp. 1564, 1569–1570.)   

Here, the Master Association asks the Court to take judicial notice of the truth of facts in Plaintiff’s harassment action against Melamed, i.e., that there was no basis for a preliminary injunction order to issue against Melamed.  The Court cannot (and declines to) take judicial notice of these facts.      

As to request (3), relating to a minute order in this action, it is unnecessary to take judicial notice of records in the Court’s own docket.  “[A]ll that is necessary is to call the court’s attention to such papers.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 9.53.1a.)     

DISCUSSION 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty 

The Master Association argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a breach of fiduciary duty because Plaintiff has not shown that any of the acts or omissions he complains about violated the governing documents.  The Court disagrees in part. 

The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of fiduciary duty and damage.  (Oasis West Realty LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)  A homeowners association owes a fiduciary duty to its members, who can sue the association if it fails to perform its enforcement obligations under the governing documents.  (Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 642, 651.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Master Association failed to enforce its obligations under the governing documents by failing to (1) investigate reports of violations made by Plaintiff; (2) afford Plaintiff due process under the Master Governing Documents and Custom Governing Documents; (3) enforce the Master Governing Documents and Custom Governing Documents; (4) act in good faith and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner; (5) apply the Master Governing Documents and Custom Governing Documents in a fair and uniform manner; (6) maintain the confidential information of Plaintiff and taking necessary actions to avoid unnecessary disclosures to interested directors and other third-parties; (7) take necessary actions to avoid conflicts of interest in matters involving Director Yedidsion and Plaintiff; and (8) honoring Plaintiff’s reserved parking spaces in the front of his residence.  

Plaintiff points to three provisions of the governing documents.  One is the philosophy section which says that the Master Association is responsible for “enforcing the [CC&R’s] and providing a safe, secure and peaceful environment for all Homeowners”.  (TAC  ¶65.)  The Court agrees with the Master Association that the “philosophy” to provide a “safe, secure and peaceful environment” for HOA members is so amorphous it cannot be enforced.  There is no means for the Court to determine if there was a breach.   

Plaintiff also points to a second, “quiet enjoyment” provision which states “No Owner shall permit or suffer anything to be done or kept upon such Owner’s Lot which will obstruct or interfere with the rights of quiet enjoyment of the other occupants or annoy them by unreasonable noises or otherwise, nor will any Owner commit or permit any nuisance on the premises or commit or suffer any immoral or illegal act to be committed thereon.”  (Id. ¶67.)  Again, the Court agrees with the Master Association that this provision is designed to address garden-variety nuisance problems like unreasonable noises, or failing to remove trash cans, or obstructing views with fences.  This is buttressed by the fact that the type of sanctions available to the HOA (suspension of voting privileges, a “compliance assessment” or precluding use of common areas like a pool, (id. ¶69)) would not have addressed the harassment issues raised by Plaintiff here.  The HOA Defendants were simply not equipped to handle an investigation into threats of rape and murder, which is more suitable for the courts and police to address. 

Plaintiff next points to a third “parking/garage use” provision which states “[t]he area in front of a home is reserved for residents of that home and their guests.”  The Master Association does not address this provision, or otherwise argue that it was not obligated to enforce it.  Rather, the Master Association quibbles with Plaintiff that it failed to enforce that provision.  However, in a demurrer, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true.  

Accordingly, because at least one of Plaintiff’s theories survives demurrer and a demurrer cannot be made to a part of a claim, the Court overrules the demurrer to the breach of fiduciary duty claim (first cause of action).     

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

The Master Association argues that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for IIED fails because (1) Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous conduct and (2) Plaintiff cannot recover tort or consequential damages for a breach of contract.  But Plaintiff is not alleging the IIED claim against the Master Association.  Accordingly, this demurrer is moot.  

Breach of Contract Claims 

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims (third and fourth causes of action) are based on alleged violations of the three provisions of the governing documents discussed above.  For reasons set forth above, the Court concludes the claims survive demurrer.   

Misrepresentation Claims 

Plaintiff’s “estoppel” and misrepresentation claims (fifth and sixth causes of action) are based on the Master Association’s failure to abide by its purported promise to keep Plaintiff’s report confidential and that Yedidsion would not be involved in the review and investigation of the complaint.   

The Master Association argues these claims are “irrelevant” because the Superior Court dissolved the TRO and dismissed Plaintiff’s harassment case against Melamed.  But the fact the superior court did not issue a permanent injunction has no bearing on the misrepresentation claims.   

