Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr, Case: 24SMCV00089, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV00089    Hearing Date: April 24, 2025    Dept: 205

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

BACKGROUND

This case arises from an accident involving a car and an electric scooter.  Plaintiff Isabella Grossling was a passenger on an electric scooter when it hit a car driven by Defendant Kaylee Ioane, as the car was making a right turn.  Defendant Courtney Ioane is the registered owner of the car. 

Grossling sued the Ioanes for negligence.  Defendants answered, but at the time they did so, they claim they did not know the identity of the driver of the scooter, Evan McGee.  Defendants claim they did not learn of McGee’s identity until Grossling’s deposition on March 5, 2025. 

Defendants now seek leave to file a cross-complaint against McGee for indemnity, declaratory relief and contribution.  Defendants/Cross-Complainants argue that their cross-complaint arises out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions and occurrences as the Complaint, and therefore, the claim is permissive and should be allowed to avoid the possibility of multiple lawsuits. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Code Civ. Proc. § 428.50 states, “(a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial. (c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b).  Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” 

A cross-complaint is compulsory when a related cause of action existed at the time of serving the defendant’s answer to the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a); see also Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864.)  A related cause of action is “. . . a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c).)  Leave must be granted to file a compulsory cross-complaint when the defendant is acting in good faith.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50.) 

A defendant may cross-complain against a third person not yet a party to the action only if the cause of action asserted “(1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences (set forth in the complaint) ... or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause (of action) brought against him.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10(b).) Cross-complaints against third parties are permissive, not mandatory. While it may be “more orderly and expeditious” to resolve all claims in a single lawsuit, this is not required.  Defendants may wait and pursue their rights against third parties in subsequent, independent proceedings. (Insurance Co. of North America v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 297, 303.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek leave to file their cross-complaint after the Court has already set a trial date, but leave may be granted “in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.”  The Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to grant leave here.

The proposed cross-complaint raises claims that involve the same accident at issue in the Complaint.  Trial is 18 months from now, leaving the parties with ample time to address the allegations in the proposed cross-complaint.  Further, the proposed cross-complaint will aid judicial efficiency by permitting all related issues to be litigated simultaneously, rather than forcing separate lawsuits.  (Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 614-615 (bringing an action for indemnity by cross-complaint promotes judicial efficiency and allows related evidence and matters of proof to be consolidated in a single proceeding).)

Grossling opposes the motion on two grounds, neither of which has merit.  First, Grossling argues that the motion is untimely because it was filed after the Court had already set a trial date.  As discussed above, however, the Court has authority to grant leave to file a cross-complaint at any time in the interest of justice. 

Second, Grossling argues that Defendants have presented no facts that McGee actually contributed to the accident.  Grossling argues (1) she and McGee were permitted to operate the scooter on the sidewalk; (2) they proceeded on a lawful walk signal; and (3) Plaintiff was struck when she was in the middle of a marked crosswalk.  Grossling’s arguments are better suited for a motion for summary judgment, not a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint.  On a motion for leave, the Court generally does not address the merits of the amendments.  (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1047 (1989); Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2006) 109 Cal. App. 4th 739, 760.)  The Court denies leave only if the amendment is futile because, for example, it is time-barred.  Grossling has not shown how the amendments here are futile. 

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for leave to file a cross-complaint against Evan McGee.   

DATED: April 24, 2025                                                        ___________________________

Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court