Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a car versus pedestrian accident.  Plaintiff Jane Heymann alleges that Defendant Eugene Schwam was driving negligently when he hit Plaintiff with his car.  Plaintiff claims the collision occurred after she parked her car in the west parking lane of Crescent Drive, which is to the right of a bike lane that separates the west parking and southbound traffic lanes, exited her car, and proceeded to walk across the street. Plaintiff also alleges that Schwam was driving his car in the course and scope of his employment at Defendant Hanson & Schwam Public Relations LLC (H&S) when the accident occurred.  Plaintiff further alleges that H&S was negligent in maintaining the car.     

Meanwhile, Schwam claims he was driving at three-five miles per hour approaching a stop sign when Plaintiff walked directly into the path of his car.  According to Schwam, officers who reported to the scene found Plaintiff was at fault for crossing the road outside of a crosswalk and into the path of Defendant’s car.   

At his deposition, Schwam testified that the weather at the time of the collision was clear and sunny and that his view of the roadway was unobstructed. (Manapol Decl., Ex. B, at p. 27, line 17, to p. 28, line 5.)  Defendant admitted in his deposition that he did not see Plaintiff park her car in the west parking lane on Crescent, exit from the driver’s side, or start crossing the street from his right side before he struck her with his car, even though he was traveling on the same side of the street where Plaintiff parked her car. (Id. at p. 27, lines 2-14.)  

Defendant also testified at his deposition that his vision has been tested every four weeks since he was diagnosed with macular degeneration in his left eye eight years ago by his ophthalmologist, Dr. Hamid Hosseini, at the Jules Stein Eye Institute at UCLA. (Id., at p. 17, line 25, to p. 18, line 20.) Schwam testified that the vision in his left eye was 20/20 and that he received injections in his left eye to treat the macular degeneration every four weeks since he was diagnosed. (Id., at p. 19, line 13, to p. 21, line 13.) Defendant also testified that the vision in his right eye was less than 20/20.  He also testified that he had been diagnosed with macular degeneration in his right eye within the last six months and had been receiving injections in that eye since his diagnosis. (Id., at p. 21, lines 2-13.)  

On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff served a deposition subpoena on Jules Stein Eye Institute UCLA and Dr. Hamid Hosseini (the “Subpoena”).  After some back and forth between the parties, Plaintiff reissued a more limited subpoena.  The Subpoena seeks:  

 

Complete medical records from 10/25/13 to present, limited to Eugene Schwam’s eyes/vision, including but not limited to: 

 

All eyes/vision medical records pertaining to examinations, treatment, consultation, x-rays & associated reports, history, laboratory findings, submission and discharge reports, treatment records, diagnosis & prognosis records, nurses’ & doctors’ notes, all medical reports, photographs, video & audio recordings, digital or other images. 

 

All eyes/vision physical, occupational and rehabilitation requests, consultations and progress reports.  

 

All eyes/vision pharmacy/prescription records including NDC numbers and drug information handouts/monographs. 

 

All eyes/vision radiology records & films/CDs including CT scan and MRIs. 

(Ex. F to Swim Decl.) 

This hearing is on Schwam’s motion to quash the Subpoena.  Schwam argues that the Subpoena to Dr. Hosseini seeks irrelevant documents and violates his privacy rights.  As to the Subpoena to Jules Stein Eye Institute, Schwam’s counsel says he recently discovered that Schwam actually did not receive treatment at the Jules Stein Eye Institute.  Counsel’s assertion is not supported by any declaration.      

LEGAL STANDARD  

A¿motion¿to¿quash¿a¿deposition subpoena¿or deposition notice is used to strike, modify, or impose conditions on a subpoena or notice that is procedurally or substantively defective. (See¿Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1987.1, subd. (a), 2025.410, subd. (c).)  Either the nonparty witness who has been subpoenaed or any party to the action may challenge the deposition subpoena.¿¿¿(Weil & Brown,¿Civ. Proc. Before Trial,¿¶¿8:597.)¿¿ 

A motion to quash may be based on various grounds, including that the subpoena seeks information that is not relevant to the issues in the case. (See, e.g.,¿Catholic Mut. Relief Soc'y v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th at 365 (motion to quash deposition subpoena because documents were outside the scope of discovery); cf.¿Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle, L.P. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 122-123¿(motion to quash deposition notice because deposition would not lead to admissible evidence).  The subpoena may also be quashed because it will violate  

the consumer’s right to privacy.  (See, e.g.,¿Fett v. Medical Bd. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 211, 213¿(petitions to quash to subpoena to nonparties’ doctor because of privacy rights);¿Manela v. Superior Court (2009) 117 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150-51¿(motion to quash subpoena to party’s doctor because of privacy rights).) 