Irrespective of whether there was a TRO, Plaintiff claims the Master Association (through its agent Cole), allegedly assured him his report would be kept confidential and that Yedidson would not be involved in the review of his complaint.  That a superior court ultimately concluded there was no basis for a preliminary injunction does not impact whether Plaintiff was harmed because the Master Association breached its promises and Plaintiff was subjected to further abuse by Melamed.  To the extent the Master Association is arguing there was in fact no harassment by Melamed based on the superior court’s finding, as discussed above, the court cannot judicially notice of the superior court’s factual finding.    

Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer to the misrepresentation claims (fifth and sixth causes of action). 

Nuisance/Negligence Claims 

The Master Association again argues that the dissolution of the TRO and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s harassment case against Melamed renders Plaintiff’s nuisance and negligence claims irrelevant.  Again, the Court fails to see the Master Association’s logic.  These claims are not rooted on the existence of the TRO.  Rather, they are based on the Master Association’s failure to adequately investigate Plaintiff’s complaint.  Even assuming there was never a TRO entered, Plaintiff would still be able to allege that the Master Association was negligent in its investigation.   While the Master Association may point to the dissolution of the TRO to argue that Plaintiff was not harmed by its failure to conduct an adequate investigation or avoid a conflict of interest because there was no harassment, that is an issue for another day and not appropriate for the demurrer stage because the Court cannot judicially notice the superior court’s factual finding.  In any event, such an argument would only address the allegations relating to Melamed and not Plaintiff’s claims relating to the parking issues.  As such, the Court also overrules the demurrer to the nuisance and negligence claims (seventh and ninth causes of action). 

Declaratory Relief 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as to the rights and obligations of the Master Association to enforce the governing documents, to investigate his report, to keep his report confidential and to enforce the parking policies.  The Master Association again argues that the dissolution of the TRO and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s harassment case against Melamed renders this claim irrelevant.  The Court disagrees for reasons stated above.  Accordingly, the Court also overrules the demurrer to the declaratory relief claim (eighth cause of action).   

Individual Board Members 

The Master Association demurrers to the claims against the individual board members.  The Master Association does not have standing to challenge the claims against the individual board members.  Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to these defendants. 

Punitive Damages 

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.  Defendant argues Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations that he is entitled to punitive damages without stating facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  The Court agrees.    

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (citations omitted).)   

Allegations that merely plead the statutory phraseology are wholly insufficient to state a basis for recovery of punitive damages.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)  Conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct as willful, intentional or fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of the necessary factual grounds for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)     

Cal. Civ. Code section 3294 provides the basis upon which punitive damages can be recovered.  Punitive damages may only be sought where there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud: 

(c)(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

(c)(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. 

(c)(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise 

causing injury.  

(Civ. Code §3294.) 

Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to increase the burden of proof required in order to allege a punitive damages claim as well as to raise the level of misconduct necessary for an award of punitive damages.  The California Supreme Court has ruled that the insertion of the word “despicable” in section 3294 created a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.) 

Punitive damages are disfavored by public policy and are allowed only under the most extreme circumstances and in the “clearest of cases.”  (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.)  “To contain the generosity and emotionality of juries, appellate courts have set the threshold high in defining situations in which punitive damages can be given.  Conduct which may be characterized as unreasonable, negligent, grossly negligent or reckless does not satisfy the highly culpable state of mind warranting punitive damages.  Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.”  (Id. at 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)  

Here, the factual allegations in the complaint do not support a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  Plaintiff does not allege fraud.  As to malice and oppression, both require despicable conduct in the absence of intent to cause injury.  (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 713, 725.)  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott, 175 Cal.App.4th at 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.)   

Here, Plaintiff alleges the Master Association failed to adequately investigate his complaint, disclosed his complaint to a board member contrary to assurances that it would not do so, allowed a board member who was hostile against him to participate in evaluating his complaint, and revoked his parking agreement.  These acts are not “vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome conduct,” nor do they have the character of outrage frequently associated with a crime.   

To be sure punitive damages are available for a breach of fiduciary duty.  However, a breach of a fiduciary duty alone without malice, fraud or oppression does not permit an award of punitive damages. (Delos v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 642, 656-657.)  The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.  Here, the Master Association’s alleged wrongdoing was at best the product of gross negligence or recklessness.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the Master Association’s demurrer and GRANTS the motion to strike without leave to amend.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED:  March 18, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court