Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is a personal injury case arising from a collision between a car driven by Defendant James Serota and a bicycle ridden by Plaintiff Melanie Jarzyniecki, at an intersection in Santa Monica.  Plaintiff claims that Defendant was negligent when he struck her while she was riding her bicycle, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff.  

As a result of the accident, Plaintiff alleges she suffered injuries to her right thumb, right index finger and wrist, left calf and shin.  To date, Plaintiff experiences intermittent shaking/trembling in her right thumb, as well as fatigue in the area surrounding the thumb, to the base of the palm and index finger. (Ex. 1 to Reid Decl., Plaintiff’s Response to Form Interrogatory, Set One No. 6.3 p. 9).  

Plaintiff claims economic damages for medical expenses, lost earnings, and damage to personal property. (Id., Form Interrogatory Nos. 6.4, 8.7, 7.2). To date, Plaintiff’s past medical expenses are $1,242.14. (Id., Plaintiff’s Response to Form Interrogatory, Set One No. 6.4 p. 10).  Plaintiff’s past lost earnings are $1,484.13. (Id., Plaintiff’s Response to Form Interrogatory, Set One No. 8.7 p. 14). The damage to the bicycle necessitated repairs that cost $2,094.74. (Id., Plaintiff’s Response to Form Interrogatory, Set One No. 7.2 p. 12). In sum, Plaintiff’s past economic damages are approximately $4,821.01.  She also claims future economic damages stemming from future lost earning capacity and future medical care, which are currently unknown.   

Additionally, Plaintiff claims non-economic damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, inconvenience, and emotional distress, which constitute the bulk of her claimed damages. (Id., Plaintiff’s Response to Form Interrogatory, Set One No. 6.3 p. 9).  The incident left Plaintiff feeling helpless and trapped.  Prior to the accident, the bicycle had been her primary mode of transportation.  (Id.). After the incident, she did not ride a bicycle for the following year. (Id.).  Although she regained the courage to ride again, it is no longer a joyful activity because she has developed hyper-vigilance and anxiety stemming from the collision. (Id.). Relatedly, the incapacitation of her right hand left Plaintiff unable to sustain her yoga practice, weight training routine, and jewelry making hobby. (Id.). All of these activities were significant sources of stress relief, and her inability to participate in them heightened her anxiety level and negatively impacted her mood. (Id.)   

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion for an order transferring this action to limited jurisdiction.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s damages will not exceed $35,000, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s discovery responses and medical bills.  According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s damages total only $4,537.67. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Actions in which the amount in controversy is $35,000 or less are classified as limited jurisdiction cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may order a case reclassified as a limited civil case upon finding to a legal certainty that a judgment over $35,000 cannot be obtained.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 396, 403.040(a).)   The code requires reclassification “when (i) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (ii) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will ‘necessarily’ result in a verdict below the superior court jurisdictional amount, and the court affords the parties an opportunity to contest transfer.” (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262.)  “This standard requires a high level of certainty that a damage award will not exceed [$35,000] and is not satisfied by a finding that such an award is merely ‘unlikely’ or ‘not reasonably probable.’”  (Id. at p. 269.)   

“The [trial] court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount [of the] demand[.]”  (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 277); see also Maldonado v. Superior Court of Orange County (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 402 (“the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.”)).             

Courts have required an adequate record, but not necessarily competent evidence, in support of transfers to a limited jurisdiction court.  (See Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 233 (evidence can include the complaint, arbitration awards and a settlement recommendation).)  Without sufficient evidence as to the value of the case, where the allegations of the complaint preclude a finding that the verdict will “necessarily” fall short of the $35,001 jurisdictional requirement, a reclassification order may be an abuse of discretion.  (Stern 105 Cal.App.4th at 233.)  Moreover, a motion to reclassify does not involve an evaluation of the merits of the claims. (Id.)  However, “the party opposing reclassification (from unlimited to limited), to defeat the motion (or oppose the OSC), must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility that the verdict will exceed [the jurisdictional minimum].” (Ytuarte, 129 Cal.App.4th at 277.)   