ANALYSIS  

Schwam makes three arguments in support of the motion to quash.  First, Schwam argues that his eye/vision medical records are not relevant to the instant case.  For discovery purposes, information should be regarded as “relevant” to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing¿for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Sup.Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)  Admissibility at trial is not required. Rather, the test is whether the information sought might reasonably lead to other evidence that would be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿2017.010.)   

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s poor vision may have caused the accident.  Defendant claims the accident was actually Plaintiff’s fault.  Defendant argues that because he has not put his eyesight at issue, it is irrelevant.  However, that Defendant believes Plaintiff’s theory is meritless is not a basis to argue that documents supporting that theory are irrelevant.   

Notwithstanding, the Court concludes the Subpoena is overbroad.  The Subpoena seeks information relating to Defendant’s eyesight for a 12 year period (from “10/25/13 to present”), including years after the accident took place in October 25, 2023.  It should be limited to documents relating to only a one year period before the accident.     

Second, Schwam argues disclosure of the medical records¿violates his right to privacy. The burden is on “the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion,” and then the court must “weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies.” (Williams v. Sup.Ct. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.)   

The burden is initially on the party asserting a privacy right in the information sought to establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id. at 552.) Once that party does so, “the party seeking the information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy… [and a trial] court must balance these competing considerations.” (Id.) If the party asserting a privacy interest does not make the threshold showing required under Williams, then the court does “not move on to a balancing of interests.” (Id., at 555.) 

Here, Schwam has shown a legally protective privacy interest.  The California Constitution¿protects¿an individual’s right to privacy, including medical¿information. ¿(Cal. Const., art. I, section 1;¿Lantz v. Superior Court¿(1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 1839, 1853.)  “A person’s medical profile is an area of privacy, infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and protected …” (Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 93 Cal.App.3d at 678.) 

Plaintiff argues however that Schwam has not shown an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy or a threatened intrusion that is serious because he voluntarily disclosed his medical condition at his deposition.  In reply, Schwam argues that he did not understand the  implication of Plaintiff’s questions at deposition about his medical condition, and he did not intentionally waive any right to privacy.  Without reaching this question, the Court nevertheless concludes that Plaintiff has shown a countervailing interest in seeking the information, and Schwam has not proposed a feasible alternative that would provide Plaintiff with the information sought without infringing on his privacy rights.   

Sensitive personal information can be ordered disclosed if the information is directly relevant and essential to a fair determination of the action.¿(Alch v. Superior Court¿(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1431-1432.)¿“A particularized need for the information must be established. How compelling this need must be will depend on the importance of the privacy interest involved.”¿(Davies v. Superior Court¿(1984) 36 Cal. 3d 291,304.)¿“Even where the balance weighs in favor of disclosure of private information, the scope of the disclosure will be narrowly circumscribed and is permitted only to the extent necessary for a fair resolution of the lawsuit.”¿(Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 859.) 

Here, the Court concludes Plaintiff has shown a compelling need for the information as she is arguing that Schwam’s eyesight contributed to the accident.  Schwam testified at his deposition that he suffers from macular degeneration in his right and left eye, and that combined with Schwam’s claim he did not see Plaintiff walking in front of his car until he hit her renders information relating to his eyesight relevant to this case.  Further, the scope of disclosure is narrowly circumscribed by the Court’s narrowing of the Subpoena to only records relating to Schwam’s eyesight for a period of one year before the accident.    

Third, Defendant argues that disclosing the records would infringe on the physician-patient privilege. Under California’s Evidence Code, the physician-patient privileges grants a patient the right to decline to disclose, or prohibit¿a third party from disclosing, any “confidential communication” with a medical professional. (Evid. Code, § 994.)¿ The privilege serves two purposes: (1) to prevent humiliation that might follow disclosure of the patient’s ailments, and (2) to encourage the patient’s full disclosure to his or her physician. (Binder v. Superior Court¿(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 893, 898.) 

