Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from the parties’ agreement to split attorneys’ fees earned on a premises liability case, Joana Gallegos v. Cosco Wholesale Corporation.  (Compl. ¶9.)  Defendants Alina Landver and Landver Law Corporation APC represented Defendant Joana Gallegos in the premises liability case.  (Id. ¶12.)   

Landver asked Plaintiff Sebastian Richards to defend the deposition of Gallegos.  (Id. ¶14.)  Landver wrote an email to Plaintiff offering the following terms to defend the deposition of Gallegos: “If they settle the case for more than $250,000, I can offer you 10%.  If we get $250,000 and less as a settlement, I am pleased to offer you 15%.”  (Id. ¶ 17.)  Plaintiff defended the deposition of Gallegos.  (Id. ¶ 22.)   

Landver then asked Plaintiff to oppose Costco’s motion for summary judgment.  (Id. ¶ 24.)  In an email, Plaintiff proposed the following terms for his work on the opposition: “To be clear, our fee splitting agreement for Gallegos v. Costco is as follows: Made Law Group [Plaintiff’s firm] receives 40% of legal fees.  Landver Law covers costs and recoups from client’s 60%.  Attorney’s fees will not be reduced by, including but not limited to, costs, expenses, expert fees, etc.”  (Id. ¶ 27.)  Landver replied, “Agreed.”  (Id. ¶ 27.)  Plaintiff successfully opposed Costco’s motion for summary judgment.  (Id. ¶ 33.) 

Plaintiff sent a written fee splitting agreement to Defendants Landver, Landver Law and Gallegos.  (Id. ¶ 35.)  Landver and Gallegos refused to sign the agreement.  (Id. ¶ 37.)  Landver told Plaintiff to provide his hours and “we will work something out with you at the end of the case.”  (Id.)  Plaintiff submitted to Landver a statement of billable hours due on the case.   (Id. ¶ 38.)  On December 12, 2024, the underlying case was dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement with Costco.  (Id. ¶ 40.)  Defendants did not split the settlement proceeds with Plaintiff.  This lawsuit ensued.   

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion to continue trial.  Defendants seek a four-month continuance from July 7, 2025 to at least November 4, 2025.  Defendants claim a continuance is warranted because (1) counsel has to prepare for four other trials and arbitrations starting in April 2025; (2) counsel is a small firm consisting of one shareholder attorney, and the firm’s of -counsel attorney has recently become sick; (3) counsel’s wedding anniversary is on July 7, 2025 and she has a pre-planned pre-paid trip, and (4) counsel’s expert is unavailable until after July 7, 2025 and will therefore be unavailable to assist her in the preparation for expert depositions or trial.  Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion to continue, but filed an opposition to Defendants' notice of non-opposition to the motion to continue. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Trial dates are firm to ensure prompt disposition of civil cases. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (a).)  Continuances are thus generally disfavored.  (See id., rule 3.1332, subd. (b).)  Nevertheless, the trial court has discretion to continue trial dates.  (Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.)  Each request for continuance must be considered on its own merits and is granted upon an affirmative showing of good cause.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (c); Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)   

Circumstances that may indicate good cause include: (1) the unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) the unavailability of a party due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) the unavailability of trial counsel due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) the substitution of trial counsel where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) the addition of a new party if (A) the new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, or (B) the other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party’s involvement in the case; (6) a party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) a significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (c).)  

The court must also consider such relevant factors as: (1) the proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial caused by any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) if the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) the court’s calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.  (Id., rule 3.1332, subd. (d).) 

DISCUSSION 

The Court concludes that a four-month continuance is not warranted.  First, Defendants contend their counsel has a pre-planned, pre-paid trip in July 2025.  As this issue should have been raised at the trial setting conference, the Court does not conclude it is a basis to grant a continuance.   

Second, defense counsel represents she has four other trials and arbitrations.  It is not clear when these trials or arbitrations were set.  Either way, it should have been raised at the trial setting conference or counsel should not have double (or in this case quadruple) booked trials, in the misguided hope that the Court would grant her a continuance.   

Third, defense counsel maintains they are a small firm.  But that has always been the case since the inception of the case, and certainly was true at the trial setting conference.  It is not an “unanticipated change in the status of the case” warranting continuance.   

Fourth, defense counsel points to the illness of her of-counsel.  Defense counsel does not specify the nature of her of-counsel's illness, the anticipated duration of the illness, or even her of-counsel's involvement in the case.  In any event, this is a relatively simple case involving facts known to counsel as it was Landver who communicated with Plaintiff regarding the underlying case and any fee arrangements. 

Last, defense counsel claims that her expert is not available until after July 7, 2025.  She claims the expert is necessary to help her prepare for expert depositions and trial.  Counsel never specifies when she retained her expert, whether she conferred with her expert about the trial date before retaining him or her, and why she only “recently” learned of his or her unavailability.  It was incumbent on counsel to make sure that her expert was actually available for the scheduled trial date before she retained him or her.  Again, the Court concludes this is not a basis to grant a continuance.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to continue trial.    

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: April 25, 2025