Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Case: 24SMCV01797, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV01797    Hearing Date: August 15, 2024    Dept: 205

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

BACKGROUND

This is a trespass and quiet title case.  Plaintiffs Lancaster Villas LLC, Hypericum Interests, LLC and DNN Palmdale Land Co. own the real property located at 3472 S. Centinela Avenue, Los Angeles, California (“Plaintiffs’ Property”).  (Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.)  Plaintiffs intend to develop a mixed use building with 32 residential units.  (Id. ¶3.)  Defendant Centinela Ocean View Homeowners Association, Inc. owns the property adjoining Plaintiffs’ Property, located at 3460 S. Centinela, Los Angeles, California (“Defendant’s Property”).  (Id. ¶8.)

Plaintiffs allege that there is a retaining wall on Defendant’s Property that is encroaching on their Property by 16 to 17 inches.  (Id. ¶6.)  Plaintiffs obtained a structural engineering assessment which indicated the retaining wall was a “failed wall” and any demolition on Plaintiffs’ Property would cause the wall to topple.  (Id. ¶5.)  Defendant would not agree to fix the wall until Plaintiffs notified the Los Angeles Department of Building & Safety (“LDBS”) which upon inspection, issued a notice of code violation and instructed Defendant to repair the wall.  (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) 

Only then did Defendant indicate a willingness to repair the wall.  (Id. ¶11.)  But Defendant later told Plaintiffs it did not have funds to proceed.   (Id. ¶12.)  Still later, Defendant said it would replace the wall on October 1, 2023, using Plaintiffs’ contractor, but then the very next day, Defendant retracted and said it would use their own contractor.  (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) 

LDBS told Plaintiffs Defendant was working on a soils report and engineering.  (Id. ¶16.)  Defendant filed for a permit with the LDBS on January 18, 2024, but no action after that day was performed.  (Id. ¶17.) 

On these facts, Plaintiffs allege two claims for (1) trespass and (2) quiet title.  Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a judgment quieting Plaintiffs’ title to that portion of Plaintiffs’ Property on which Defendant’s wall allegedly encroaches. 

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.  Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged malice, oppression or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages. 

MEET AND CONFER

Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5 requires that before the filing of a motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing its meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(3).)  Defendant submits the Declaration of Anthony Castillo-Mendoza which shows the parties met and conferred by telephone on June 25, 2024, at least five days before Defendant filed its motion to strike on July 5, 2024.  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of §435.5.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.  Defendant argues Plaintiffs have only made conclusory allegations that they are entitled to punitive damages without stating facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  The Court agrees.  

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4^th 1253, 1255.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (citations omitted).) 

Allegations that merely plead the statutory phraseology are wholly insufficient to state a basis for recovery of punitive damages.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4^th 1033, 1041.)  Conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct as willful, intentional or fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of the necessary factual grounds for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)   

Cal. Civ. Code section 3294 provides the basis upon which punitive damages can be recovered.  Punitive damages may only be sought where there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud:

(c)(1)   “Malice” means conduct which is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or                       despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and                       conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(c)(2)   “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust                        hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(c)(3)   “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of a                      material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the                                                      defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise

causing injury.

(Civ. Code §3294.)

Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to increase the burden of proof required in order to allege a punitive damages claim as well as to raise the level of misconduct necessary for an award of punitive damages.  The California Supreme Court has ruled that the insertion of the word “despicable” in section 3294 created a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4^th 704, 725.)  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 702, 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.)

Punitive damages are disfavored by public policy and are allowed only under the most extreme circumstances and in the “clearest of cases.”  (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.)  “To contain the generosity and emotionality of juries, appellate courts have set the threshold high in defining situations in which punitive damages can be given.  Conduct which may be characterized as unreasonable, negligent, grossly negligent or reckless does not satisfy the highly culpable state of mind warranting punitive damages.  Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.”  (Id. at 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)

Here, the factual allegations in the Complaint do not support a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  Paragraph 23 of the Complaint states: “Plaintiffs are informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants knew that they were using, taking, and occupying property not part of the Centinela Property, without Plaintiffs’ consent, the rightful owner of the Lancaster Property, when the trespass first began. However, even if Defendants’ initial occupancy of the Lancaster Property was merely negligent, Defendants’ continued occupancy of the portion of the Lancaster Property after being apprised of the trespass was willful, oppressive, malicious and with conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights.”

There are no facts to support an allegation that Defendant intended to injure Plaintiffs.  A conclusory allegation of an intent to injure is insufficient.  Absent a specific intent to injure Plaintiff, both malice and oppression require despicable conduct.  (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4^th 704, 713, 725.)  Defendant’s continued occupancy after they were apprised of the trespass and its foot-dragging in repairing the wall is not despicable conduct.

The Complaint alleges that in late 2022, the LDBS tagged the wall and told Defendant to repair it. (Compl. ¶10.)  In April 2023, Defendant indicated a willingness to comply with Plaintiffs’ requests to move the wall back, but indicated thereafter, that Defendant did not have the funds to proceed.  (Id. ¶¶11-12.)  Rather than use Plaintiffs’ contractor, in August 2023 Defendant indicated it would retain its own contractor to perform the work.  (Id. ¶ 14.)  Finally, in December 2023, LDBS informed Plaintiffs that Defendant was obtaining a soils report, and in January 2024, Defendants filed for a permit. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.)  These factual allegations do not rise to the level of “despicable conduct.”  At most, it shows an association that is actively attempting to correct the problem, despite potentially having insufficient funds to fix the wall. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2024                                                    ___________________________

Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court