Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action is for breach of a residential lease for failure to pay rent.  Plaintiff Angel Ho is the owner of a condominium unit, located at 13700 Marina Pointe Drive #1809, Marina del Rey, California (the “Property”).  (Compl. ¶ 2.)  Defendants Ben Sayani and Valeh Raissi are tenants of the Property.  (Id. ¶6.) 

Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a written lease agreement for the Property on May 3, 2016.  (Id.)  The lease was subsequently extended in 2017, 2018, 2019 and finally on January 31, 2020.  (Id.)  After the termination of the lease, on March 31, 2020, Defendants remained in possession on a month to month basis.  (Id. ¶7.)    

Beginning March 1, 2020 and continuing for each month through March 1, 2023, Defendants breached the rental agreement by failing to pay rent.  (Id. ¶8.)  Defendants claimed they were unable to pay rent as a result of the COVID 19 pandemic.  (Id. ¶6.)  Defendants made the representations under penalty of perjury.  (Id. ¶21.)  Plaintiff claims the representations were in fact false.  (Id.)  As result of the false statements and pursuant to various eviction moratoria and state law, Plaintiff was prohibited from evicting Defendants from the Property and from suing for unpaid rent.  (Id. ¶24.)   

This action ensued.  The operative complaint alleges four claims for (1) breach of lease, (2) open book account, (3) account stated and (4) fraud.   

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.  Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged malice, oppression or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages.     

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5 requires that before the filing of a motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing its meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(3).)  Defendants submit the Declaration of Brian Jacobs which shows the parties met and conferred by telephone on April 5, 2024, at least five days before the date the responsive pleading was filed.  This satisfies the requirements of §435.5. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  

DISCUSSION 

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.  Defendants argue Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations that she is entitled to punitive damages without stating facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  The Court disagrees.    

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (citations omitted).)   

Allegations that merely plead the statutory phraseology are wholly insufficient to state a basis for recovery of punitive damages.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)  Conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct as willful, intentional or fraudulent are a patently insufficient statement of the necessary factual grounds for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)     

Cal. Civ. Code section 3294 provides the basis upon which punitive damages can be recovered.  Punitive damages may only be sought where there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud: 

(c)(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

(c)(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. 

(c)(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise 

causing injury.  

(Civ. Code §3294.) 

Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to increase the burden of proof required in order to allege a punitive damages claim as well as to raise the level of misconduct necessary for an award of punitive damages.  The California Supreme Court has ruled that the insertion of the word “despicable” in section 3294 created a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.) 

Punitive damages are disfavored by public policy and are allowed only under the most extreme circumstances and in the “clearest of cases.”  (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.)  “To contain the generosity and emotionality of juries, appellate courts have set the threshold high in defining situations in which punitive damages can be given.  Conduct which may be characterized as unreasonable, negligent, grossly negligent or reckless does not satisfy the highly culpable state of mind warranting punitive damages.  Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.”  (Id. at 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)  

Here, the factual allegations in the complaint support a claim for fraud.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants falsely represented in writing under penalty of perjury that they were unable to pay rent because of the COVID 19 pandemic.  (Compl. ¶21.)  Plaintiff attaches the declarations as exhibits to her Complaint.  (Id.)  Plaintiff alleges the representations were in fact false, and Defendants had sufficient assets and income to pay rent notwithstanding any impact from the pandemic.  (Id. ¶23.)  In reliance on the false representations, Plaintiff could not evict Defendants or seek unpaid rent until February 1, 2024.  (Id. ¶24.)  Plaintiff also alleges she was harmed by the false representations in the amount of $196,625 as lost rent.  (Id. ¶¶25-26.)  These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for fraud, and Plaintiff’s claim for fraud entitles her to seek punitive damages.  (Civ. Code, § 3294.)  

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: May 14, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court