Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This hearing is on Defendant Nariman Naimiakbar’s motion to seal a four-page complaint filed by Plaintiff Tannaz Gerbadi.  The complaint alleges that Defendant committed battery against Plaintiff.  Defendant is the Chief Executive Officer of a burgeoning technology company.  The company and its officers are regularly being reviewed by the business community for possible investment and/or partnership.  Defendant claims the complaint is entirely false; he will be prejudiced if the Complaint is available to the public, and this overriding interest overcomes the right of public access to the records.  In the alternative, Defendant asks that the Court strike the Complaint in its entirety because Plaintiff has now dismissed her Complaint with prejudice.  

MOTION TO SEAL 

An application to seal must be accompanied by a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify sealing. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.551(b)(1).)  Defendant has submitted the requisite declaration explaining the facts which justify sealing.   

A court may order records to be filed under seal when the following conditions are met: “(1) [t]here exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record[s]; (2) [t]he overriding interest supports sealing the record[s]; (3) [a] substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record[s are] not sealed; (4) [t]he proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) [n]o less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.”  (Cal. Rules of Court 2.550(d).) 

In ruling on a motion to seal, the court must identify (1) the specific information claimed to be entitled to protection from public disclosure, (2) the nature of the harm threatened by disclosure, and (3) any countervailing considerations. (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.) Therefore, in order to prevail on his or her motion, the moving party must present a specific enumeration of the facts sought to be withheld and the specific reasons for withholding them. (Id. at 904.) 

The California Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment provides “a right of access to ordinary civil trial and proceedings.” (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1212.)  The court further noted its belief that “the public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial system.”  (Id. at 1210.)  There is a presumption of openness in civil court proceedings. (Id. at 1217.)  Therefore, it is up to this Court to determine if that presumption has been overcome. 

Courts must find compelling reasons, prejudice absent sealing and the lack of less-restrictive means, before ordering filed documents sealed. (Hurvitz v. Hoefflin (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1246; KNBC-TV, 20 Cal.4th at 1208-1209 n. 25; Champion v. Superior Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 777, 787.)   

A person’s right to¿privacy¿may be an¿overriding¿interest¿that supports a¿sealing¿order.  (See¿In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1063¿(“The right to¿privacy¿is an inalienable right guaranteed under the California Constitution, and has been acknowledged as an¿overriding¿interest.”); Advisory Com. com.,¿Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550¿(“[P]rivacy interests … may constitute ‘overriding interests’” warranting¿sealing).) 

A proposed sealing must also be narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest, such as by sealing only portions of pleadings or redacting particular text that refer to the confidential information.  (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1052, 1070.)   

Here, Defendant argues that his right to privacy constitutes an “overriding interest” that overcomes the right of public access and supports sealing the Complaint.  Defendant claims a right to privacy against embarrassing claims made against him in the Complaint, which are damaging to his reputation.   

But it cannot be the rule that a defendant is entitled to a sealing order simply because a complaint denigrates him.  If that were the case, then every complaint would be subject to a motion to seal because it contains unflattering information about the defendant.   

The cases cited by Defendant do not support sealing a complaint simply because it is embarrassing to the defendant.  Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1069-1070 involved an order to seal a plaintiff’s medical records.  Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20, 35 involved financial records identifying donors and amounts donated.  Neither dealt with sealing a complaint simply because it depicted a defendant in a bad light.   

Defendant argues that the allegations here are scurrilous and untrue.  But that’s what almost every defendant argues.  There is nothing unique about Defendant’s position.  And adopting it would warrant sealing every complaint.   

In the alternative, Defendant moves to strike the Complaint as irrelevant because the action has been dismissed.  Defendant fails to satisfy the meet and confer requirements for bringing a motion to strike.   

Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5 requires that before the filing of a motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a)(3).)  There was no meet and confer declaration by Defendant.  Notwithstanding, the Court will consider Defendant’s motion on the merits as the Court cannot deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient (here nonexistent) meet and confer.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a)(4).)  

The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §437.)¿ 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are untrue.  Defendant has not sought judicial notice so the Court may only evaluate his motion based on the Complaint.  Based on the Complaint, the Court cannot conclude that any of Plaintiff’s allegations are false.   

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are irrelevant because Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of her Complaint.  Defendant has not cited to any authority, and the Court has found none, that a request for dismissal means the complaint is now irrelevant and must be stricken.   

The sole case cited by Defendant, Overstock.com Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, does not support his position.  There, plaintiffs submitted a veritable mountain of confidential materials in opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  Entire documents were submitted, when only a page or two were identified as containing matter relevant to the issues.¿ Under these circumstances, the appellate court held the trial court could strike the irrelevant exhibits, negating the need for a motion to seal.  (231 Cal.App.4th at 500.)  Unlike Overstock, there are no confidential documents involved here.   

Defendant also argues that the Complaint was not filed in conformity with the order of the court because it was in violation of the terms of Defendant’s temporary restraining order (“TRO”) which was granted on April 5, 2024.  Defendant points to Item 9 of the TRO which ordered Plaintiff to not, directly or indirectly, “disturb the peace” of Defendant or engage in acts of “coercive control” against Defendant.  The TRO is not the subject of a request for judicial notice, and accordingly, the Court cannot consider it on a motion to strike.  And, in any event, Defendant offers no authority that the filing of a legal pleading can amount to disturbing the peace as contemplated by a TRO.   

     

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to seal or in the alternative motion to strike.  

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: September 19, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court