Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

 

This case arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute.  The Schiff 605, LLC (“Landlord”) is the owner of a multi-unit apartment building located at 605 S. Barrington Ave., Los Angeles, California 90049 (the “Property”).  (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶8.)  Plaintiff Eric Johner rented Apartment 37 at the Property (the “Premises”).  (Id. ¶ 11.)   

“Sean” occupied Unit 17 at the Property, located directly below Plaintiff’s Unit 37.  (Id. ¶ 13.)  Sean had an extensive criminal record dating back to 2012, including convictions for assault, drug use, evading police arrest, DUI and reckless driving, and had been incarcerated in state prison.  (Id.)  Plaintiff alleges Sean’s criminal history would have been known to Landlord given it would have performed a background check on each prospective tenant.  (Id. ¶14.)   

Plaintiff allegedly made several complaints to management about Sean making loud noises, but requested that his complaints be kept anonymous.  (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.)  Landlord failed to stop the noise, and worse still, Landlord purportedly identified to Sean that Plaintiff was the complaining party.  (Id. ¶18.)   Plaintiff claims Landlord did so to force Plaintiff out of the building and allow them to raise the rent on his “below-market apartment”.  (Id.)   

The FAC alleges that Sean retaliated against Plaintiff by forcibly pounding on Plaintiff’s front door and windows, yelling obscenities and making violent threats against Plaintiff.  (Id. ¶¶ 19-23.)  Plaintiff reported these abuses to Landlord and requested Landlord take action to protect Plaintiff, but Landlord purportedly refused.  (Id. ¶25.) 

In addition to Sean, Plaintiff claims he complained to Landlord about loud banging in his apartment caused by pipes when the heater was running.  (Id. ¶31.)  After sending several repairmen to inspect the issue, Plaintiff alleges Landlord decided not to make “easy” repairs.  (Id. ¶ 32.)  Plaintiff also complains that Landlord changed the gate code to the Property.  (Id. ¶34.)  Plaintiff claims he was locked out for an undisclosed amount of time because he was not timely provided the new gate code.  (Id.)  Plaintiff alleges these acts and/or omissions were part of Landlord’s scheme to force him out of his apartment.  (Id. ¶¶ 33, 36.)   

The FAC alleges four claims for: (1) breach of lease, (2) violation of Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance, (3) negligence and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.   

Landlord filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief.  Landlord alleges that pursuant to the terms of the lease between the parties, it was not obligated to mediate any disputes between Plaintiff and Sean, and Plaintiff assumed all risks of living at the Premises.   

This hearing is on Plaintiff’s demurrer to the cross-complaint.  Plaintiff argues that (1) the cross-complaint for declaratory relief fails because Landlord sold the property and no longer owns the Property, thus it lacks standing to sue, and (2) the cross-complaint is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible because Plaintiff is not asking Landlord to mediate any dispute.  There is no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling.   

MEET AND CONFER   

Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 requires that before the filing of a demurrer, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(3).)  Plaintiff failed to submit a meet and confer declaration.  However, in the notice to the demurrer, Plaintiff represents the parties through their counsel met and conferred by email and subsequently by phone concerning the issues presented by the demurrer, but were unable to resolve their dispute.  This satisfies the substantive meet and confer requirements of § 430.41. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE  

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of a Grant Deed dated October 15, 2024 and recorded on November 26, 2024 in the Official Records of the Recorder’s Office in Los Angeles County showing a transfer of ownership of the Property from Landlord to 605 Barrington LP.  The Court grants the request pursuant to Evid. Code §§ 452(h), and 453.  Judicial notice can be taken of recorded documents. (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 755.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer to a complaint may be general or special.¿ A general demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)¿ A special demurrer challenges other defects in the complaint, including whether a pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).)¿ The term uncertain means “ambiguous and unintelligible.”¿ (Id.)¿ A demurrer for uncertainty should be sustained if the complaint is drafted in such a manner that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿ 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues that Landlord’s declaratory relief claim fails because Landlord no longer has standing to seek such relief as it sold the Property.  Landlord has not filed an opposition, which means it concedes this argument.  (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566 (“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue”); Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 507, 529 (“failure to address the threshold question . . . effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot”); Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1424 (issue is impliedly conceded by failing to address it).)  Accordingly, the Court concludes Landlord has no standing to sue, and the Court sustains the demurrer to Landlord’s cross-complaint.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s demurrer to the cross-complaint.   

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: May 22, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court