DISCUSSION 

 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s discovery responses and medical bills show her damages cannot exceed $35,000.  In itemizing Plaintiff’s damages, Defendant focuses on her medical bills, lost wages and replacement bicycle.  But Plaintiff is also claiming emotional distress damages.  Based on the record, the Court cannot conclude to a legal certainty that with pain and suffering damages, Plaintiff’s damages will not exceed $35,000.   

On a motion to transfer to limited jurisdiction, the court must find it to be “clear that the matter will ‘necessarily’ result in a verdict below the superior court jurisdictional amount” of $35,000. (Walker, 53 Cal.3d at 262).  This standard “requires a high level of certainty that a damage award will not exceed” the jurisdictional amount of $35,000. (Id. at 269).  This test is not satisfied by a mere finding that an award in excess of $35,000 is “unlikely” or “not reasonably probable” (Id. at 270). A motion to transfer may only be granted if the court finds that damages are less than $35,000 as a “legal certainty.” (Ytuarte, 129 Cal.App.4th at 271).  

Legal certainty is not met if there is a possibility of achieving a verdict within the jurisdictional amount. (Id.). “A transfer must be made only when the lack of jurisdiction is clear on the face of the record before the court because the transfer [i.e., reclassification as a limited case] deprives the plaintiff from attempting to prove damages greater than those available in [the limited civil] court.” (Williams v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 171, 175-176).  

Here, a jury could reasonably find Plaintiff’s pain and suffering damages to exceed the jurisdictional amount. Plaintiff claims the accident resulted in a year of pain, ongoing trembling and weakness of the right hand, anxiety while riding her bike—which had previously been her primary mode of transportation, feelings of helplessness, and the inability to do her stress-relieving hobbies.  A jury could reasonably conclude that these non-economic damages exceed $35,000.  

That Plaintiff’s past economic damages total $4,821.01 does not foreclose the possibility that a jury could award a verdict in excess of $35,000.  In Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, the appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion when transferring a personal injury case from superior court to a limited jurisdiction when medical bills were approximately $7,000. The appellate court reasoned that “[p]ain and suffering are not subject to precise measurement by any scale, and their translation into money damages is peculiarly the function of the trier of the facts.” (Id. at 401).  Here, Plaintiff’s pain and suffering is not subject to precise calculation, and that calculation should in any event be left to the jury.  

In addition, Defendant attempted to remove this matter to federal court, claiming the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement was established “with certainty.” (Ex. 2 to Reid Decl., Notice of Removal p. 4).  Defendant’s notice of removal supports the Court’s conclusion that it cannot find to a “legal certainty” that damages in this case are less than $35,001.  

Plaintiff seeks attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b).  Section 1032(b) provides that a prevailing party on an “action” or “proceeding” is entitled to costs as a “matter of right.”  The statute does not define “action” or “proceeding,” but it does define a “prevailing party.”   

A “prevailing party” includes the “party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.”  Where neither party “recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.”  Given that Plaintiff did not recover monetary relief, the award of costs is wholly discretionary and is not a matter of right.  The Court exercises its discretion to deny Plaintiff’s request for costs because it cannot conclude Defendant’s motion to transfer is entirely frivolous or made in bad faith.    

Plaintiff also cites Metzger v. Silverman (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d Supp. 30 in support of her request for costs. Metzger held that “the court is empowered to assess attorney fees against….a lawyer who files a motion for a change of venue found to be without merit.”  The Metzger court relied on Code Civ. Proc. § 396b, which authorizes attorneys’ fees on a motion to transfer venue.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 396b(b).)  The motion at issue here is not a motion to transfer venue.  Accordingly, Metzger does not support Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to transfer.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED:   January 6, 2025                            ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court