The¿physician-patient¿privilege¿may¿be¿waived¿through a clear manifestation of an intent to waive.  (Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a);¿Palay v. Superior Court¿(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 926, fn. 7.) Waiver occurs if the person holding the privilege, without coercion, discloses a significant portion of the communication or has consented to disclosure.¿Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure. (Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a).)  For example, a person suing for personal injuries waives the physician-patient privilege. (Evid. Code, § 996.)   

Here, Plaintiff argues that Schwam voluntarily disclosed his medical condition at deposition by testifying about his macular degeneration.  Schwam counters that he did not understand the import of Plaintiff’s question because he is a layperson, and accordingly, his deposition testimony about his medical condition was not a waiver of the physician patient privilege.  Neither party has cited to any cases directly on point.  Notwithstanding, the Court need not resolve this question because the physician-patient privilege does not apply to communications relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient in a proceeding to recover damages due to the conduct of the patient if good cause for disclosure of the communication is shown. (Evid. Code § 999.) 

Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1314-1315, is instructive.  Slagle involved a personal injury action arising from an automobile collision where the plaintiff alleged one of the defendants negligently backed out of a parking space and struck his car, causing him injuries. (Id. at 1311.) The defendants subpoenaed the plaintiff’s medical records from a physician who treated plaintiff’s eyes before the accident based on one of the defendants’ claim that he overheard the plaintiff tell a doctor at the hospital on the day of the accident that he was blind in both eyes six months before the accident. (Id.)  

The plaintiff moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that his medical records were subject to the physician-patient privilege and that the patient-litigant exception to the privilege did not apply because he was not seeking to recover for any injury to his eyes. (Id., at 1312-1313.) The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the records were relevant to plaintiff’s liability for the accident and there was good cause for disclosure of the medical records given plaintiff’s statement to the doctor on the day of the accident that he was blind six months before the accident. (Id. at 1312.)  

The trial court denied the motion to quash, and the plaintiff petitioned for extraordinary relief. (Id.)  In affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash, the court of appeal held that defendants showed good cause that the history of treatment to plaintiff’s eyes was relevant to the cause of the accident sufficient to invoke section 999.  (Id. at 1315.)  

So it is here.  Schwam’s macular degeneration combined with his testimony that he did not see Plaintiff until she stepped in front of his car establishes good cause for the disclosure of the subpoenaed medical records.  The records are relevant to an issue concerning the condition of Schwam’s eyesight in an action to recover damages on account of Schwam’s conduct, e.g., negligent operation of his vehicle.  Thus, under Evid. Code § 999, the physician-patient privilege does not apply.   

Schwam next claims that the subpoena to Jules Eye Institute is moot because, contrary to his deposition testimony, he actually did not seek treatment at the facility.  This assertion is not supported by any declaration, and accordingly, the Court concludes it is not sufficiently supported, and not a basis to quash the subpoena to Jules Stein Eye Institute.   

Finally, the Court addresses the parties’ competing requests for sanctions.  Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410(d) states that the “court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to quash a deposition notice, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”   

Because Defendant did not prevail on his motion to quash, Defendant is not entitled to sanctions under section 2025.410(d).  As to Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should be sanctioned because he intentionally omitted reference to his deposition testimony regarding his eyesight; he omitted any discussion of the exception to the physician patient privilege under Evidence Code section 999; he argued for a standard regarding his right to privacy that was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Williams, and he failed to meet and confer prior to bringing his motion.   

The Court concludes that the imposition of sanctions in this case would be unjust.  The Court credits Defendant’s assertion that he brought this motion in good faith to protect his significant privacy interest in his medical records.  And while defense counsel may have made mistakes regarding the applicable law, the Court concludes these mistakes were inadvertent, and not intentional.  Further, there is no requirement to meet and confer on a motion to¿quash¿brought under¿section 1985.3. (See¿Code Civ. Proc, §§ 1987.1;¿1985.3, subd. (g)¿(meet-and-confer¿required for motion to enforce¿subpoena, but¿no¿similar requirement for motion to¿quash).)  In any event, defense counsel¿has shown he met and conferred extensively on the initial subpoenas at issue here.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to quash the subpoena, subject to the limitation to a one-year period prior to the accident, and DENIES both parties’ requests for sanctions.   

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: March 21, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court